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ABSTRACT 
Why do people support the harsh punishment of criminal offenders? This dissertation 
starts from the premise that views about punishment go far beyond concerns about 
crime and security. Punishment is a central component of the social order and a means 
by which social order is produced. It follows that ideological preferences will be crucial 
in understanding people’s punitive reactions. People who have a preference for 
collective security might support punishment to restore order and cohesion. Yet, by 
committing crime, offenders also seem to gain power in society and punishment can 
restore the status quo. Punishment might therefore have positive value for people 
motivated to achieve social order (people high in right-wing authoritarianism, RWA) as 
well as for people motivated to achieve power and dominance (people high in social 
dominance orientation, SDO). In this dissertation I build on criminological and social-
psychological research to propose a dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes. I 
examine whether the effects of RWA and SDO are mediated by different beliefs about 
crime and symbolic motives of punishment (Paper 1) and whether they predict different 
retributive goals of punishment (Paper 2). Finally, I explore the circumstances under 
which RWA and SDO predict punitive attitudes (Papers 3 and 4). The four papers 
presented in this dissertation suggest that there are, indeed, two ideological antecedents 
to punitive attitudes. High RWA individuals favoured harsh punishment to restore 
collective security, maintain hierarchies and avoid powerful criminals disrupting social 
order.  High SDO’s did so to establish and maintain power and status hierarchies in 
society. However, the effect of SDO was limited to situations where crime was 
associated with a competitive situation. Punitiveness seems to be related to a group-
based competition for status and power with criminal offenders. Yet, high SDO 
individuals are not predisposed to think of criminal offenders as threats to hierarchies.  
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PREFACE 
This document constitutes my PhD submission to the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. The PhD programme at the Methodology Institute allows a paper 
based format that differs from the usual dissertation format. A paper based thesis 
unavoidably entails some repetition of the concepts and theory in each paper. The 
introductory chapter of this document outlines the main argument and contribution of 
this dissertation, presents research questions and a brief overview of the empirical 
component. The conceptual and theoretical chapter discusses how punitive attitudes 
have been defined and measured, and outlines different models that have been proposed 
to explain people’s support for punitive responses to law-breakers. A social-
psychological perspective of punitive attitudes is then proposed to build on previous 
research.  The dual-process motivational model of ideological attitudes, right-wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are described and discussed in the 
context of punitive attitudes. The fourth chapter starts with a summary and presents 
hypotheses of the different empirical papers in this dissertation. Four papers are then 
presented. The second paper (‘Retribution as revenge and just deserts: On the 
relationship between two dimensions of retribution, ideological dispositions and the 
harsh treatment of criminal offenders’) is a joint-authored paper (with Jonathan 
Jackson), for which I contributed 80 per cent of the work. The other three papers are my 
own. The final section summarises the findings, discusses the limitations of the 
presented studies and future avenues for research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Ideology and punitive attitudes 
People differ in their beliefs, theories and expectations of how society should be 
structured and the ways in which people and institutions ought to behave. Some people 
have a preference for stability, cohesion and tradition; they believe that the role of 
society and its institutions is to assure order and security. Others value diversity, change 
and freedom; they believe that society should work to facilitate human growth 
(Tomkins, in Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Different ideological beliefs 
about the proper moral and political order of society serve as guidelines for social 
judgment, and shape the value that people assign to groups, social practices and 
institutions (Pratto, 1999). For example, those who have a preference for social 
cohesion and stability might find comfort in strong institutions that can help to ensure 
order, security and moral alignment in society.  
One such institution is the criminal justice system. The core function of the 
criminal justice system is to maintain social order by preventing crime and punishing 
criminal offenders. Crucially, however, crime prevention policies do not only work to 
reduce crime, but also “address some of the deeper emotional or affective dimensions of 
crime and its place in society” (Freiberg, 2001, p. 265). Highlighting the expressive and 
symbolic function of crime and punishment in society, Durkheim (1964, 1973) argued 
that crime threatens the normative order, and that punishment can help clarifying moral 
boundaries and bringing back order and security to society. The punishment of rule-
breakers is thus a central component of any social order, and people’s ideological 
preferences of how social order should be achieved are key in understanding their 
beliefs about the proper role of judicial institutions and their support for crime and 
punishment policies. Those who have ideological preferences to live in highly cohesive 
and stable societies may favour punitive policies because strong punishment can be 
perceived as reinforcing social order.  
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Ideological attitudes have been argued to affect people’s views about criminals, 
their theories about the causes of crime, and their beliefs about appropriate institutional 
reactions to rule-breaking (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987). Carroll et al. 
(1987) explain this association in terms of resonances between ideological beliefs, 
beliefs about the causes of crime, and attitudes towards punishment. The conservative 
political right, on the one hand, believes that crime is committed by those who lack 
moral conscience and self-control, and that harsh punishment can bring offenders back 
on the right track. The liberal political left, on the other hand, thinks that the causes of 
crime can be found in structural economical inequalities and problems of 
discrimination, with the solution lying in reforming the system and rehabilitating 
offenders. Consistent with this argument, the support for harsh sentencing of criminal 
offenders seems to be a right-wing phenomenon: conservatives tend to be more punitive 
towards offenders than liberals (Baron & Hartnagel, 1996; Carroll et al., 1987; Hogan, 
Chiricos, & Gertz, 2005; Johnson, 2009; King & Maruna, 2009; Tetlock et al., 2007; 
Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010). Unnever et al. (2007, p. 313) 
even suggest that punitive attitudes and political conservatism are “two peas in the same 
pod”. 
 This dissertation lies precisely at the intersection between ideological 
preferences and attitudes towards punitive policies. Punitive attitudes – that is, people’s 
preferences for assigning harsh punitive measures to criminal offenders – seem to be 
deeply ideological in nature. Yet, how exactly does ideology affect the endorsement of 
harsh sentencing? Criminological research has observed that conservative people tend to 
favour harsh sentencing, but conservatism is often considered as a background variable 
(e.g. King & Maruna, 2009). Research in social and political psychology, on the other 
hand, has proposed models to explain the relationship between ideological attitudes, and 
a range of attitudes towards inter-group violence (e.g. military action, Cohrs, Moschner, 
Maes, & Kielmann, 2005) and prejudice (e.g. Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du 
Plessis, & Birum, 2002). Thus far, however, less attention has been paid to 
understanding the mechanisms by which ideology affects people’s desire for harsh 
punishment.  
Understanding people’s support for institutional reactions to rule breaking is 
important not the least because people’s support for punitive stances shape penal 
policies in an era where penal policies are determined based just as much on public as 
on expert’s opinion (Garland, 2001a). Roberts and Hough (2002, p. 34) state: “Simply 
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put, politicians are reluctant to create, and judges slow to impose, community 
punishments if the general public is perceived to be hostile”. Taken to an extreme, many 
(e.g. Pratt, 2007; Roberts & Hough, 2005) have referred to a phenomenon called ‘penal 
populism’, that is, a situation where penal policies are determined to win votes rather 
than to promote justice.  
Penal populism becomes particularly relevant in a context where the public 
demands stronger sentences for criminal offences. In Europe, in all 26 countries 
considered by the European Social Survey (ESS Round 5: European Social Survey 
Round 5 Data, 2010), more than 40% of those questioned agreed with the use of stiffer 
sentences for law-breakers. In the United Kingdom, 77% favoured harsher sentences, 
and this number was even higher in countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria (85 and 
88%, respectively). In line with public attitudes, the implementation of punitive 
measures has become more widespread during the last decades. Imprisonment rates 
have increased all over the world, despite the fact that crime rates have been decreasing 
(Lacey, 2008; see also Garland, 2001b).   
 
1.2 This dissertation: a social psychological approach to punitive attitudes 
The aim of this dissertation is to propose a social psychological perspective to 
account for the public’s support for the use of harsh sentences for criminal offenders. In 
a series of studies, this dissertation draws upon criminological, political psychological 
and social psychological research to explore the role that ideological attitudes have in 
shaping people’s demands for tougher sentences from the justice system, as well as their 
beliefs about the goals punishment should achieve. Drawing on a motivated social 
cognition perspective, I argue that the key to understanding why ideology affects public 
attitudes towards punishment lies in the goals that lead people to adopt different 
ideological beliefs in the first place. A motivated social-cognition perspective (Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost et al., 2003) understands ideologies as being driven by 
psychological needs and motivations, with people’s motivational goals affecting the 
endorsement of certain ideologies, as these help satisfying psychological needs 
(Jost et al., 2009, 2003). Motivationally driven ideologies, in turn, lead people to assign 
positive or negative value to punishment, to the extent that it is perceived as sustaining 
or detracting a specific goal in society. 
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Tetlock and his collaborators (Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2007; see also 
Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Rucker, 
Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004) have proposed a motivated approach to punitiveness. 
The authors argue that people internalise the normative order, and will defend rules and 
support harsh punishment. They do so in particular when they are ideologically 
predisposed or are situationally induced to believe that the normative order is being 
threatened. From a motivated social cognition perspective, then, conservatives might 
favour harsh punishment to restore values and collective security. This is in part 
consistent with a value restoration motive of punishment (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). 
Value restoration is concerned with the extent to which offences damage shared values 
and challenge the legitimacy of social bonds and consensus, disturbing social order 
(Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Harsh punishment symbolically labels the offence as 
wrong, restoring people’s faith in shared values (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Rucker et 
al., 2004; Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980).  
Yet, crime not only affects value consensus. Breaking the rules symbolises 
power as offenders seem to be free to behave the way they like (Van Kleef, Homan, 
Finkenauer, Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011; see also Miller, 2001). Criminal offenders 
committing crime can be perceived in terms of zero-sum beliefs: the more power and 
resources criminal offenders gain, the less power and resources there remain for the rest 
of society. Consistent with a status and power restoration motive of punishment, harsh 
sentences can be perceived as a way of enhancing status differentials by degrading the 
offender’s status and power (Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Wenzel & 
Thielmann, 2006). This is particularly relevant if one considers that the criminal justice 
system is more likely to apply harsh punishment against people in subordinate social 
groups (Garland, 2001b; Green, Thomsen, Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius, Staerklé, 
& Potanina, 2009; Mitchell & Sidanius, 1995; Sidanius, Mitchell, & Navarrete, 2006). 
This perceived status and power restoration function of punishment suggests that 
punishment might have positive value not only for people motivated to achieve social 
order and value consensus, but also for those who are ideologically motivated to achieve 
power and dominance and have a preference to live in highly unequal societies. It is 
therefore important to consider both motivational goals when exploring people’s 
punitive reactions, and this is where a dual-motivational model of ideological attitudes 
(Duckitt, 2001) comes in. 
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1.2.1 A dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes 
Harsh punitive policies can be perceived as communicating two different 
messages in society. On the one hand, crime threatens stability, social order and shared 
values, while harsh punishment communicates that the offence was wrong and restores 
people’s faith in shared values (value restoration). On the other hand, by committing 
crime, criminal offenders seem to gain power over society and one way of restoring the 
status quo is by degrading the offender’s status and power (status and power 
restoration). Therefore, while ideological beliefs might be important to understand 
people’s preferences for harsh punitive policies, more than one ideological attitude 
might play a role.  
In line with a dual-motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001) 
two conservative ideologies may be relevant to punitive attitudes: right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). RWA and SDO are 
argued to be ideological expressions of different motivational goals, which are made 
salient by different social worldviews and predisposed by different personalities and 
socialisations (see for a review Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). It follows that even if they will 
both predict the support for harsh sentencing they will do so for different reasons. 
Duckitt (2009) has argued that high RWA individuals value collective security and in-
group conformity and they are likely to favour harsh punitive policies to restore social 
order, values and security in society. This is consistent with a value restoration motive 
of punishment, with the exception that Duckitt’s approach considers security issues in 
addition to value consensus. High SDO individuals, on the other hand, value power and 
dominance over out-groups and they should support stiffer sentences to restore status 
and power relationships in society.  
In this dissertation I explore the role of ideological attitudes in shaping people’s 
support for harsh punishment of criminal offenders. Given that two conservative 
ideological attitudes seem to be relevant to punitiveness, I focus on examining the 
different reasons and circumstances under which RWA and SDO predict punitive 
attitudes. In the following pages I briefly discuss each ideology (longer discussions are 
presented in the conceptual review of this dissertation), their relationships with punitive 
attitudes, as well as questions that remain unsolved. I then move on to describe the 
research questions and contributions, as well as to give an overview of the empirical 
component of this dissertation. 
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1.2.2 Right-wing authoritarianism and punitive attitudes 
People high in RWA are motivated to achieve collective security and in-group 
conformity and will assign positive value to policies and institutions that can help to 
control social threats and assure order and security in society (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). 
Duckitt (2009; see also Tam, Leung, & Chiu, 2008) has argued that people high in 
RWA should favour punitive measures to uphold the social order, security and in-group 
conformity. High RWA individuals are also submissive towards authorities and should 
be more likely to endorse harsh punishment of criminal offenders to the extent that it is 
undertaken by legal authorities. This is, people high in RWA should favour harsh 
punishment both in terms of the role that punishment is perceived to play in society 
(maintain social order) and the institution in charge of carrying it out (authorities). 
Research has consistently found an association between RWA and punitive and 
retributive reactions to criminal offences (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998; Capps, 2002; 
Carroll et al., 1987; Feather, 1998; Funke, 2005; Lerner et al., 1998; Unnever & Cullen, 
2010), including the support for the death penalty (Tyler & Weber, 1982; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2010). People high in RWA consider crimes to be more serious (e.g. Altemeyer, 
1981, 1998; Feather, 1996) allegedly because crime constitutes a threat to security and 
order, as well as a violation to legitimate social norms that are sanctioned by authorities 
(Feather, 1996). They are also more likely to support mandatory sentences (Feather & 
Souter, 2002). But people high in RWA are not always punitive: some research has 
shown that people high in RWA are concerned about respectable groups being 
victimised while they are accepting of illegal acts committed by the government 
(Altemeyer, 1998). Similarly, Feather (1998) found that people high in RWA 
considered an offence as more serious than people low in RWA when it was committed 
by a protester. But the relationship was inversed when the offender was a police officer. 
While there is agreement in that high RWA individuals are highly punitive, 
some questions remain open. First, the reasons why RWA predicts punitive attitudes are 
underexplored. Duckitt (2009) has argued that people high in RWA will support 
punitive policies to restore social order and in-group conformity. Yet, no research to my 
knowledge has tested whether a motive to restore collective security actually mediates 
the effect of RWA on punitive attitudes. 
Second, little is known about how social circumstances activate the effect of 
RWA on punitive attitudes. As argued by Duckitt and Sibley (2010) in relation to 
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prejudice, RWA should be a stronger predictor when the in-group’s collective security, 
stability and cohesion are threatened by an out-group. It follows that they should be 
especially punitive towards criminal offenders perceived to deviate from common 
norms and values, or when the social circumstances are perceived to be dangerous. 
Stenner (2005; see also Feldman & Stenner, 1997) showed that people’s authoritarian 
predispositions interacted with perceptions of threat to the normative order in affecting 
the support for harsh punishment. This is consistent with a wide body of research on the 
relationship between social threat and authoritarianism (see Cohrs & Ibler, 2009). Yet, 
the mechanism by which social threat strengthens the relationship between 
authoritarianism and punitive attitudes is less clear. Does threat activate 
authoritarianism in general or does it increase the salience of crime as disturbing social 
order and value consensus? 
Third, harsh punitive policies might have conflicting meaning for high RWA 
individuals. On the one hand, they are likely to endorse punishment because they feel 
that crime disturbs social order and because it is undertaken by legal authorities. But 
legal authorities are usually also committed to following legal and fair procedures, 
which should limit the harshness of punishment. Research so far has shown that people 
high in RWA endorse a wide range of different –and often inconsistent- goals of 
punishment: they favour retributive reactions to criminal offences (e.g. Carroll et al., 
1987), the restoration of moral balance (Colémont, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2011), 
deterrence and incapacitation, but not personal revenge (McKee & Feather, 2008). More 
research is required to examine under what circumstances high RWA individuals will 
endorse different goals of punishment. 
Last but not least, most RWA scales (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, Bizumic, 
Krauss, & Heled, 2010) include items that refer either explicitly (e.g. ‘Being kind to 
loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your weakness, so 
it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them’, Duckitt et al., 2010) or 
implicitly (e.g. ‘We should smash all the negative elements that are causing trouble in 
our society’, Duckitt et al., 2010) to crime and punishment issues.  Importantly, it is 
often difficult to distinguish conceptually and practically between authoritarian 
aggression and punitive reactions. More research is needed to evaluate whether RWA 
remains a significant predictor of punitiveness when these items are excluded from its 
measurement.  
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Overall, ideological views about the role of authorities in society seem to be key 
in explaining punitive reactions. People high in RWA are concerned about maintaining 
collective security and in-group conformity and they arguably will support harsh 
punishment to restore value consensus and security. Yet, more research is required to 
understand the mechanisms by which RWA affects punitiveness. 
 
1.2.3 Social dominance orientation and punitive attitudes 
People might favour harsh punishment to restore values and security threatened 
by crime. In addition, by committing crime offenders show disrespect and assume 
superiority over the victim and society (Miller, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2011). 
Ideological preferences to live in unequal societies can therefore also play a role in 
explaining punitive attitudes. People high in SDO are motivated to achieve power and 
dominance and favour policies and institutions that are perceived as helping to establish 
and maintain inequalities and social hierarchies (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). They are 
likely to perceive criminal offenders as competing for power and resources and crime as 
a threat to hierarchical relationships in society. Furthermore, they might perceive the 
offenders’ gain in power  in terms of zero-sum beliefs: the more power and resources 
gained by the offender, the less power and resources that remain for superior groups 
(Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2011). High SDO individuals should favour punishment 
to restore status and power relationships (Duckitt, 2009). Since they also lack empathy, 
they should be less caring for the wellbeing of criminal offenders (Duckitt, 2009)1.  
At a societal macro-level the relationship between punishment and inequality 
has been widely discussed in the literature. According to a Marxist tradition (for a 
review see Garland, 1990) punishment is a social artefact that serves the function of 
maintaining the power of dominant groups. For this tradition, punishment goes beyond 
the control of crime to the control of disadvantaged classes. It is thus embedded in the 
class struggle between rich and poor and serves the interests of only one part of society. 
In this context, punishment is understood as a class domination instrument through 
                                               
1 This is in line with Unnever and Cullen’s (2009) argument that conservatives are punitive precisely 
because they lack empathy towards criminals. The authors summarize an extensive body of literature 
showing the link between empathy and punitiveness. They reason that people who are able to 
empathically identify with offenders are less supportive of harsh sentencing because -among other 
reasons- they are more inclined to understand the offender and imagine the suffering that punishment 
would exert over them. 
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which dominant classes protect their property. In words of Sidanius et al. (2006, p. 436) 
“the use of harsh criminal sanctions, including the death penalty and severe torture, is 
not only a means of maintaining social order, but also a means of maintaining the 
hierarchical nature of this social order”.  
Punishment serves a hierarchy enhancing function in that the criminal justice 
system is more likely to apply harsh punishment against people of subordinate social 
groups (Green et al., 2009; Mitchell & Sidanius, 1995; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; 
Sidanius et al., 2006)2. This is so widespread that “one can easily identify which social 
groups are subordinate within a social system by simply noting which groups are 
overrepresented in that society’s prisons, dungeons, or execution chambers” (Sidanius et 
al., 2006, p. 435). According to Sidanius and Pratto (2001) the criminal justice system 
protects the privileges of dominant groups. There are, according to the authors, five 
principles of discrimination within the criminal justice system: (a) the criminal justice 
system assigns disproportionaly high negative sanctions to people from subordinate 
groups, (b) the criminal justice system applies particularly tough sentences to people 
from subordinate groups committing crime against people from dominant groups (see 
Farrell & Swigert, 1978 for individual level data on this relationship), (c) hierarchy 
enhancing actors within the criminal justice system (e.g. police) should display high 
levels of social dominance orientation, while those actors that attenuate hierarchies (e.g. 
public defenders) should display low levels of social dominance orientation; (d) the 
abuse of power from security forces (in particular against people from subordinate 
groups) will receive small negative sanctions or even be rewarded; and (e) the extent to 
which the criminal justice system applies terror to maintain hierarchies will depend on 
the degree of social hierarchy in a given context (see also Mitchell & Sidanius, 1995).  
Western (2006) has studied the link between punishment and inequality in the 
United States and has shown the immense class inequalities in imprisonment rates (see 
also for a review, Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). One striking figure is that at the end of the 
1990s, a thirty year old black man had a higher chance to have been to prison than to 
have finished a four-year degree in college. But punishment is not only unequally 
distributed, the penal system also increases the levels of inequality by reducing the 
chances of disadvantaged groups even further. Former inmates have a hard time finding 
                                               
2 At the same time, it can also be argued that the justice system increases status differentials by choosing 
to penalise crimes that are associated to low-class criminals, although no research to my knowledge has 
tested this proposition. 
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a job and earn lower wages. Incarceration also affects marital relations and the family as 
a whole, increasing the risk of violence within the family. Consistent with the argued 
macro-level relationship between social inequalities and punishment, Mitchell and 
Sidanius (1995) found that the social hierarchy of U.S. states (measured as an index of 
class, race, income and political inequalities) was associated with a greater number of 
executions, controlling for a range of variables.  
At an individual level of analysis, ideological preferences for group-based 
dominance (as expressed by SDO) have also been found to predict the support for harsh 
criminal sanctions (Sidanius et al., 2006), vengeance (McKee & Feather, 2008), general 
punitiveness (Capps, 2002), law and order policies, painful executions and the belief in 
retribution (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). In line with research on 
prejudice (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), however, high SDO individuals should express 
negative attitudes towards low status out-groups or out-groups perceived to compete for 
dominance. It follows that SDO should predict the support of harsh punishment of low-
status criminals, but should not relate to punitiveness towards high-status criminals, 
such as white collar offenders. Consistent with this argument, Kemmelmeier (2005) 
conducted a mock-jury study and found that SDO moderated the Black sentencing bias. 
Remarkably, this interaction was qualified by two opposing biases: Respondents high in 
SDO were found to be more likely to assign harsher sentences to Black defendants 
while respondents low in SDO did so to White defendants. Low SDO individuals are 
sensitive towards social inequalities and sought to attenuate inequalities annulling unfair 
advantages for White defendants. High SDO individuals, on the other hand, sought to 
enhance inequalities by being harsher on Black defendants. Interestingly, Green et al. 
(2009) found that SDO was positively related to perceptions of negativity, 
prototypicality and extremety of an offender portrayed as being part of an out-group 
(Arab offender), but not when he was portrayed as being part of the in-group (Swiss 
offender). The latter provides evidence that punishment can be used as a hierarchy-
enhancing strategy. 
The mentioned research suggests a strong link between SDO and punitive 
attitudes: People high in SDO seem to favour harsh punishment to maintain group-
based hierarchies. Yet, again, a number of issues remain unsolved. First, most studies 
that have found effects of SDO have failed to control for RWA. Furthermore, there are 
inconsistent findings on whether SDO predicts punitiveness over and above the effect of 
RWA. Only three studies to my knowledge have looked at the joint effects of RWA and 
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SDO on punitive attitudes. Two of these studies (Colémont et al., 2011; McKee & 
Feather, 2008) found that SDO became a non-significant predictor of punitiveness after 
RWA was controlled for, while the third study (Capps, 2002) found a significant effect 
of SDO even after controlling for RWA. As discussed above, RWA scales often include 
items on crime and punishment and this might enhance its effect. It thus remains to be 
seen whether SDO predicts punitiveness controlling for a measure of RWA that 
excludes items on punishment.  
Second, Jost and Thompson (2000) have provided evidence that SDO measures 
two different concepts: groups-based dominance (GBD) and opposition to equality 
(OEQ). OEQ is described as a general preference for inequality, while GBD is 
concerned specificially with the desire to see one’s in-group dominating over outgroups 
(see also Ho et al., 2012; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010). Importantly, GBD and OEQ 
have been found to relate in different ways to justice attitudes (McKee & Feather, 
2008): only GBD predicted harsh punitive reactions (Ho et al., 2012; Okimoto et al., 
2011) and capital punishment (McKee & Feather, 2008). OEQ, on the other hand, was 
negatively related to rehabilitation (McKee & Feather, 2008) and restorative justice 
(Okimoto et al., 2011). These findings suggest that people high in SDO favour harsh 
punishment to establish a position of dominance over criminal offenders more than to 
justify inequalities more broadly. Therefore, combining GBD and OEQ might blur their 
distinctive effects. Further research is required to evaluate when one or the other will be 
relevant to punitive attitudes.  
Third, little is known about the mechanisms by which SDO affects punitiveness. 
Research in other areas has shown that high SDO individuals support violent measures 
because of a lack of concern for the wellbeing of others (see for research on the support 
for war, McFarland, 2005), while the effect of SDO on attitudes towards out-groups is 
mediated by perceptions of competition towards these groups (Duckitt, 2006). Yet, no 
study has looked at the reasons why high SDO individuals support harsh punishment3. 
Even less is known about the social circumstances under which SDO predicts 
punitiveness. SDO should become a stronger predictor of attitudes when the social 
conditions are perceived to be competitive (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Some research in 
other areas has supported this claim. For example, research has shown that SDO 
                                               
3 There is one study conducted by Sidanius et al. (2006) that found that beliefs about retribution and 
deterrence mediated the effect of SDO on harsh punishment.  These mediators, however, were presented 
as legitimising beliefs and do little to explain the reasons why people high in SDO favour punishment. 
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becomes a stronger predictor of intergroup attitudes when the in-group status is attacked 
(Pratto & Shih, 2000) or when status differentials or status concerns are salient (Pratto, 
1999). At a country level, SDO is a stronger predictor of attitudes towards immigrants 
in countries where immigrants have a higher relative unemployment rate (Cohrs & 
Stelzl, 2010). However, none of these studies have examined the social conditions under 
which SDO predicts punitiveness. 
Fourth, little research has examined the goals of punishment that people high in 
SDO support. Specifically, SDO has been found to predict personal vengeance (McKee 
& Feather, 2008), while evidence on its relationship with retribution and deterrence are 
mixed (Colémont et al., 2011; Sidanius et al., 2006). One particular question is whether 
high SDO individuals will only support using violence against offences that have 
personal implications or if they will also support state-sponsored responses to get even 
with criminal offenders in general. 
Overall, ideological preferences for power and dominance over out-groups seem 
to play a role in shaping people’s sentencing preferences. Crucially, punishment can be 
argued to serve a hierarchy enhancing function by reducing the opportunities of 
subordinate groups even further. High SDO individuals, favouring unequal social 
relations, might value an institution such as the criminal justice system to the extent that 
it helps establishing and maintaining hierarchical social relations. However, little 
research has tested this proposition so far.  
 
1.3 Research questions and contribution 
The following pages give a general overview of the main research questions of 
this dissertation and its contribution to the current literature. Chapter 2 defines the main 
concepts and theoretical perspectives that will then allow specifying more detailed 
hypotheses about the relationships between ideological preferences and punitive 
attitudes. Chapter 3 starts by summarising the empirical component of this dissertation 
and describes each hypothesis in detail. 
The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to look at the relationship between 
ideological preferences and the support for harsh sentencing of criminal offenders. An 
extensive body of research has developed in political psychology and criminology on 
the link between ideology and punitive attitudes (Baron & Hartnagel, 1996; Carroll et 
al., 1987; Hogan et al., 2005; Johnson, 2009; King & Maruna, 2009; Miller, 1973; 
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Tetlock et al., 2007; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010). However, 
less attention has been paid to the processes by which ideological beliefs affect people’s 
support for harsh sentencing.  
This doctoral dissertation draws on a motivated social-cognition perspective to 
extend research on the social-psychological basis of punitive attitudes. From this 
perspective, people assign positive or negative value to punishment to the extent that it 
is perceived as sustaining or detracting a specific motivation that is relevant to their 
ideological views. Two such motivations have been discussed to be important to 
understand punitiveness. First, punishment can have positive value for people who are 
motivated to achieve collective security and in-group conformity (this is, people high in 
RWA) as strong punitive responses can be perceived to restore common values and 
order in society. Second, punishment can also be thought of as a means by which social 
inequalities are maintained. It follows that those who are motivated to achieve power 
and dominance over out-groups (this is, people high in SDO) will also see punishment 
in a positive light. Therefore, and in line with a dual-motivational perspective (Duckitt, 
2001), this dissertation explores whether both RWA and SDO predict punitive attitudes 
and whether they do so for different reasons and under different circumstances. This 
dissertation will address the following overarching research question:  
 
Q.  How do right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation relate to 
the endorsement of harsh punishment?  
 
In particular, this research seeks to address a number of issues that remain 
unexplained in the literature on the relationship between RWA, SDO and punitive 
attitudes. First, while both RWA (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998) and SDO (e.g. Sidanius 
et al., 2006) have been shown to predict punitiveness, there is less clarity about whether 
they are important predictors after controlling for each other. It is of particular interest 
to examine the effect of RWA when items on the punishment of criminal offenders are 
excluded from its measurement. At the same time, it remains to be seen whether both 
subscales of SDO – GBD and OEQ – are relevant to punitive attitudes. Therefore, the 
first question of this dissertation is as follows: 
  
Q1.  Do RWA and SDO predict unique variance in punitive attitudes?  
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Second, there is also little research into the different mechanisms by which 
RWA and SDO affect the endorsement of punitive attitudes. In line with a dual-
motivational perspective of punitive attitudes (Duckitt, 2009), while both RWA and 
SDO should predict attitudes they should do so for different reasons and under different 
circumstances. Three hypotheses have been suggested to evaluate the dual-motivational 
model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009): the differential mediation hypothesis, the differential 
effects hypothesis and the differential moderation hypothesis. The remaining research 
questions seek to address each of these hypotheses in turn.  
According to the differential mediation hypothesis, RWA and SDO should 
predict attitudes for different reasons and different mediations should therefore be 
observed. While an important number of studies have looked at the different reasons 
why RWA and SDO predict intergroup attitudes (e.g. Duckitt, 2006; McFarland, 2005), 
little research has examined possible mediators of the effects of RWA and SDO on the 
support for punitive policies4. Therefore, the second question of this research is the 
following: 
 
Q2.  Why do people high in RWA and SDO endorse the harsh sentencing of criminal 
offenders?  
 
In line with the differential effects hypothesis, while RWA and SDO should both 
affect attitudes in general, they should also clearly predict different specific outcomes. 
For example, Duckitt and Sibley (2007) found that RWA predicted prejudice towards 
dangerous groups, only SDO predicted prejudice towards derogated groups and both 
predicted prejudice towards dissident groups. In this dissertation, I examine whether 
RWA and SDO predict the support for different retributive goals of punishment and 
attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders. In particular, I distinguish 
between retribution as just deserts and revenge and examine their relationships with 
ideological dispositions (RWA and SDO) and attitudes towards the treatment of 
criminal offenders (harsh sentences and the denial of fair sentencing processes). While 
there is some previous research on the relationship between RWA, SDO and 
                                               
4 There is one study of Feather (1996) that shows that high RWA’s tend to perceive offences as more 
serious than low’s. In addition, Sidanius et al. (2006) showed that beliefs about retribution and deterrence 
mediated the effect of SDO on harsh punishment. These mediators, however, do little to explain why 
people high in RWA and SDO support harsh punishment and how these motives differ. 
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punishment goals, results are conflicting (Colémont et al., 2011; Sidanius et al., 2006).  
The third question of this dissertation is as follows: 
 
Q3.  Do people high in RWA and SDO support different retributive goals of 
punishment and attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders?  
 
Finally, the differential moderation hypothesis states that the effects of RWA 
and SDO should be moderated by different conditions. Previous research has shown that 
RWA and SDO interact with certain conditions in predicting attitudes (e.g. Thomsen, 
Green, & Sidanius, 2008). Yet, no research so far has looked at the differential 
conditions that activate the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. This 
dissertation explores whether the salience of different worldviews (dangerous and 
competitive) and of different social categories (social attitudes in general or criminal 
offenders as a group) activate the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. The 
fourth and final question of this dissertation is: 
 
Q4.  Under what circumstances do RWA and SDO predict punitiveness?  
 
By addressing these issues, this doctoral dissertation expects to contribute to two 
fields of research. First, it seeks to contribute to the criminological debate on the public 
support for the use of harsh sentences with criminal offenders. Previous research has 
looked at the role of perceptions of moral decline and social anxieties in predicting 
punitive reactions (e.g. King & Maruna, 2009; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2010). However, less research has looked at the individual differences that lead 
people to worry about moral decline and social anxieties in the first place. This 
dissertation explores people’s perceptions about the threats posed by crime. But it 
extends this research by looking at the ideological preferences that make people more 
sensitive towards specific threats and more likely to endorse punitive measures. Second, 
this dissertation seeks to contribute to the field of political psychology. The dual-
motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001) has been found useful for 
explaining different interpersonal processes, such as prejudice, attitudes towards 
violence, among others (see for a review Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). But until now it has 
only been suggested as a framework to research punitive attitudes (Duckitt, 2009). This 
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research will produce empirical data to test the application of this model to crime and 
justice issues.  
 
1.4 Summary and brief overview of the empirical component 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the public’s views about the 
punishment that criminal offenders should receive. Public attitudes towards the 
sentencing of criminal offenders are important because an increasingly punitive public 
can result in the decision to increase the harshness of penal policies. In this introduction 
I have started from the premise that views about punishment go far beyond concerns 
about crime and security. The punishment of criminal offenders can be considered as 
central to the social order: it is an instrument used to secure order and stability, as well 
as to maintain in-group conformity and cohesive social bonds.  
Given the central role that punishment plays in structuring social order, it is only 
natural that people’s views about the proper role of institutions in society will affect 
their beliefs about how society should deal with law-breakers. In this dissertation I 
adopt a social-psychological framework to study how ideological views shape people’s 
support for harsh punitive measures. Applying a dual-motivational model to the study of 
punitive attitudes (Duckitt, 2009) I explore the differential roles of two ideological 
attitudes: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. I argue that 
people high in RWA will support punitive policies to restore in-group conformity and 
security that have been disturbed by crime. Those high in SDO, on the other hand, 
should support harsh punishment to avoid criminal offenders gaining power over the 
victim and society and restoring status and power hierarchies.  
While there seems to be agreement that RWA (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998) and 
SDO (e.g. Sidanius et al., 2006) relate to punitive attitudes, little research has looked at 
the mechanisms why which they affect punitiveness. The empirical component of this 
dissertation consists of four papers that explore the relationships between RWA, SDO 
and punitive attitudes. The different papers examine different propositions of the dual-
motivational model: whether RWA and SDO predict attitudes for different reasons 
(‘differential mediation hypothesis’), whether they predict different retributive 
punishment goals (‘differential effects hypothesis’) and whether they predict attitudes 
under different circumstances (‘differential moderation hypothesis’). In the following I 
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will briefly summarise the issues covered in each paper. A longer summary of the 
papers and their hypotheses are presented in Chapter 3.   
Paper 1 of this dissertation starts examining the most central proposition which 
is that RWA and SDO will have joint effects on punitive attitudes. In addition, it 
evaluates the different reasons why RWA and SDO predict the support for harsh 
sentencing. It does so by examining whether the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive 
attitudes are mediated by different beliefs about crime and criminals, as well as different 
symbolic motives of punishment. Paper 2 looks at whether RWA and SDO predict the 
support of punishment to achieve different retributive goals of punishment and whether 
they endorse different attitudes towards the harsh treatment of criminal offenders. 
Finally, Papers 3 and 4 explore the social conditions under which RWA and SDO 
become stronger predictors of punitive attitudes are different. In Paper 3, conditions are 
experimentally primed to be dangerous or competitive and the extent to which RWA 
and SDO predict punitive attitudes are observed. Paper 4, on the other hand, draws on 
criticism from social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation (Turner, 
Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) theories  to examine the role of measuring RWA and 
SDO when respondents have criminal offenders in mind when completing the survey. 
The next chapter presents and discusses the main concepts and theoretical 
perspectives applied in this dissertation. I start by defining punitive attitudes and 
describing the findings so far. I then present the concept of ideology and its definition 
from a motivated social cognition perspective. I finish by describing a dual motivational 
perspective of ideological attitudes, as well as introducing the ideological attitudes of 
right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and their relationships 
with punitive attitudes. Chapter 3 starts with a general overview and summarises the 
hypotheses of the papers in this dissertation 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 
 
 
Public punitiveness – that is, people’s support of harsh sentences for criminal 
offenders – is an important phenomenon with a number of social and political 
implications, shaping, for example, penal policies (Garland, 1990; Roberts & Hough, 
2002). It is therefore not surprising that an extensive body of research in social 
psychology, sociology, law, criminology and political science has addressed the issue. 
Given the scope of this dissertation, however, only one of these perspectives is 
examined in detail: a social psychological perspective that focuses on the role of 
ideological attitudes. 
A number of studies have adopted other approaches to the study of punitiveness. 
First, studies have focused on the role of social insecurities and concerns about moral 
decline (Costelloe, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2009; King, 2008; King & Maruna, 2009; 
Maruna, Matravers, & King, 2004; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 
2010). Second, research has looked at characteristics of crime and criminals that induce 
stronger punitive reactions. For example, perceiving the offender to be responsible for a 
crime leads to higher perceptions of seriousness and deservingness, which in turn 
influences people’s desire for harsh punishment (Feather, 1996). Related to the latter, 
attributing crime to dispositional and controllable causes increases perceptions of 
responsibility and blameworthiness, as well as punitive reactions (see on the link 
between causal attributions and punitive attitudes, Carroll et al., 1987; Cullen, Clark, 
Cullen, & Mathers, 1985; Hogan, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2005; Maruna & King, 2009; 
Sargent, 2004; Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 1997). An ideological perspective on 
punitive attitudes departs from the latter research in that it does not focus on 
characteristics of the social order, the offence or the offender. Instead, it is concerned 
with the ideological beliefs that predispose people to believe that the social order is 
under threat in the first place, that criminal offenders are to blame and that crime 
disrupts social order. Importantly, in this dissertation I examine how people’s 
ideological dispositions interact with perceptions of social threat to affect beliefs that 
harsh punishment is required to bring back security and value consensus. At the same 
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time I examine how ideological dispositions influence people’s perceptions of threat 
and hereby affect punitive reactions.   
The following conceptual and theoretical review examines the concept of 
punitive attitudes and the main perspectives that have sought to explain why people 
agree with the harsh punishment of criminal offenders. The theoretical framework 
adopted in this dissertation is then presented. The concept of ideology is discussed, 
particularly in terms of its motivational underpinnings; the dual-motivational model of 
ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001) is introduced, and right-wing authoritarianism and 
social dominance orientation are described. Other social-psychological theories (social 
identity theory, Tajfel and Turner, (1979); and instrumental models of group conflict, 
e.g. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson & Armstrong (2001), among others) are referenced in the 
papers when relevant. Their contribution to the current and further research is then 
discussed in the conclusions of this dissertation.  
 
2.1. Punitive Attitudes 
2.1.1. What are punitive attitudes? 
It is important to start by clarifying what I understand by punishment and 
punitive attitudes. Punishment can be understood as “a negative sanction intentionally 
applied to someone perceived to have violated a law, rule, norm, or expectation” 
(Vidmar & Miller, 1980, p. 568) or more specifically as the “legal process whereby 
violators of the criminal law are condemned and sanctioned in accordance with 
specified legal categories and procedures” (Garland, 1990, p. 17). While there seems to 
be certain agreement about the definition of punishment, attitudes towards the 
punishment of criminal offenders remain under-defined (Matthews, 2005).  
According to Stalans (2009), punitiveness is a complex concept with a number 
of different facets. One aspect is a diffuse desire to punish criminals. A second aspect 
relates to people’s attitudes towards sentencing and the extent to which they think that 
the courts are being too lenient towards criminals (and may also encompass their 
evaluation of the punitive system as a whole). Most research has focused on the latter of 
these (Garland, 2001a; Hough & Roberts, 1999). More generally, Matthews (2005, p. 
179) has defined punitiveness as the “pursuit of punishment over and above that which 
is necessary or appropriate”, while Capps (2002, p. 263) defines it as “choosing harsh 
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rather than lenient treatment of individuals”.  These definitions are vague, however, 
since they requires consensus in what can be considered to be a ‘necessary’ or ‘harsh’ 
punishment.  
There is also disagreement in the way punitive attitudes should be measured, 
probably due to the same lack of conceptual clarity. Agreeing on the measurement of 
punitive attitudes is central to research, not least because different measurements lead to 
different conclusions about the public’s support for harsh sentences (Cullen, Fisher, & 
Applegate, 2000; Sprott, 1999; Stalans, 2009). The first aspect to consider is the 
operationalisation of the concept. Measurements go from broad questions about the 
leniency of the courts (e.g. Brown, 2006; Gelb, 2006), to asking people to assign 
sentences to vignettes describing specific cases (e.g. Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 
2002; Payne, Gainey, Triplett, & Danner, 2004). Some studies have constructed more 
complex measurements of support for punitive policies (e.g. Costelloe, Chiricos, & 
Gertz, 2009; Hogan et al., 2005; Johnson, 2009; King & Maruna, 2009; Sidanius et al., 
2006), general attitudes towards sentencing (Cullen, Clark, Cullen, & Mathers, 1985) or 
general punitiveness (Capps, 2002). 
While asking about the leniency of sentences shows a widely and consistently 
punitive public (for a review see Gelb, 2006), research has shown that the public tends 
to be less punitive when confronted with cases of specific offenders (for a review see 
Cullen et al., 2000; Sprott, 1999; Stalans, 2009) and with more detailed information 
(Doob & Roberts, in Gelb, 2006). On the other hand, when the question includes a 
range of alternative sentences, people do consider less harsh sentences (for a review see 
Cullen et al., 2000; Gelb, 2006; Roberts & Hough, 2005) and even rehabilitation 
(Cullen, Cullen, & Wozniak, 1988; Cullen et al., 2000; Hutton, 2005). Cullen et al 
(1988) get to the point of arguing that the punitive public is only a myth. 
A second factor is related to the method used to gather the data. Many argue that 
surveys tend to exaggerate people’s support for punishment (Cullen et al., 1988, 2000; 
Gelb, 2006; Hough & Roberts, 1999; Hutton, 2005; Matthews, 2005), while focus 
groups, deliberative polls and other methods show more moderate, complex and 
contradictory attitudes (Hutton, 2005). In general terms, giving people more information 
seems to reduce punitive responses, as shown by De Keijser and Elffers (2009). In their 
study, participants were more punitive when basing their decisions on newspaper 
articles as compared to detailed information about the case. 
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Measurement problems seem to go even deeper than this. Studies have shown 
that different conclusions about the motivations for punishment can be drawn depending 
on the way the questions are asked. People are not aware of the motivations for their 
behaviour, giving different reasons for punishment than the ones they actually used to 
assign punishment (Carlsmith, 2008). Clearly, more methodological research on the 
measurement of people’s attitudes towards punishment is needed.  
Throughout this dissertation, punitive attitudes are conceptualised as people’s 
support for the use of harsh sentences for criminal offenders, evidenced by their 
endorsement of popular statements such as ‘offences against laws and norms in our 
society should be punished as severely as possible’ or ‘law-breakers should be given 
stiffer sentences’. Answers to such questions tap into not only the desire to punish law-
breakers (a general preference for harsh retributive sentencing as opposed to 
rehabilitative programmes for example) but also people’s beliefs about the right and 
proper role of institutions of justice. Reflecting the complex nature of public attitudes 
towards punishment, ‘punitive attitudes’ signify a broad range of public beliefs about 
crime, the goals and functions of punishment, and the criminal justice system. This 
definition of punitive attitudes is thus very broad and does not refer to any particular 
type of crime. Instead, people respond to such statements in terms of the type of crime 
they have in mind (which is usually violent crime, Roberts & Doob, 1990; Stalans, 
2009). While this approach to understanding punitive attitudes might be less specific, it 
is arguably of interest given that it is in this way that the media and politicians discuss 
the topic and the public often expresses its punitive desires. It can also be expected to be 
the most ‘ideological’ expression of attitudes towards crime and punishment. However, 
special care should be taken to avoid extrapolating responses from these types of 
measures to other measurement (such as sentencing decisions for particular scenarios). 
 
2.1.2. Why do people endorse punitive attitudes? 
Numerous studies have attempted to explain people’s support for punitive 
attitudes. Most studies can be broadly classified in two (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & 
Pittman, 2003; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Wenzel & 
Thielmann, 2006). For the purpose of this review, these approaches will be referred to 
as the instrumental and the retributive perspectives. These approaches are closely 
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related to punishment goals, this is, to the purpose people think punishment should 
achieve in society. The main punishment goals discussed in the literature are deterrence 
and incapacitation (instrumental goals), and retribution (retributive goal)1. Punishment 
goals will be discussed in the context of each perspective.  
While instrumental and retributive perspectives are not of central interest for this 
dissertation, they provide important antecedents to understanding the importance of 
considering factors that go beyond crime control when it comes to people’s attitudes 
towards punishment. Also, Paper 2 of this dissertation deals with retribution in 
particular and it is important to describe the main issues regarding the differences 
between punishment goals. 
 
a. Instrumental perspective 
According to an instrumental perspective, people want to punish because 
punishment reduces the likelihood of future harms, be it in terms of incapacitating the 
offender (imprisonment) or by deterring possible offenders of committing crimes 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Vidmar & 
Miller, 1980). This perspective goes back to Bentham who argued that punishment 
should be assessed in terms of the potential harm or benefit to society (see Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008). Punishment works under the assumption that offenders and citizens are 
rational actors; punishment should be just sufficient to control the offender’s behaviour 
(Carlsmith et al., 2002). The critical component is the likelihood of recidivism 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008) while the focus is on reducing crime in the future (Weiner, 
Graham, & Reyna, 1997).  
If people are thinking about the punishment of law-breakers to control the 
behaviour of criminal offenders, then their desire for punishment should be driven by 
concern about safety, high crime rates, fear of crime and victimisation experiences 
(King, 2008; Maruna, Matravers, & King, 2004). The relevance given to victimisation 
experiences in explaining tough stances towards crime is best exemplified by the 
“mugging thesis” (Unnever et al., 2007; see also King & Maruna, 2009): people become 
                                               
1 Other research has focused on the goals of rehabilitation (e.g. Cullen, Cullen, & Wozniak, 1988), 
general positive prevention (e.g. Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug, & Gabriel, 2002) and restoration 
(e.g. Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2009). The current research centers around reasons for punitive 
attitudes and therefore only considers those goals that predict higher support for harsh punishment. 
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conservative and support conservative views on crime after they experience the reality 
of being criminally victimised.  
There is some evidence supporting the role of crime concerns on punitiveness. 
Support for the death penalty has been found to be associated with deterrence beliefs 
(Thomas, 1977; Thomas & Foster, 1975; Thomas & Howard, 1977) and with the belief 
in its deterring effects (Steele & Wilcox, 2003), while fear of crime, 
(Costelloe et al., 2009; De Keijser & Elffers, 2009; Hogan et al., 2005), concerns about 
crime (Costelloe et al., 2009; Hogan et al., 2005) and perceptions of increased crime 
rates (De Keijser & Elffers, 2009; Unnever et al., 2010) have been found to predict 
punitive stances. At a macro level, Jacobs and Carmichel (2004) found that states with 
higher violent crime rates had applied larger numbers of death sentences. 
However, other studies have failed to find an effect of victimisation experiences 
(Baron & Hartnagel, 1996; Costelloe et al., 2009; Cullen et al., 1985; Hough & Roberts, 
1999; King & Maruna, 2009), personal fear of crime (Baron & Hartnagel, 1996; Sprott, 
1999) and crime concerns (Cullen et al., 1985; King & Maruna, 2009) on punitiveness. 
These findings suggest that the social function of punishment – at least in the public 
imagination – lies beyond mere crime control (Garland, 1990). 
 
b. Retributive perspective 
A second perspective is concerned with retaliating a past wrong rather than 
preventing future crimes (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & 
Pittman, 2003; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Weiner et al., 1997). This approach goes back to 
Kant who argued that offenders deserve a proportional punishment that does not derive 
from future consequences (see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). For Durkheim (1964, 1973) 
punishment goes far beyond penology. He considered punishment to be a moral 
phenomenon. Crime is argued to violate the moral order in society, while punishment 
reaffirms social bonds. Punishment thus serves the role of expressing and restoring 
society’s values and can be considered as the embodiment of moral order and social 
cohesion. Under this approach, punishment is an end in itself and consequences are not 
relevant (Carlsmith, 2006). 
According to this line of thinking, punishment has less to do with the rational 
control of crime and more with the extent to which crime damages something that is 
sacred to society (Garland, 1990). Two different symbolic motives might be relevant to 
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people’s desire to punish to restore balance: value restoration and status/power 
restoration (Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Value restoration is 
concerned with the extent to which offences damage shared values and challenge the 
legitimacy of social bonds and consensus, disturbing social order. Harsh punishment 
symbolically labels the offence as wrong, restoring people’s faith in shared values 
(Carlsmith et al., 2002; Goldberg et al., 1999; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Rucker et al., 
2004; Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). This symbolic motive also resembles a 
general positive prevention perspective according to which punishment seeks to restore 
norms and values, as well as to increase the public’s awareness of the law and their trust 
in justice (see Orth, 2003; Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug, & Gabriel, 2002). Value restoration 
is especially relevant when dealing with in-group offenders, since crime threatens 
identity-defining group values (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010).  
A second issue is concerned with restoring status and power relations in society. 
By committing crime, the offender shows disrespect and assumes power over the victim 
and society (Miller, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2011). One way of restoring balance is by 
degrading the offender’s status and power (Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; 
Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Thus, punishment (actually and symbolically) removes 
power and demeans the status of the offender, returning proportionality to the situation 
(Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008, 2010). Status and power restoration is especially relevant 
when dealing with out-group offenders, since the out-group criminal can gain power 
over the in-group (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010). 
A considerable amount of literature has looked at the expressive and symbolic 
aspects of punishment. Research has consistently found that punishment serves moral 
and justice related motives more than behaviour control motives (Carlsmith, 2008; 
Carlsmith, 2006, 2006; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Darley, 2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & 
Robinson, 2000; Darley & Pittman, 2003; King & Maruna, 2009; Maruna et al., 2004; 
Rucker et al., 2004; Tetlock et al., 2007; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997).  
First, punitive attitudes are related to retributive goals more than to instrumental 
goals. Darley et al. (2000) found that people determined sentencing more in terms of the 
severity of the offence than in terms of the likelihood of recidivism, while severity was 
mediated by the moral outrage and seriousness of the offence. Carlsmith and Darley 
(2008) also showed that people consider less information about the utilitarian aspects of 
punishment and more in line with a retributive perspective when assigning sentences to 
offenders (Carlsmith, 2006; Darley et al., 2000). Punitiveness is also predicted by the 
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moral outrage brought about by the offence (Darley, 2009; Darley & Pittman, 2003; 
Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Goldberg et al., 1999; Lerner et al., 1998) and by people’s anger 
towards crime in general (Johnson, 2009).  
Second, punitiveness has also been linked to concerns about societal cohesion, 
perceptions of moral decline, and other social anxieties. The key study was conducted 
by Tyler and Boeckmann (1997), who argued that punishment has less to do with 
perception of fear of crime and more with the extent to which deviance threatens 
groups’ values, norms and cohesion. The authors found that harsher punitiveness was 
associated with concerns about social cohesion and the deterioration of the moral 
structure of society rather than concerns about crime. Similarly, Unnever and Cullen 
(2010) showed that perceptions of moral decline were significantly related to support 
for the death penalty, even after controlling for conservatism. In the same line, King and 
Maruna (2009) found that generational and economic anxieties were better predictors of 
punitiveness than crime related concerns (see also on the role of economic anxiety, 
Costelloe et al., 2009). 
 
c. Two dimensions of retribution 
Retribution is often treated in the literature as the repayment of wrongful acts 
(Finckenauer, 1988). Yet, retribution often captures a wide range of different non-
instrumental aspects of punishment, including concerns about proportionality, justice, 
morality, social cohesion, deservingness and retaliation of wrongdoing. It is also often 
measured as a mixture between these concepts (e.g. Okimoto et al., 2011; Orth, 2003; 
Tam et al., 2008; Wenzel, Okimoto, & Cameron, 2012). Some authors have tried to 
clarify the components of retribution. Von Hirsch (1976; see also Finckenauer, 1988; 
Weiner et al., 1997) proposes that two dimensions of retribution should be 
distinguished: retribution as just deserts and retribution as revenge. In retribution as just 
deserts, the offender is allowed to compensate for the harm done and justice is restored 
through a proportional and fair process. This is, people who commit morally wrong 
actions should get what they deserve, that is should be punished proportionally to the 
moral wrongdoing (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; 
Darley, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). In retribution as revenge society seeks to get 
even and this desire is not constrained by proportionality and a fair process. It involves 
an emotional pleasure of seeing the offender suffer (Ho, ForsterLee, ForsterLee, & 
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Crofts, 2002; Weiner et al., 1997) and is often described as a personal matter 
(Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; Ho et al., 2002; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). 
Some research has supported the claim that retribution comprises two different 
dimensions. For example De Keijser, Van Der Leeden and Jackson (2002) asked Dutch 
judges to evaluate a number of punishment goals and they found two different factors: 
just desert (what I here call revenge) and moral balance (what I we here call just 
deserts). The first factor included items on deservingness, suffering and vengeance, 
while the second one considered items on restoring legal and moral order in society, as 
well as beliefs that the offender should compensate society for the harm done. McKee 
and Feather (2008), on the other hand, distinguished between desires for personal 
revenge and legitimate retributive punishment. The authors found a positive relationship 
between vengeance attitudes and retribution and a negative relationship with the goal of 
rehabilitation. They concluded that: “At least some component of support for capital 
punishment does have a basis in attitudes related to vengeance” (McKee & Feather, 
2008, p. 159). Finally, using factor analysis, Ho et al., (2002) distinguished between 
what they call vengeance- and justice-oriented decisions. The authors highlighted as 
main aspects of vengeance the role of emotions and the intensity of the response, while 
justice was measured as preferences for a fair and legal response.  
Crucially for this research, retribution as revenge and just deserts might 
communicate different messages to criminal offenders and community more broadly. A 
just deserts perspective, on the one hand, assumes some commitment to fair procedures 
and might be better suited when the aim is to restore values and collective security in 
society. It follows that high RWA individuals might favour such an approach to 
punitive reactions. A vengeful perspective, on the other hand, might be better suited to 
restoring status and power relationships:  making the offender suffer can be demeaning 
and less constructive. The aims of a revenge perspective might therefore be closely 
related to those of people high in SDO.  
 
2.1.3. Procedural fairness 
People’s support for harsh punitive responses and their beliefs about the goals 
punishment should achieve are two dimensions of attitudes towards punishment. A third 
-and less explored- dimension of punishment is the extent to which criminal offenders 
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deserve a fair sentencing process and to be treated with dignity and respect. The group-
value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990) provides a framework to understand 
why people might not agree that criminal offenders deserve a fair and respectful 
sentencing process. This model highlights the importance of the process by which 
outcomes are determined, more than the outcomes themselves. Crucially, people derive 
identity-relevant information on their status within a group or on the status of their in-
group from the quality of the treatment they receive when interacting with group 
authorities.  
Unfair treatment communicates to the observer that he is not respected within 
the group. The same reasoning can be applied to whether people believe that others 
deserve fair treatment. This is people should agree to provide fair treatment when the 
object of this treatment is a valued member of society. It follows that denying 
procedural fairness to criminal offenders can communicate that they are not considered 
members of the in-group (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997) or at least that they are 
considered to be low in status within the group. Boeckmann and Tyler (1997) have 
shown that people are willing to deny fair procedures to criminal offenders when they 
perceive them to be a threat to common values (symbolic model), or to physical or 
financial security (instrumental model).  
 Research on procedural fairness provides further evidence that the attitudes 
people hold about crime and punishment issues are far removed from security issues. 
Instead, the way the sentencing process is conducted and criminal offenders are 
punished communicates information on the importance of certain values in society. In 
this dissertation, beliefs about whether criminal offenders deserve fair treatment are 
considered as an additional measure of harsh treatment of criminal offenders. One of the 
main arguments of this dissertation is that people assign harsh punishment in part 
because this is perceived as an instrument to restore status and power relationships in 
society. Yet, status and power restoration can be achieved not only by assigning harsh 
punishment or seeking revenge. Denying criminal offenders of a fair and respectful 
sentencing procedure might also demean their status.  
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2.1.4. The role of ideology 
Research so far has provided consistent evidence that people are punitive not so 
much because of concerns about security, but because they worry about a lack of social 
cohesion and expect punishment to reassert social bonds and moral alignment. 
However, less attention has been paid to the reasons why people worry about threats to 
the social order in the first place. People differ in their beliefs about the proper structure 
of society and the extent to which they worry about threats to the social order. Crucially, 
ideological beliefs are argued to affect people’s perceptions of society as lacking social 
and moral cohesion and also their preferences for institutional reactions to rule-
breaking.  
A number of authors have proposed social-psychological approaches to the 
study of punitive attitudes (notably, Carroll et al., 1987; Tetlock et al, 2007; Vidmar & 
Miller, 1980). Importantly, studies have found a close link between individual 
differences in ideology and people’s preferences for harsh punitive policies (e.g. 
Altemeyer, 1998; Capps, 2002; Carroll et al., 1987; Tetlock et al., 2007; Tyler & 
Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010).  
The focus of this dissertation is precisely the role that ideological attitudes play 
in shaping people’s preferences for harsh punitive responses. Drawing on a motivated 
social cognition perspective, ideology is understood as being rooted in psychological 
goals and motivations. Motivationally driven ideologies define the value people attach 
to punitive measures, to the extent that punishment is perceived as sustaining or 
detracting goals that are relevant for each person. A dual-motivational perspective, in 
particular, looks at the role of two ideological attitudes that seem to be important to 
punitive attitudes: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. This 
dissertation builds on previous research on the ideological basis of punitive attitudes in 
a number of ways. First, it highlights the importance of considering a social 
psychological perspective to explain the link between ideology and punitive attitudes in 
terms of the motivational underpinnings of ideology. Second, it applies a dual-
motivational model to the study of punitiveness and proposes a comprehensive model to 
explain why and when conservative people will favour harsh punishment. Unlike 
previous research, two reasons are argued to be relevant to the goals of conservative 
individuals. First, punishment can help restoring in-group conformity threatened by 
crime (which should be relevant to individuals high in RWA). Second, punishment can 
40 
 
also be perceived as a way of enhancing status boundaries in society (which should be 
relevant to individuals high in SDO). 
The next section reviews the concept of ideology from a motivated social 
cognition perspective, and describes the main concepts and theories of this dissertation: 
a dual-motivational model, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation.  
 
2.2. Ideology: A Dual-Process Motivational Perspective 
2.2.1 Defining Ideology 
To understand how ideological attitudes affect punitive attitudes, it is important 
to clarify what is meant by ideology. Ideology can be understood as a network of 
beliefs, opinion and values (Jost et al., 2009), which are usually shared among a group 
of people (Rokeach in Jost, 2006). More specifically, (political) ideology has been 
defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be 
achieved” (Erikson, Luttbeg, & Tedin, 1988, p. 74) and as “consensually shared beliefs 
about how people ought (and ought not) to behave” (Pratto, 1999, p. 199). Ideology can 
serve to define guidelines for the judgement and for the legitimisation or de-
legitimisation of persons, groups and social practices (Pratto, 1999). 
Broadly speaking, authors agree in defining ideology as a set of shared beliefs 
about how society should be structured and about the accepted means to achieve this 
order. There are, however, at least two contested issues that are relevant for 
understanding the effect of ideology on punitive attitudes. First, what shapes people’s 
ideological attitudes? Second, what is the structure and dimensionality of ideology? 
These two issues will be discussed, emphasising how a motivated social-cognition 
perspective and – more specifically – a dual-motivational model of ideological attitudes 
helps to respond to these questions.  
 
2.2.2 Ideology: a motivated social-cognition perspective 
In this section I start by describing how ideology is understood from a motivated 
social cognition perspective. I then describe what I understand by goals and motivations 
and how ideology can help dealing with them. With these definitions in mind, I move 
on to describing how a motivated perspective on ideology can help clarifying the link 
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between ideological attitudes and the endorsement of harsh sentences for criminal 
offenders. 
Jost et al. (2009) have argued that when trying to understand people’s 
endorsement of specific ideologies, political scientists have focused on how elites 
construct and disseminate discourses that shape people’s political attitudes, while 
psychologists have favoured explanations that look at the function of psychological 
needs and motives. The authors reason that both a top-down (discursive superstructure) 
and a bottom-up process (motivational substructure) are relevant when explaining 
ideological outcomes. The discursive superstructure refers to “socially constructed 
attitudes, values, and beliefs bound up with a particular ideological position at a 
particular time and place”, while the motivational substructure refers to the “ensemble 
of social and psychological needs, goals, and motives that drive the political interests of 
ordinary citizens in a bottom-up fashion and are served by the discursive contents of 
ideology” (Jost et al., 2009, p. 315). While both perspectives may be relevant in 
predicting ideological outcomes, the present dissertation will focus on the second of 
these.  
From a motivated social-cognition approach (e.g. Jost et al., 2009, 2003), 
people’s motivational goals affect the endorsement of certain attitudes, beliefs and 
ideologies, as these help satisfying psychological needs. In words of Jost et al. (2003, p. 
341) “a kind of matching process takes place whereby people adopt ideological belief 
systems (…) that are most likely to satisfy their psychological needs and motives”. This 
process is described as an elective affinity between motivations, on the one hand, and 
ideologies, beliefs and attitudes, on the other.  
Ideologies are argued to be rooted in psychological goals and motivations. 
Motivations can be understood as “any wish, desire, or preference that concerns the 
outcome of a given reasoning task” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480) and they are “experienced as 
a desire or wish, followed by a feeling of satisfaction if the desire is fulfilled or a sense 
of frustration if it is not” (D’Andrade, 1992, pp. 23–24). This striving for a goal was 
defined by Murray (as cited in D’Andrade, 1992) as a need (such as the needs for 
affiliation, autonomy or order). Motivations are thought to originate from a discrepancy 
between actual and desired states (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). When a discrepancy 
is perceived between an existing and a desired state a tension is created. This tension 
will be greater, the greater the desirability of the goal (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996).  
42 
 
The argument that goals and motivations shape people’s reasoning and their 
endorsement of specific attitudes and beliefs has long been discussed in social 
psychology (see for a review Jost et al., 2003; Kunda, 1990). Kunda (1990) argues that 
motivation affects attitudes and beliefs through the reliance on biased cognitive 
processes. Motivations can affect various stages of cognitive processing (Kruglanski, 
2001), such as the quantity of cognitive processing used to assess information (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Kruglanski, 1980), the generation and evaluation of hypotheses 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) the reliance on dispositional and situational causal 
attributions (Kruglanski, 1980) and the formation or accessibility of cognitive categories 
(Kruglanski, 2001). Most relevant to this research, motivations seem to affect social 
cognition in everyday life, shaping the ways in which people construe the social world 
(Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Needs and motivations determine the valence of 
objects, actions or outcomes and can lead people to assign positive or negative valence 
to institutions and social policies (Feather, 1998).  
The affinity between psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat and 
the adoption of these attitudes and beliefs has found consistent evidence, especially 
regarding the motivated endorsement of political conservatism (see Jost et al., 2003). 
Conservative ideologies – conceptualised by Jost et al. (2007) and Jost, Nosek & 
Gosling (2008) as resistance to change and acceptance of inequality – serve the needs to 
reduce uncertainty and threat, since they allow justifying the status quo and reject social 
change2.  
                                               
2 The function of ideology in dealing with psychological needs has been widely recognised by different 
theories. According to terror management theory, people have an existential insecurity brought about by 
the awareness of their own mortality. Cultural worldviews (or ideologies) allow them to symbolically 
transcend this threat by providing meaning and value to themselves (e.g. Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Similarly, just world theory (Lerner, 
1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; see also Furnham, 2003; Hafer & Bègue, 2005) argues that people are in 
general motivated to believe that the world is just and predictable to be able to live their lives with trust 
and confidence in the future. This basic psychological need could lead people to adopt certain ideologies 
that allow them to explain and rationalise the way things are or how things should be (Jost, Federico, & 
Napier, 2009). Jost and his collaborators (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003) draw on dissonance and just world theories to argue that people are in general motivated 
to justify the status quo, adopting ideologies that exaggerate the fairness and legitimacy of the system 
(Jost, Federico, et al., 2009; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). They refer to this process as system justification, 
which can be defined as the tendency to “justify and rationalise the way things are, so that existing social, 
economic and political arrangements tend to be perceived as fair and legitimate” (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, 
p. 260) and which can occur even at the expenses of personal and group interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994). 
The theory proposes that people have the motivation to justify the legitimacy of the system and that they 
will rely on different psychological processes to do so (Jost, Kay, & Thorisdottir, 2009). Examples of 
system justifying ideologies are the protestant work ethic, belief in a just world, and political 
conservatism, among others (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). 
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Understanding ideological attitudes from a motivated social cognition 
perspective might shed some light on why beliefs people hold about how society should 
be structured affect their support of harsh punitive measures. Crucially, ideologies are 
thought of as expressing needs and motivations, while people’s needs can affect the 
value they assign to the criminal justice system and punitive policies. People can be 
expected to assign positive value to punishment to the extent that it is perceived as 
helping to deal with their needs.  
 
2.2.3 Punitive attitudes: a motivated social cognition perspective 
From a motivated social cognition perspective, then, motivationally driven 
ideologies shape the value people assign to harsh punitive policies. The crucial element 
here is whether punishment is perceived as helping to achieve goals that are relevant to 
people with different ideological views.  
Tetlock and his collaborators (Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2007; see also 
Goldberg et al., 1999; Lerner et al., 1998; Rucker et al., 2004) have proposed a 
motivated approach to punishment that focuses on the order generating function of 
punishment. People internalise the normative order and will defend rules and regimes, 
thus behaving like intuitive prosecutors. They adopt a prosecutorial mindset, which is 
characterised by “a heightened likelihood of causal attributions holding norm violators 
culpable, of moral outrage, of endorsing retribution and general deterrence as goals of 
punishment, and of punishing both violators and those who fail to punish violators” 
(Tetlock et al., 2007, p. 196). This mindset should be more accessible to people who are 
“ideologically predisposed to believe that the normative order is at risk and it is 
therefore prudent to set low thresholds for attributing intentionality to norm violators” 
(Tetlock, 2002, p. 462). It is also more accessible when people are induced to believe 
that the social order is threatened and that norm violations are widespread3. Meanwhile, 
people are argued to disengage from the prosecutorial mindset when norm violations 
have been punished. Interestingly, Tetlock et al. (2007) understand the prosecutorial 
mindset as a case of motivated reasoning that can bias people’s inferences towards more 
internal attributions and the belief that criminal offenders deserve punishment.  
                                               
3 See also Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Frey and Oßwald (2007) on the role of terror salience in 
increasing punitive attitudes. 
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A series of studies (Goldberg et al., 1999; Lerner et al., 1998; Rucker et al., 
2004; Tetlock et al., 2007) have experimentally manipulated social threat 
(operationalised as high crime and low punishment rates) and observed that it increases 
people’s preferences for punishment. For example, Rucker et al. (2004) found that 
threats to social order increased punitiveness, especially for moderately to highly severe 
crimes. Goldberg et al. (1999) showed evidence for a carry-over effect in that 
respondents’ anger in relation to an injustice increased punitive judgments of an 
unrelated transgression (see also Lerner et al., 1998). Exploring the situational and 
dispositional antecedents of the support of harsh sentences, Tetlock et al. (2007) found 
that ideological conservatism and induced threat (high crime rates and low punishment 
rates) lead people to support harsher sentences and to be less concerned about protecting 
innocent people.  
From a motivated social cognition perspective, conservatives will be 
dispositionally more likely to perceive the world as a dangerous place and to be 
motivated to uphold the social order. In addition, situationally induced perceptions of 
the world as lacking social order can also lead people to support harsh crime policies. 
Conservatives might favour harsh punishment to restore values and collective security. 
However, and as has been discussed before, crime not only affects value consensus and 
security. By committing crime, offenders also communicate that they have gained 
power over the victim and society (Miller, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2011) and degrading 
the offender’s status and power can restore the status quo (Vidmar, 2002; Vidmar & 
Miller, 1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Since punishment can be perceived as a 
means to establish and maintain social hierarchies in society, it might also have a 
positive value for those who are motivated to achieve power and dominance and a 
preference to live in highly unequal societies. A dual-motivational model of punitive 
attitudes (Duckitt, 2009) incorporates this second motivational goal and will be the 
focus of the next section.  
 
2.2.4 The dimensionality of ideology: a dual-process model 
From a motivated social-cognition perspective, ideologies are rooted in 
psychological needs and motivations and this motivational basis helps explaining the 
link between ideological and punitive attitudes. A second issue refers to the 
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dimensionality of ideology. This is, is there a single (left-right) dimension or are there 
multiple dimensions of ideology? There seems to be agreement that ideology considers 
at least two aspects: resistance to change and acceptance of inequalities (Jost, Federico, 
et al., 2009; Jost et al., 2003). One of these dual-process perspectives is the dual-
motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001).  
Duckitt (2001) proposed an individual differences approach to prejudice that 
distinguished between two relatively orthogonal dimensions: one dimension 
corresponds to authoritarianism, social conservatism or traditionalism as opposed to 
autonomy, openness and liberalism. The second dimension pertains to economic 
conservatism, preferences for power and inequalities as opposed to egalitarianism, 
humanitarianism and social welfare. The dual-process motivational model proposes that 
these two ideological attitude dimensions have independent causal effects on prejudice 
and ethnocentric attitudes. Duckitt’s (2001) model links socialization, personality, 
worldviews, ideology and prejudice through the concept of motivational goal-schema. 
His model predicts that personality dispositions and socialisation experiences form the 
basis of social worldviews, which in turn activate goals. Motivational goals are then 
expressed in ideological beliefs and values, as well as people’s disposition to adopt 
certain types of social identities and intergroup categorisation schemas.  
The dual-motivational model distinguishes between two ideological attitudes: 
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). By doing 
so, it differentiates the cultural (resistance to change) and economic aspect (acceptance 
of inequality) of conservatism (e.g. Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). RWA and 
SDO are argued to be ideological expressions of different motivational goals, which are 
made salient by different social worldviews and predisposed by different personalities 
and socialisations (see for a review Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Given their differential 
motivational basis, even if they predict similar outcomes, they are argued do so for 
different reasons (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). This model has found consistent support in 
research about prejudice, attitudes towards war and immigrants, among others (see for a 
review, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Research has shown that the reasons why high RWA 
and high SDO individuals endorse attitudes are different (e.g. Duckitt, 2006). Thus, 
merging them together would blur their predictive capacity.  
Given the relevance of a dual-motivational model in explaining a range of social 
and political attitudes (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), this dissertation seeks to apply these 
concepts to the study of public punitiveness. The argument is that both RWA and SDO 
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are relevant to punitiveness, although for different reasons. In the following, both 
ideologies are described in detail, and previous research on their link with punitive 
attitudes is discussed.  
 
2.2.5 Right-wing authoritarianism 
a. The development of authoritarianism 
Research on authoritarianism began more than 60 years ago with “The 
Authoritarian Personality” of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 
(1950; see for a review on the history of authoritarianism, Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005). 
It was first proposed as a personality explanation of people’s susceptibility to right-wing 
fascist ideologies, anti-semitism, ethnocentrism and prejudice, with the F-scale being 
the measure of it. Based on psychoanalytic theory, it was proposed that rigid and 
authoritarian child-rearing practices resulted in a displacement from the hostility 
towards parental authority to societal out-groups (Stenner, 2005).  
However, since then there has been an important controversy about the 
conceptualisation and measurement of authoritarianism (for a discussion see Duckitt, 
1989). According to Duckitt and his collaborators (Duckitt, 1989; Duckitt et al., 2010) 
the main problem of Adorno et al.’s (1950) approach was a lack of conceptual definition 
of what authoritarianism actually was supposed to mean and methodological issues such 
as its susceptibility to acquiescence (given that all items were positively phrased) and 
the subscales not correlating properly. And while Adorno et al. (1950) viewed 
authoritarianism as a personality dimension, it has been noted that authoritarian items 
were measures of social attitudes of ideological nature more than personality trait items 
(Duckitt, 1989). Furthermore, the F scale did not predict what it was supposed to 
predict. All these problems resulted in the concept “... becoming more or less relegated 
to obscurity" (Duckitt, 1989, p. 64; see also Feldman, 2003) until Altemeyer’s (1981) 
reconceptualisation of authoritarianism. 
Altemeyer (1981) constructed the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA). 
Testing a large number of items he focused on deriving reliable scales more than in 
defining the concept of authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005). He defined right-wing 
authoritarianism as the covariation of three attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, 
authoritarian aggression and conventionalism. Authoritarian submission refers to 
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people’s submission to and trust in established and legitimate authorities; authoritarian 
aggression is concerned with the use of aggression against people to preserve 
established authorities; lastly, conventionalism is the endorsement of social conventions 
that are sanctioned by society and authorities (Altemeyer, 1981). Altemeyer (1981, 
1988) adopted a social learning perspective according to which people learn this bundle 
of attitudes through socialisation (religious orientation, rewards and punishment, among 
others). The new scale has shown stronger reliability and unidimensionality, and also 
solved the acquiescence problem by including positive and negative statements 
(Feldman, 2003). One of the problems with Altemeyer’s scale, however, is that most of 
its items resemble relevant outcome variables (such as prejudice against specific groups 
and punitive attitudes) (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005).  
 
b. New conceptualisation of right-wing authoritarianism 
There have been many attempts to reconceptualise right-wing authoritarianism 
after Altemeyer’s research (e.g. Duckitt, 1989; Feldman, 2003; Kreindler, 2005; 
Stenner, 2005). Notably, Duckitt (1989) sought to clarify the underlying construct that 
made authoritarian submission, aggression and conventionalism covary. He proposed a 
group model of authoritarianism that focuses on the appropriate balance between group 
uniformity and individual autonomy and diversity. The main question here is the degree 
to which personal autonomy should be subordinated to group uniformity and cohesion. 
Authoritarianism, at one extreme, implies that personal needs and values should be 
completely subordinated to group cohesion. Libertarianism, on the other extreme, 
expects group requirements to be completely subordinated to the autonomy of the 
individual. According to his model, each of the components of Altemeyer’s 
conceptualisation can be considered as expressions of an insecure identification with the 
in-group and a demand for group cohesion. The greater the identification with the 
group, the greater will be the importance given to (a) the obedience and respect of in-
group leaders (authoritarian submission), (b) the conformity to the group’s norms and 
conventions (conventionalism) and (c) the need to aggress against those who do not 
conform to group values and norms (authoritarian aggression).  
One interesting proposition of Duckitt’s (1989) model is that authoritarian 
beliefs are activated when highly identified people perceive a threat to group 
identification (see also Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005). Stellmacher and Petzel (2005) 
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provided empirical evidence in favour of Duckitt’s model of group authoritarianism: 
they found that authoritarian beliefs were a product of the interaction between an 
authoritarian disposition, high identification and high threat.  
In future developments of the concept of right-wing authoritarianism, Duckitt 
(2001) defined it as the ideological expression of the motivational goal of social control, 
conformity and security (which was later referred to as ‘collective security’, e.g. Duckitt 
& Sibley, 2009; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009) as opposed to individual freedom and 
autonomy. According to this motivational model, authoritarianism is predisposed by a 
personality high in social conformity and is made salient by the perception that the 
world is a dangerous and threatening place (Duckitt, 2009; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; 
Duckitt et al., 2002; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). Being exposed to social 
situations that are perceived as highly dangerous will also increase people’s dangerous 
worldview and their need for collective security (Duckitt, 2006).  
Other models of authoritarianism have highlighted the importance of relative 
priorities between group conformity as opposed to individual autonomy in defining 
authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Kreindler, 2005; Stenner, 
2005). According to Feldman (2003), the most important threat to social conformity is 
diversity: people who value social conformity will support obedience to authority, 
commit to norms and conventions, and will also be willing to support the government’s 
actions to suppress diversity and restrict civil liberties.  
 
c. Authoritarianism and threat 
An extensive body of research has looked at the relationship between right-wing 
authoritarianism and social threat, and the empirical evidence suggests a number of 
ways in which these variables affect each other and interact in affecting outcome 
variables. First, social threat has been found to increase levels of expressed 
authoritarianism at an individual (e.g. Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Perrin, 2005; Rickert, 
1998; Sales & Friend, 1973; Sibley et al., 2007) and societal level (Doty, Peterson, & 
Winter, 1991; Sales, 1972). Second, high RWA individuals are also more likely to 
interpret a situation as threatening social order than those low in RWA. For example, 
Lavine, Lodge, Polichak and Taber (2002) found that people high in RWA were quicker 
in responding to threatening words, compared to low authoritarians, concluding that 
they are especially sensitive to threat. Third, social threat has been found to activate 
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authoritarian dispositions. In her book “The authoritarian dynamic” Stenner (2005; see 
also Feldmann & Stenner, 1997) proposed that there is a relatively stable authoritarian 
predisposition that becomes activated in moments of collective, normative threat. She 
defines normative threat as threats to oneness and sameness, common values and 
authority (e.g. lack of consensus in group norms and values or disrespect to authorities). 
Providing support for her model, in a number of surveys and experiments, she found 
that authoritarian predispositions interacted with normative threats to predict a range of 
variables, including punitive attitudes. 
 Finally, in one interesting paper, Cohrs and Ibler (2009) provided greater clarity 
into the ways in which threat and RWA interact in affecting prejudice. In two 
experimental studies, the authors manipulated threat from Turks (using a threatening 
argument), and measured the extent to which respondents perceived the manipulation as 
threatening and also whether they experienced actual threat from Turks after reading the 
argument. They found that people high in RWA were more likely than people low in 
RWA to perceive an argument as threatening, although this happened regardless of the 
threatening content of the argument. Interestingly, perceiving the argument as 
threatening affected the perception of actual threat only for high RWA individuals. This 
is, high RWA individuals seemed to be more likely to be influenced by a threatening 
argument. Finally, RWA also moderated the effect of actual threat on negative (but not 
positive) emotions towards Turks (although results were weaker here). That is, 
perceptions of threat seemed to be more relevant for those high in RWA to determine 
their levels of prejudice. Overall, the findings of this study suggest that people high in 
RWA are more likely than people low in RWA to sway their perception of actual threat 
in the light of threatening information and to react more negatively to perceived actual 
threat. 
 
d. Current debates 
Two main questions are still being debated (for a review, see Duckitt et al., 
2010). The first question is whether authoritarianism should be considered a personality 
measure as first described by Adorno et al. (1950) or rather a social attitude and value 
measure, as argued by many (e.g. Duckitt et al., 2010). Duckitt et al. (2010) argue that 
RWA tends to correlate better with values than with personality dimensions. At the 
same time, given its high sensitivity to situational factors, it is difficult to conceive it as 
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a stable personality measure (see Duckitt, 2009; Duckitt et al., 2010). Notably, there 
seems to be more and more agreement in the literature in treating authoritarianism as an 
ideological attitude (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). 
The second question is whether the subscales of authoritarian aggression, 
authoritarian submission and conventionalism can be considered as part of one 
overarching concept or if they should be treated as distinctive concepts. Duckitt et al. 
(2010) recently made the case for conceptualising and measuring RWA as a set of three 
attitudinal dimensions. The authors refer to these as three different authoritarian attitude 
dimensions that can all help achieving the motivational goal of collective security: 
authoritarianism (authoritarian aggression), conservatism (authoritarian submission) and 
traditionalism (conventionalism). Meanwhile, Funke (2005; see also Mavor, Louis, & 
Sibley, 2010) found a better fit using three factors compared to using a one-factor 
solution. Duckitt et al. (2010) found discriminative validity for this, in that the three 
dimensions were related to the support for different policies.  
 
e. Correlates of right-wing authoritarianism 
Altemeyer (1981, 1998) studied the characteristics of people high in RWA and 
concluded that they have a strong religious background, attend church and are inclined 
to be religious fundamentalists. They are also more likely to come from lower social 
classes, to have lower levels of education and to be slightly older than people low in 
authoritarianism. 
Because of their motivation to achieve order and security, people high in RWA 
dislike anything that relates to disorder, change, novelty and autonomy (Duckitt, 2009). 
They are generally more likely to dislike groups perceived as threatening social order 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), such as social deviants or minority groups (Altemeyer, 1981; 
Duckitt, 2006). In contrast, they like everything that symbolises order, social cohesion, 
tradition, and stability (Duckitt, 2009) and will favour situations and policies that can 
control social threats and bring back order and security (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). They 
are thus willing to restrict civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; 
Cohrs, Moschner, et al., 2005; Crowson, 2009; Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2005), 
and human rights (Crowson et al., 2005; McFarland & Mathews, 2005), as well as 
support surveillance measures (Cohrs, Kielmann, et al., 2005), military action (Cohrs, 
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Moschner, et al., 2005; Crowson, 2009; Crowson et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005) and 
harsh interrogation (Anderson, Roberts, & Struck, 2009). 
 
f. RWA and punitive attitudes 
High RWA individuals seek to achieve in-group conformity and collective 
security. As they are motivated to support institutions that help assuring order and 
controlling social threat, it follows that they will be the first to support tough crime 
control policies. In line with Duckitt (2009; see also Tam et al., 2008) I have argued that 
individuals high in RWA will favour punitive measures to restore social order, security 
and in-group conformity perceived to be disrupted by crime, and also because 
punishment is exerted by legal authorities which should be obeyed. Recall that a number 
of studies have linked authoritarian dispositions to punitive reactions to criminal 
offences (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998; Capps, 2002; Carroll et al., 1987; Feather, 1998; 
Feather & Souter, 2002; Funke, 2005; Lerner et al., 1998; Tam et al., 2008; Unnever & 
Cullen, 2010), in particular when punishment is applied against people perceived as 
disrupting social order (Feather, 1998). However, while RWA seems to be a key 
variable in explaining punitiveness, I have also argued that a number of questions 
remain open. In particular, more research is needed on the reasons why high RWA 
individuals support punitive measures and the circumstances under which they will do 
so. It is also not clear whether RWA will predict harsh punishment above and beyond 
the commitment they should have to fair and legal procedures. Finally, research is 
needed on the role of RWA on punitive attitudes when items on crime and punishment 
are excluded from its measurement.   
 
2.2.6 Social dominance orientation 
a. Social dominance theory 
Right-wing authoritarianism is the most widely used ideological attitude to 
predict beliefs about the proper punishment of criminal offenders.  Nevertheless, some 
research has shown that social dominance orientation might also be relevant to punitive 
attitudes (Sidanius et al., 2006). In the following I will describe social dominance theory 
and briefly recapitulate the relationship between SDO and punitive attitudes. 
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Social dominance theory (SDT; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; 
Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994) starts from the observation that surplus-producing 
societies tend to organise themselves in group-based hierarchical structures. Two social 
groups can be distinguished in these societies: a dominant group that enjoys high degree 
of positive social value (e.g. power or wealth), and one or more subordinate groups that 
enjoy a high degree of negative social value (e.g. death sentences). Different 
legitimising beliefs are used to preserve existing hierarchies in society, prevent change 
to the social order and stabilise oppression (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). The authors refer 
to these as hierarchy-legitimizing myths because they imply that some people should 
have less positive social value because they are not as good as others (e.g. social 
Darwinism). SDT posits that there are three factors that help maintaining social 
hierarchies: behavioural asymmetry, individual discrimination and institutional 
discrimination. Importantly in the context of this dissertation, institutional 
discrimination means that institutions assign more negative social value to subordinate 
groups’ members and more positive social value to dominant groups’ members. 
Hierarchy-enhancing institutions work to produce different outcomes for dominant and 
subordinate groups and help to maintain unequal relationships. One of such institutions 
is the criminal justice system (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Hierarchy-attenuating 
institutions and myths, on the other hand, seek to promote social equality by defending 
the interests of the wealthy (e.g. welfare organisations). 
 
b. Social Dominance Orientation 
SDT proposed a measure of individual differences, social dominance orientation, 
which has been defined as a “general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, 
reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” 
and “the extent to which one desires that one’s ingroup dominate and be superior to 
outgroups” (Pratto et al., 1994, p.742). People high in SDO show a desire for the 
superiority and domination of their in-group and a preference for hierarchical 
relationships. High SDO individuals will therefore prefer hierarchy-enhancing, 
compared to hierarchy-attenuating, ideologies such as racial prejudice and in-group 
favouritism. They are more likely to view society in terms of zero-sum beliefs that gains 
for one group mean losses for the others: Sidanius et al. (2004) found that zero-sum 
beliefs mediated the effect of SDO on attitudes towards immigration.  
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Jost and Thompson (2000) have argued that SDO actually measures two 
different concepts: group-based dominance (GBD) and opposition to equality (OEQ). 
While OEQ can be thought of as a general preference for inequality, GBD is argued to 
relate specifically to one’s in-group and its dominance over out-groups (see also Ho et 
al., 2012; Kugler et al., 2010). Other research, however, has suggested that differences 
between these two subscales are due to wording issues (Xin & Chi, 2010). 
Duckitt (2001) has argued that social dominance orientation is the ideological 
expression of the motivational goal of power, dominance and superiority over others as 
opposed to egalitarian and altruistic concerns for others. According to this model, SDO 
is predisposed by a tough-minded personality and is made salient by the perception that 
the world is a competitive place (Duckitt, 2006, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, 2009; 
Duckitt et al., 2002). Being exposed to social situations that are perceived as highly 
unequal and competitive also increases people’s competitive worldview and their 
preference for hierarchies and power (Duckitt, 2006).  
 
c. Correlates of Social Dominance Orientation 
In contrast to RWA, people high in SDO do not tend to be religious and there is 
no relation with income levels. Men do, however, show higher levels of SDO than 
women (Altemeyer, 1998). High SDO individuals do not feel constrained by morality, 
showing high scores in Altemeyer’s Exploitive Manipulative Amoral Dishonesty Scale 
(Altemeyer, 1998). Neurobiological research has related SDO to neural functioning 
within the brain regions that are linked to the ability to share and feel concern for 
other’s pain (Chiao, Mathur, Harada, & Lipke, 2009). People high on SDO are also less 
empathic, altruistic, expressive and agreeable (see Cohrs, Moschner et al., 2005). 
The SDO scale has been shown to be a powerful predictor of a wide range of 
social and political attitudes, such as prejudice and ethnocentrism (Pratto et al., 1994; 
Sidanius et al., 1994). Because of their motivation to achieve power and dominance, 
people high in SDO will assign negative value to anything that symbolises 
egalitarianism, altruistic social concerns and helping others (Duckitt, 2009). They tend 
to dislike groups that compete for relative dominance or that are of low status or power 
(Duckitt, 2006). In contrast, they like everything that reflects hierarchies and 
inequalities and will support situations and policies that are perceived as helping to 
establish and maintain inequality and social hierarchies (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), such 
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as a lack of commitment to human rights (Crowson, 2009; Crowson et al., 2005; 
Crowson, Debacker, & Thoma, 2006; McFarland & Mathews, 2005), the restriction of 
civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann et al., 2005), and the support for harsh interrogation of 
suspects (Anderson et al., 2009) and military actions (Cohrs, Moschner, et al., 2005; 
Crowson et al., 2006; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006; McFarland, 
2005; Pratto et al., 1994). But since they are no supporters of equality and helping 
others, they will not support the war if the purpose is humanitarian (McFarland & 
Mathews, 2005; Pratto et al., 1994).  
 
d. Social dominance orientation and punitive attitudes 
High SDO individuals seek to achieve in-group superiority and dominance over 
out-groups. As they are motivated to support institutions that maintain and legitimise 
social inequalities, it follows that they will be more likely to endorse actions undertaken 
by a justice system that promotes unequal outcomes. In line with Duckitt (2009) I have 
argued that individuals high in SDO might perceive criminal offenders as gaining power 
and favour harsh punishment to restore status and power hierarchies in society. While 
there are reasons to believe that SDO should be related to punitive attitudes, and a 
number of studies have confirmed this assumption  (Green et al., 2009; Kemmelmeier, 
2005; Sidanius et al., 2006), a number of issues remain to be evaluated. First, there is 
conflicting evidence on whether SDO predicts punitiveness above and beyond RWA. 
Two studies that have controlled for RWA found no effect of SDO (Colémont et al., 
2011; McKee & Feather, 2008), while in one study (Capps, 2002) SDO remained a 
significant predictor after controlling for RWA. Second, more research is required on 
the role of the subscales of SDO (GBD and OEQ). Third, little research has examined 
the reasons why SDO predicts punitiveness and the social conditions under which it will 
do so. Finally, there is mixed evidence on whether SDO predicts retributive goals of 
punishment or if it only predicts the desire for personal vengeance.  
 
2.2.7 The relationship between RWA and SDO 
A note is required on the relationship between RWA and SDO. Importantly, 
because RWA and SDO can be considered as two aspects of conservatism, it is not 
surprising to observe that they predict similar outcomes, such as prejudice, (for a review 
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see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009) and attitudes toward restriction of civil liberties (Cohrs, 
Kielmann, et al., 2005; Crowson et al., 2005; Crowson et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that despite their similar effects, RWA and SDO tend to correlate only 
moderately (see Crowson et al., 2005) and they are argued to correspond to distinct 
dimensions with different motivational bases (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). 
There are four main reasons that support the argument that RWA and SDO correspond 
to different dimensions. First, high RWA and high SDO individuals tend to come from 
very different backgrounds. While people high in RWA are highly religious and 
dogmatic, people high in SDO lack a religious background (Altemeyer, 1998, 2004). 
Similarly, while RWA is related to lower social classes (Altemeyer, 1998) and lower 
levels of education (Altemeyer, 1981), no such relationship has been found with SDO.  
Second, RWA and SDO are related to different personalities, worldviews and 
motivational bases. High RWA individuals, on the one hand, tend to be high in social 
conformity, belief that the world is a dangerous place and are motivated to achieve 
collective security. High SDO individuals, on the other hand, tend to be high in a tough-
minded personality, belief that the world is a competitive place and are motivated to 
achieve power and dominance (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002).  
Third, the level of correlation between these variables varies across countries 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Roccato and Ricolfi (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of the 
correlation between RWA and SDO in different countries. The authors showed that, as 
hypothesised by Duckitt (2001), correlations are higher in countries with strong 
ideological polarisations (such as Western European countries) than in countries with 
weak ideological contrasts (such as the United States and Canada). This suggests that 
the degree to which RWA and SDO differ from each other will depend on different 
historical or cultural backgrounds. At an individual level, Mirisola, Sibley, Boca and 
Duckitt (2007; see also Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005) found that people with 
higher levels of political identification (both measured and primed) displayed stronger 
correlations between RWA and SDO. 
Fourth, despite the important overlap, RWA and SDO explain unique variance 
of different outcome variables (e.g. Altemeyer, 1998; Crowson et al., 2005; Duckitt, 
2001; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). What’s more, there seem to be reasons to argue that 
the mechanisms through which RWA and SDO affect outcome variables are different. 
Duckitt & Sibley (2009) have summarised research showing that RWA and SDO 
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predict different specific outcomes, and that their effects are differently mediated and 
moderated.  
Interestingly, however, Altemeyer (2003, 2004) proposed that “double-highs”, 
this is people who are high in both RWA and SDO, combine the worst aspects of each 
dimension: religious ethnocentrism and dogmatism, on the one hand, and manipulative 
tendencies and power-hunger, on the other. While Altemeyer (2003) found that 
“double-highs” were more likely to declare war in a global futures simulation, Cohrs, 
Kielmann et al. (2005) found no interaction effect between RWA and SDO predicting 
attitudes towards the restriction of civil liberties (see also Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 
2006 for a lack of interaction effects)4. 
This dissertation examines the joint effects of RWA and SDO and the different 
reasons why they predict punitiveness. Given that they are often correlated to some 
degree, special attention is placed in controlling for each other’s effect in all analyses. 
Furthermore, given their closeness, I avoid implying that people are either authoritarians 
or social dominators. In this dissertation I refer to people as being high in RWA or high 
in SDO, which assumes that respondents could be high in both ideologies. 
 
2.3. A dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes: different hypotheses 
A dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes (Duckitt, 2009) predicts that 
both RWA and SDO will affect punitive attitudes. Given their different motivational 
basis, however, they should predict punitive attitudes for different reasons and under 
different circumstances.  I have argued (in line with Duckitt, 2009) that while high 
RWA individuals should favour punishment to restore collective security, high SDO 
individuals should do so to restore status and power relationships. Duckitt and Sibley 
(2009) suggest testing the dual-motivational model through three hypotheses: the 
differential mediation hypothesis, the differential effects hypothesis and the differential 
moderation hypothesis. In the following, these three hypotheses will be described and 
findings supporting each will be discussed. I will then outline predictions of each 
hypothesis in relation to punitive attitudes.  
 
                                               
4 Interaction effects between RWA and SDO were tested in all studies of this dissertation. Since no 
significant effects were found, however, these analyses were omitted from further consideration.  
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2.3.1 The differential mediation hypothesis 
The differential mediation hypothesis states that, even if RWA and SDO predict 
the same outcome, their effects should occur for different reasons, and different 
mediations should be observed. In terms of prejudice, the effect of RWA should be 
mediated by the perceived threat posed by the out-group, while the effect of SDO 
should be mediated by perceived competitiveness over power and dominance. Duckitt 
(2006) found that the effect of RWA on attitudes towards out-groups was mediated by 
perceived threat, while the effect of SDO was mediated by competitiveness towards 
these groups. McFarland (2005) showed that even though high RWA and high SDO 
students supported the war on Iraq, they did so for different reasons. The effect of 
authoritarianism was mediated by the threat posed by Iraq, while the effect of social 
dominance orientation was mediated by a lack of concern for the human costs of the 
war. 
The effect of RWA on attitudes has been found to be mediated by perceptions of 
threat, while the effect of SDO seems to be driven by perceptions of competition and a 
lack of concern for others. The same is expected in the case of punitive attitudes. High 
RWA individuals should be more likely to perceive crime as disrupting social order and 
seek punishment to restore it. High SDO individuals, on the other hand, should be more 
likely to interpret crime in terms of criminal offenders gaining power in society and 
support punishment to restore social hierarchies. They should also be more likely to be 
unempathic towards criminal offenders, which should also mediate their desires to 
punish.  
 
2.3.2 The differential effects hypothesis 
One prediction of the dual-motivational model is that the effects of RWA and 
SDO on punitive attitudes will be differently mediated. A second prediction is that even 
if RWA and SDO predict similar outcomes, they should also clearly predict different 
specific outcomes, such as disliking different groups and endorsing different policies 
and legitimising myths. This hypothesis has been tested in the case of prejudice towards 
different groups (see for a review, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). RWA and SDO both predict 
prejudice, however, people high on RWA dislike groups perceived as threatening social 
order and security (such as deviant groups and people with different cultural and ethnic 
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backgrounds), while high SDO’s dislike social groups perceived as belonging to lower 
social classes and groups who compete for status and power. For high SDO’s, being 
prejudiced against people of lower status can help legitimising superiority over them. 
Similarly, Duckitt and Sibley (2007) found that only RWA was related to attitudes 
towards dangerous groups, only SDO was related to attitudes towards derogated groups 
and both predicted attitudes towards dissident groups. This model fits Altemeyer’s 
(2004) argument about SDO’s prejudice being driven by their desire to dominate, while 
RWA’s prejudice is more related to fear and self-righteousness. Another study tested 
the effect of RWA and SDO on men’s sexism toward women and found that RWA was 
a stronger predictor of benevolent sexism and SDO was a better predictor of hostile 
sexism (Sibley et al., 2007).  
In other studies, the effects have been found to be separable only to some extent. 
Cohrs, Moschner et al. (2005) tested the effect of RWA and SDO on attitudes in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001. They found that RWA was the main predictor of 
threat-related attitudes toward Islam, while both RWA and SDO were related to the 
concern for negative consequences of the military action. Heaven et al. (2006) found 
that SDO was a strong predictor of pro-war attitudes, while both SDO and RWA 
predicted negative attitudes towards people from the Middle East. Only RWA was 
related to perceptions of threat from terrorism, while both RWA and SDO predicted a 
lack of support for Saddam Hussein (Crowson et al., 2005). 
 RWA and SDO seem to predict different specific outcomes, although only to 
some extent. In this dissertation I examine two dimensions of retribution -as revenge 
and just deserts- and explore whether they are differentially predicted by RWA and 
SDO. Retribution as revenge refers to a desire to retaliate a past wrong and make the 
offender suffer. Given the harsh and excluding nature of revenge, it is likely to 
communicate to the offender that people have low regard for him. It might thus be 
perceived as a means to restore status and power relationships and be the preferred goal 
of people high in SDO. Just deserts, on the other hand, allows the offender to 
compensate for the harm done and restores justice through proportionality and a fair 
process. A proportional compensation from the offender assumes some commitment to 
legal and fair procedures and is likely to be seen as a means to restore moral balance. It 
might thus be preferred by high RWA individuals. Given the tendency of high RWA’s 
to support actions undertaken by legal authorities, RWA might be relevant to both types 
of retribution.  
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2.3.3 The differential moderation hypothesis 
RWA and SDO are expected to predict punitive attitudes for different reasons 
and to relate to the support of different retributive punishment goals. The last hypothesis 
states that the effects of RWA and SDO should also be moderated by different social 
environments, this is, that the social conditions under which these ideologies will 
correlate with outcome variables are different. High RWA and SDO individuals will be 
more or less reactive to social processes if these are perceived as a threat to collective 
security or competition and dominance, respectively. This perspective resembles Lavine 
and colleague’s (Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Lavine et al., 2002) interactionist 
view, according to which the effect of personality on political variables does not occur 
in a vaccum. Political or social environments activate the effect of different dispositions 
on key variables. When dispositions are salient or relevant, their correlations with 
outcome variables –social and political attitudes and preferences- will be strengthened. 
In other words, when a certain motivation is salient, people will behave more in line 
with this motivation.  
Several studies have been carried out to test for the context-specificity of RWA 
and SDO. Extensive research has focused on how authoritarian predispositions become 
activated under the presence of different types of threat (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Feldman 
& Stenner, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1990; Lavine et al., 2005, 2002; Rickert, 1998). 
Other studies have looked at how depicting certain social groups as being threatening or 
competitive (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; see also Duckitt & Sibley, 2009) or as wanting to 
assimilate to the dominant culture or not (Thomsen et al., 2008) changed the effect of 
RWA and SDO on different types of attitudes. Furthermore, the relationships between 
RWA, SDO and attitudes have been found to vary across countries (Cohrs & Stelzl, 
2010). For example, the relationship between RWA and attitudes towards equality was 
positive in Russia and negative in the United States (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-
Paap, 1992), while SDO was positively related to support of violence toward the Middle 
East in the United States and it negatively predicted support of violence toward the 
West in Lebanon (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005).  
A second, more critical, perspective on the differential moderations of the effects 
of RWA and SDO on attitudes comes from social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and 
self-categorisation (Turner et al., 1994) theories. Crucially, studies have shown that the 
ways in which respondents complete RWA and SDO scales and the extent to which they 
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predict outcome variables depends on the social categories that are salient (Dru, 2007; 
Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006; Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001; Schmitt, 
Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003).  
It is possible to expect that the extent to which RWA and SDO predict punitive 
attitudes will depend both on the social conditions that are salient and the social 
categories respondents have in mind – in particular, whether they think about criminal 
offenders when completing the scales.  In this dissertation, I explore whether RWA and 
SDO are stronger predictors of harsh sentencing when dangerous and competitive world 
conditions, respectively, are salient. I also evaluate whether they predict punitive 
attitudes to different degrees depending on whether respondents are induced to think 
about criminal offenders prior to completing the scales. 
The three hypotheses discussed provide a guide to evaluate the application of a 
dual-motivational model to the study of punitive attitudes. However, it should be noted 
that in some cases it is difficult to distinguish between them in a clear way. For 
example, is it really different to show that high RWA’s are prejudiced against dangerous 
out-groups (‘differential effects hypothesis’) than to present evidence that they are 
prejudiced to out-groups when they are being portrayed as being dangerous 
(‘differential moderation hypothesis’)? Probably not. Similarly, in this dissertation, 
while punishment goals are considered as different specific outcomes (‘differential 
effects hypothesis), they are also used as mediators of people’s support for harsh 
punishment (‘differential mediation hypothesis’). It is thus not always clear whether a 
specific analysis is providing evidence for one or the other hypothesis. These 
hypotheses should thus be used as guidelines for possible tests to be conducted more 
than a list of requirements to be ticked.  
 
2.4. Summary 
  In this section I have defined the main concepts of this dissertation. I have 
described punitive attitudes as people’s preferences for the assignment of harsh punitive 
sentences for criminal offenders. Different models to explain punitive attitudes have 
been discussed. In particular, I have highlighted the importance of considering factors 
that are unrelated to crime issues. I have also sought to motivate the importance of 
considering the role of ideological attitudes, and, specifically, ideologies as being rooted 
in psychological needs and motivations. I have finished by outlining a dual-motivational 
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model, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Crucially, both 
ideologies seem to be related to the endorsement of harsh punitive measures. Yet, 
because they differ in their motivational antecedents, they have been argued to affect 
punitive attitudes for different reasons and under different circumstances: high RWA’s 
should favour harsh punishment to restore collective security and high SDO’s should do 
so to restore status and power relationships in society. Three hypotheses have been 
described as guidelines to evaluate the application of a dual-motivational model to the 
study of punitive attitudes: the differential mediation hypothesis, the differential effects 
hypothesis and the differential moderation hypothesis. 
  The next section presents the empirical component of this dissertation. Now that 
all the concepts have been defined, it is possible to describe the papers in more detail. 
The next chapter thus starts with a description of the papers in this dissertation and the 
hypotheses tested in each. Then, the four papers of this dissertation are presented. This 
dissertation finishes with a fourth chapter that aims at discussing the findings in the 
light of the theories adopted in this framework as well as other theories in the realm of 
social psychology. 
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 
 
3.1 Overview of the empirical component 
The current research explores the different reasons and circumstances under 
which RWA and SDO predict the endorsement of harsh sentencing of criminal 
offenders. Four papers are presented to explore the relationship between RWA, SDO 
and punitive attitudes. Each paper examines whether different predictions made by the 
dual-motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009) apply to the 
case of attitudes towards the punishment of criminal offenders. This overview will 
introduce these papers and relate them to the aims of the thesis. Hypotheses are 
presented and general findings are discussed. Hypotheses are presented in a summarised 
way, corresponding to the numbering in each paper. Findings are only briefly discussed 
in this section, and more in depth discussions of the findings are presented in the 
individual papers and the conclusions of this dissertation.  
  The first component of this thesis looks at the joint effects of RWA and SDO on 
punitive attitudes. The first paper, ‘A dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes: 
RWA and SDO predict the support of harsh punishment for different reasons’, draws 
upon two online studies from the United States (n=191 & n=167, respectively) to 
examine the most crucial hypothesis of a dual-motivational model: that RWA and SDO 
will predict unique variance of punitive attitudes. Previous findings have found a strong 
and consistent effect of RWA. However, findings on the role of SDO are conflicting. 
While many studies have found a strong effect of SDO (e.g. Sidanius et al., 2006), two 
studies that control for RWA found no effect at all (Colémont et al., 2011; McKee & 
Feather, 2008) and only one study found an effect of SDO after controlling for RWA 
(Capps, 2002). Two possible reasons for these inconsistent findings are discussed: the 
inclusion of items on crime and punishment as part of the authoritarian aggression 
subscale of RWA and the different roles of the subscales of SDO. First, the inclusion of 
items on crime and punishment as part of the measurement of RWA is likely to reduce 
the effect of SDO on punitiveness. It is expected that RWA and SDO will predict 
unique variance of punitive attitudes once authoritarian aggression is excluded from the 
measurement of RWA. Second, and in line with previous research (Ho et al., 2012; 
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McKee & Feather, 2008; Okimoto et al., 2011), people high in SDO might favour harsh 
punishment to establish a position of dominance over criminal offenders (group-based 
dominance) more than to justify inequalities more broadly (opposition to equality). This 
paper explores possible reasons for the inconsistent findings by looking at the 
relationship between punitive attitudes and the subscales of RWA and SDO. All RWA 
subscales are expected to be relevant to punitive attitudes: punishment is in itself an 
aggressive response to threatening groups (authoritarian aggression), it symbolises the 
endorsement of traditional values (conventionalism) and the need to obey authorities 
(authoritarian submission). However, only GBD -and not OEQ- is expected to predict 
punitive attitudes1. It is hypothesised that: 
 
H1.1: RWA and SDO will predict unique variance in punitive attitudes once 
authoritarian aggression is excluded from the measurement of RWA 
H1.2:  Authoritarian aggression, conventionalism and authoritarian submission will be 
associated with punitive attitudes 
H1.3:  GBD but not OEQ will be related to punitive attitudes 
 
A second under-theorised issue –and the second component of this dissertation– 
are the different reasons why people high in RWA and SDO support harsh punishment. 
From a dual-motivational perspective, RWA and SDO are rooted in different 
motivations and predict social attitudes for different reasons and through different 
mechanisms. People high in RWA value collective security; they will be especially 
sensitive towards threats to the social order; they will assign positive value to 
punishment as it can help to control perceived social threats. People high in SDO, on the 
other hand, are motivated to achieve power and dominance; they will be especially 
sensitive towards threats to social hierarchies; they will favour punitive policies to 
establish and maintain in-group dominance and inequalities. They also lack empathy 
and will be less caring for the wellbeing of criminal offenders. The first paper of this 
dissertation examines whether the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes are 
mediated by different beliefs about crime and criminals and different symbolic motives 
                                               
1 While only GBD is expected to predict punitive attitudes, all studies of this dissertation start by 
evaluating the separate effects of GBD and OEQ. SDO as a whole or only GBD are considered in each 
study depending on the particular effects of GBD and OEQ. To simplify, however, all hypotheses are 
phrased in relation to SDO as a whole.  
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of punishment (‘differential mediation hypothesis’, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). It is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H1.4:  The effect of RWA on punitive attitudes will be mediated by perceiving crime as 
a threat to collective security and punishment as a means to restore it 
H1.5:  The effect of SDO on punitive attitudes will be mediated by perceiving crime as 
a threat to hierarchies, by a lack of care for the wellbeing of criminal offenders 
and by the belief that punishment can help restore status and power 
relationships in society 
 
The findings of Paper 1 provide partial support for a dual-motivational model of 
punitive attitudes. RWA and SDO explained unique variance of punitive attitudes in 
both studies, although this was the case when authoritarian aggression items were 
included and excluded from the measurement of RWA (H1.1). All subscales of RWA 
were related to punitive attitudes (H1.2). However, the findings are inconclusive in 
relation to the role of the subscales of SDO (H1.3): in Study 1, both GBD and OEQ 
predicted punitiveness over and above the effect of RWA, while in Study 2 only GBD 
was significant.  
In line with a dual-motivational perspective of punitive attitudes the effects of 
RWA and SDO (and GBD in Study 2) were mediated by different beliefs about crime 
and criminals (Study 1), and symbolic motives of punishment (Study 2). People high in 
RWA perceived crime as a threat to collective security and favoured punishment to 
restore collective security (H1.4). People high in SDO, on the other hand, perceived 
crime as a threat to hierarchies and endorsed punishment as a way to restore status and 
power relationships (H1.5). SDO (H1.5), and unexpectedly RWA, predicted a lack of 
concern for the wellbeing of criminal offenders and this effect partially mediated their 
effects on punitive attitudes. Furthermore, RWA also predicted perceptions of crime 
threatening hierarchies and the motive to restore status and power relationships in 
society. This finding is not completely unexpected if one considers that high RWA’s 
also have a preference for hierarchies and submission to authorities. In addition, 
criminal offenders gaining power over society can also be perceived as a threat to 
stability and order (as argued in relation to prejudice by Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). This 
paper finishes by discussing the system justifying function of punishment. Harsh 
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sentences are argued to serve the status quo by reducing the potential for change in the 
normative and hierarchical structures of society. 
The third component of this thesis explores the differential effects of RWA and 
SDO on retributive punishment goals (‘differential effects hypothesis’, Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009). The second paper, ‘Retribution as revenge and just deserts: On the 
relationships between two dimensions of retribution, ideological dispositions and the 
harsh treatment of criminal offenders’ (co-authored with Jonathan Jackson) employs an 
online survey (n=176) to distinguish between two dimensions of retribution (see 
Finckenauer, 1988; Ho et al., 2002; Von Hirsch, 1976), and to explore how these relate 
to different ideological and motivational factors, as well as to the support of different 
attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders. I argue that retribution as revenge 
refers to a desire to punish to retaliate a past wrong by making the offender suffer. 
Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, refers to a more constructive support of 
punishment to restore a sense of justice through proportional compensation from the 
offender and a fair process. I hypothesise that:  
 
H2.1:  One dimension of retribution will capture preferences for getting back at the 
offender and making him suffer (retribution as revenge) while the other 
dimension will comprise elements of proportionality and compensation 
(retribution as just deserts).  
 
This paper also explores the ideological and motivational antecedents of both 
dimensions of retribution. I argue that status and power restoration might be particularly 
important to a revenge perspective, as the harsh and excluding nature of revenge is 
likely to communicate to the offender that people have low regard for him. Similarly, 
people high in SDO are motivated to achieve dominance over out-groups and should 
endorse punitive attitudes to restore status hierarchies. Again, vengeance might be better 
suited to demean the offender’s status and high SDO individuals are thus predicted to 
endorse retribution as revenge. Value restoration, on the other hand, is argued to be 
relevant to a just deserts perspective in that a proportional compensation from the 
offender is more likely to restore moral balance. As high RWA individuals seek to 
maintain in-group conformity, they are likely to endorse value restoration motives. 
However, since they tend to support actions undertaken by legal authorities, I predict 
that RWA will be associated to both types of retribution. It is hypothesised that: 
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H2.2:  Status and power restoration will be positively associated to retribution as 
revenge 
H2.3:  Value restoration will be positively associated to retribution as just deserts 
H2.4:  RWA will be positively related to retribution as just deserts and revenge, and its 
effect will be mediated by a value restoration motive 
H2.5:  SDO will be positively related to retribution as revenge and its effect will be 
mediated by a status and power restoration motive 
 
To finish, I explore the relationship between retributive dimensions and people’s 
willingness to assign harsh punishment and deny procedural fairness to criminal 
offenders. I argue that retribution as revenge and just deserts should differ in their 
association with the support for harsh punishment and the denial of respect and fair 
procedures to criminal offenders. Retribution as just deserts, on the one hand, seeks to 
restore values and assumes some basic commitment with fair legal procedures. It should 
thus predict the support for punishment, but not necessarily harsh punishment: the 
harshness of punishment should be constrained by the seriousness of the crime. 
Revenge, on the other hand, seeks to punish to make the offender suffer and should not 
be constrained by the seriousness of the crime. Those who endorse retribution as 
revenge should therefore support harsh punitive measures, while there is less clarity 
about the relationship between just deserts and harsh punishment. I hypothesise that: 
 
H2.6:  The support for harsh punishment will be positively related to retribution as 
revenge 
 
I draw on procedural fairness theory (Lind & Tyler, 1988) to understand the role 
of denying procedural fairness to criminal offenders. According to this perspective, 
denying procedural justice is used to communicate low status to a group or to a person 
within the group (Tyler & Blader, 2003). It follows that denying procedural fairness can 
be perceived as a way of enforcing status boundaries with criminal offenders: denying 
respect and neutral process to criminal offenders communicates low status to their group 
(for criminal offenders perceived to be part of an out-group) or to their status within the 
group (for criminal offenders perceived to be part of the in-group). Since retribution as 
revenge is arguably concerned with restoring status and power relationships in society, 
those who favour revenge are likely to agree to denying procedural fairness to criminal 
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offenders. Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, seeks to restore values and it is 
thus likely to be related to the support for fair procedures. It is hypothesised that: 
 
H2.7:  Denial of procedural fairness will be positively related to retribution as revenge 
and negatively related to retribution as just deserts 
 
The findings of the second paper provided evidence into the distinction between 
retribution as revenge and just deserts: a two-factor model of retribution showed a better 
fit than a one-factor model (H2.1). Getting even and making the offender suffer loaded 
on the same second order factor (retribution as revenge), while compensation and 
proportionality loaded on another second order factor (retribution as just deserts). 
Furthermore, retribution as revenge and just deserts differed in their relationship with 
preferences for the treatment of criminal offenders and ideological and motivational 
antecedents. Retribution as revenge was found to be rooted in ideological preferences 
for group-based dominance (but not opposition to equality, H2.5) and the motivation to 
enforce status boundaries with criminal offenders (H2.2). It was a strong predictor of 
preferences for harsh punishment (H2.6) and the denial of procedural fairness (H2.7). 
Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, was found to stem from the motivation to 
restore values (H2.3) and RWA (H2.4). Once revenge was controlled for, it predicted a 
strong commitment to the use of fair and neutral procedures (H2.7). Notably, beliefs 
about proportionality and compensation were found to reduce the negative effect of 
revenge on the denial of procedural fairness towards offenders. This is, at any given 
level of vengefulness, concerns about proportionality and compensation worked as a 
buffer of the desires to deny due process and respect criminal offenders. This paper 
finishes with a discussion on the relevance of considering the identification with 
criminal offenders in determining whether people high in RWA and SDO will prefer a 
vengeful or just deserts perspective of retribution.  
 The fourth component of this dissertation pertains to the circumstances under 
which RWA and SDO predict punitive attitudes. Findings consistently show that RWA 
and SDO are highly sensitive to social conditions (e.g. Sibley et al., 2007) and interact 
with social conditions in predicting attitudes (see Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010 for country-
specific effects of RWA and SDO on attitudes towards immigrants). This context-
sensitivity of the effects of RWA and SDO can be interpreted in two different ways. 
First, in line with an interactionist view (Lavine et al., 2005, 2002), social conditions are 
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expected to activate the effect of RWA and SDO. The effect of RWA is argued to be 
strongest under a dangerous world condition, while the effect of SDO is predicted to 
increase under a competitive world condition (Duckitt et al., 2002). A second –and more 
critical- perspective on the context-specificity of the effects of RWA and SDO comes 
from social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation (Turner et al., 1994) 
theories. From these perspectives, the context does not only affect, but rather determine, 
the extent to which RWA and SDO predict attitudes. Crucially, the social categories that 
are salient define the way in which respondents interpret and answer RWA and SDO 
scales (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006; Schmitt et al., 2003). This dissertation explores both 
perspectives in Papers 3 and 4, respectively. 
 Paper 3, ‘On the interplay between disposition and situation: The effects of 
priming dangerous and competitive worldviews on the relationship between RWA, SDO 
and punitive attitudes’, draws on an experimental study to examine the different social 
conditions under which RWA and SDO become stronger predictors of punitiveness 
(‘differential moderation hypothesis’, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). An online experiment 
(n=246) with a scrambled sentence exercise is used to prime dangerous and competitive 
worldviews and to evaluate whether these activate the effects of RWA and SDO on the 
support of harsh punishment and the mediation through symbolic motives of 
punishment. As in Paper 1, RWA is expected to predict punitive attitudes and its effect 
should be mediated by the motive to restore collective security in society. When the 
social conditions are primed to be dangerous, RWA should become a stronger predictor 
of punitive attitudes and a collective security restoration motive. SDO should predict 
punitiveness in general and its effect should be mediated by a status and power 
restoration motive. When the conditions are primed to be competitive, SDO should 
become a stronger predictor of punitiveness and status and power. To summarise, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H3.1:  RWA will predict punitive attitudes overall and its effect will be stronger when 
the social conditions are primed to be dangerous 
H3.2:  The effect of RWA on punitive attitudes will be mediated by the motivation to 
restore values and security in society and this relationship will be stronger when 
the social conditions are primed to be dangerous 
H3.3:  SDO will predict punitive attitudes overall and its effect will be stronger when 
the social conditions are primed to be competitive 
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H3.4:  The effect of SDO on punitive attitudes will be mediated by the motivation to 
restore status and power hierarchies in society and this relationship will be 
stronger when the social conditions are primed to be competitive 
 
Unlike predicted, the results of this study showed that RWA had a consistent 
effect on punitive attitudes (H3.1) and this effect was mediated by collective security 
restoration across experimental conditions (H3.2). Against expectations, again, the effect 
of RWA was also mediated by status and power restoration, particularly when the social 
conditions were primed to be dangerous. As in Paper 1, criminal offenders gaining 
power and status in society can also be perceived as a threat to social order and stability. 
However, the fact that RWA predicted status and power concerns mainly in the 
dangerous world condition suggests that restoring status hierarchies might be one route 
adopted by people high in RWA to secure order and value consensus. This is, unlike 
SDO, it does not seem to be led by competitive motivations.  In relation to SDO, in the 
overall sample only GBD –and not OEQ- was a significant predictor after controlling 
for RWA. In relation to the experimental conditions, only when the social conditions 
were primed to be competitive did GBD predict punitiveness (H3.3). Also, under a 
competitive world condition, GBD was the strongest predictor of a status and power 
restoration motive (H3.4). This paper concludes by discussing that people high in RWA 
might be chronically inclined to perceive the world as a dangerous place and to perceive 
punishment as a way to increase collective security, while people high in SDO do not 
seem to be readily predisposed to think of criminals as threats to the hierarchical 
structure of society. Only when the conditions are perceived to be competitive do high 
SDO’s become punitive.  
The last paper, ‘Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and 
punitive attitudes: An evaluation of the context-specificity of their relationships’, 
addresses the debate stemming from social identity and self-categorisation theories on 
whether RWA and SDO measure general attitudes or attitudes that are specific to the 
social group that is salient when completing the scales. Unlike other studies, however, 
this paper does not seek to examine the generality of RWA and SDO measures. Rather, 
and in line with Sibley and Liu’s (2010) argument, RWA and SDO are assumed to 
measure general or context-specific attitudes depending on the context in which they are 
measured. The aim then is to examine whether general measures of RWA and SDO 
predict punitive attitudes or if they do so only when people have criminal offenders in 
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mind when completing the scale. This is particularly relevant given the inconsistent 
findings in the literature regarding the effect of SDO on punitive attitudes and the fact 
that surveys vary in whether they prime (intentionally or not) criminal offenders before 
respondents complete RWA and SDO scales. The first study (n=78) consists of an 
experiment where social attitudes in general or criminal offenders are made salient to 
participants before they complete RWA and SDO scales. Comparing the effects of 
RWA and SDO across conditions provides relevant information on the generality of 
their effects on support for punishment. In the second study (n=106) participants filled 
out a criminal offender-specific measure of SDO, as well as general RWA and SDO 
scales. Here, I examine whether general measures of RWA and SDO predict 
punitiveness over and above a criminal offenders-specific measure of SDO. Given the 
close proximity between RWA items and crime and punishment issues, the extent to 
which RWA predicts punitive attitudes should not vary greatly whether general attitudes 
or criminal offenders are primed when completing RWA items. SDO items, in contrast, 
are not easily linked to crime and punishment issues and respondents are likely to have 
other social groups in mind when completing SDO items. The effect of SDO should be 
stronger when people have criminal offenders in mind. However, a general measure of 
SDO is still expected to predict attitudes above and beyond criminal offender specific 
attitudes towards inequality (in line with findings on prejudice from Sibley & Liu, 
2010). Furthermore, criminal offender-specific SDO should mediate the effect of SDO 
on punitiveness. It is hypothesised that: 
 
H4.1:  The relationship between RWA and punitive attitudes will be significant 
regardless of whether respondents are primed to think about social attitudes or 
criminal offenders when completing the scale 
H4.2:  The relationship between SDO and punitive attitudes will be stronger when 
respondents are primed to think about criminal offenders when completing the 
scale 
H4.3:  A general measure of SDO will predict punitive attitudes over and above a 
criminal offender-specific measure of SDO 
H4.4:  A criminal offender-specific measure of SDO will mediate the effect of SDO on 
punitive attitudes  
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 As in Paper 3, the findings of Paper 4 showed a consistent and strong effect of 
RWA across experimental conditions and after controlling for a criminal offender-
specific measure of SDO (H4.1). The effects of SDO –and particularly of GBD- on 
punitive attitudes were stronger when participants had criminal offenders in mind when 
completing the SDO scale (H4.2). A criminal offender-specific measure of SDO had a 
strong effect on punitiveness, but a general measure of SDO remained a significant 
predictor after controlling for the context-specific attitude (H4.3). Finally, the effect of 
SDO on punitive attitudes was mediated by a criminal-offender specific measure of 
SDO (H4.4). These findings show that SDO exerted both general and specific effects on 
punitive attitudes.  
 Findings of Papers 3 and 4 suggest that crime and punishment issues are 
accessible to people when completing RWA items, but they are far removed from SDO 
items. The support of harsh punitive measures seems to be related to a competition for 
power with criminal offenders, yet people high in SDO do not seem to be predisposed to 
think about crime and punishment in terms of hierarchical relationships. However, once 
respondents are lead to think about crime and punishment in the context of competition 
(Paper 3) or to complete SDO items in the context of criminal offenders (Paper 4), SDO 
becomes a strong predictor of punitive reactions.  
 
3.2 Papers 
In four papers, this research explores different predictions made by the dual-
motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001). Specifically, the papers test 
whether RWA and SDO predict unique variance of punitive attitudes (Paper 1); whether 
their effects are mediated by different beliefs about crime and symbolic motives of 
punishment (Paper 1); whether they predict different retributive punishment goals 
(Paper 2); whether their effects are differentially activated by dangerous and 
competitive worldviews (Paper 3); and if the extent to which they predict punitiveness 
depends on whether respondents think about criminal offenders when completing RWA 
and SDO scales (Paper 4).  
The four papers of this dissertation are presented in the following pages. With 
the purpose of linking the papers, short interludes are presented between the papers.  
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PAPER 1 
 
 
 
A dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes:  
RWA and SDO predict the support of harsh punishment for different reasons 
 
Monica M. Gerber 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper applies the dual-process motivational model (Duckitt, 2001) to the study of 
attitudes towards criminal punishment. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social 
dominance orientation (SDO) are hypothesised to predict punitive attitudes. But given 
their different motivational bases, they are expected to be important for different 
reasons. Findings from two online studies (n1=191, n2=167) provide partial support for a 
dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes. RWA and SDO predicted punitive 
attitudes and their effects were mediated by different beliefs about crime and criminals 
(Study 1), and symbolic motives of punishment (Study 2). The effect of RWA was 
mediated by the perception that crime threatens collective security and punishment can 
help restoring value consensus and security in society. The effect of SDO was mediated 
by perceiving crime as a threat to social hierarchies and punishment as a way to restore 
status and power relationships in society. An effect of RWA on perceptions of crime 
threatening hierarchies and the motive to restore status and power relationships was also 
found and discussed. While previous research has found a consistent effect of RWA on 
punitive attitudes, findings concerning SDO are conflicting. This paper finishes by 
discussing possible reasons for the inconsistent findings in the literature. 
 
Keywords: Punitive attitudes, Ideologies, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social 
Dominance Orientation 
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There is more to the punishment of criminal offenders than a rational attempt to 
control crime and increase security. Institutional reactions to rule-breaking not only 
work to prevent crime, they also “address some of the deeper emotional or affective 
dimensions of crime and its place in society” (Freiberg, 2001, p. 265; see also Garland, 
1990). Recognising the expressive and symbolic meaning of crime and punishment, 
Durkheim (1973) argued that while crime damages the normative order in society, 
punishment embodies moral order and social cohesion and can help to clarify moral 
boundaries to observers. Punishment symbolises the endorsement of authority, value 
consensus and order. It follows that those who have ideological preferences to live in 
tight and cohesive societies will assign a positive value to punishment and favour 
punitive policies. In line with this argument, a number of studies have shown a close 
link between punitive attitudes and conservative ideologies (e.g. Baron & Hartnagel, 
1996; Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997; Capps, 2002; Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 
1987; Hogan, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2005; Johnson, 2009; King & Maruna, 2009; Miller, 
1973; Tetlock et al., 2007). 
This paper explores the social-psychological underpinnings of one core aspect of 
political order: the punishment of criminal offenders. Applying the dual-motivational 
model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001) to the study of punitive attitudes (see 
Duckitt, 2009), I explore the role of two conservative ideologies: right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Duckitt (2009) 
argued that RWA and SDO should both predict punitiveness towards criminals, but that 
they should do so for different reasons. People high in RWA will support punitive 
attitudes to maintain collective security and value consensus. People high in SDO, on 
the other hand, will favour punitive measures because punishment can help establishing 
and maintaining power hierarchies in society and because they lack of empathy and will 
show low concern for the wellbeing of criminal offenders.  
Consistent with this model, previous research has found that both RWA (e.g. 
Altemeyer, 1988) and SDO (e.g. Ho et al., 2012; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994; Sidanius, Mitchell, & Navarrete, 2006) predict punitiveness. Yet, little research 
has looked at the joint effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes and at the 
different reasons why people high in RWA and SDO support harsh sentencing. 
Moreover, the few studies that have looked at their joint effects have found conflicting 
results on the effect of SDO after controlling for RWA (Capps, 2002; Colémont, Van 
Hiel, & Cornelis, 2011; McKee & Feather, 2008). This paper draws on two online 
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samples (n1=191, n2=167) to examine whether RWA and SDO predict unique variance 
of punitive attitudes and discuss possible reasons for the inconsistent findings in the 
literature. It then explores whether the effects of RWA and SDO on punitiveness are 
mediated by different beliefs about crime and criminals (Study 1) and symbolic motives 
of punishment (Study 2). It finishes by discussing possible reasons for the inconsistent 
findings in the literature. 
 
Punitive attitudes and ideology: A dual-motivational perspective  
Ideology refers to the beliefs that people hold about the proper structure of 
society and the ways in which people and institutions ought to behave. (Political) 
ideology has been defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how 
it can be achieved” (Erikson, Luttbeg, & Tedin, 1988, p. 74) and as “consensually 
shared beliefs about how people ought (and ought not) to behave” (Pratto, 1999, p. 199). 
From a motivated social-cognition perspective (e.g. Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) ideologies are rooted in psychological 
needs and motivations. In the words of Jost et al. (2003, p. 341) “a kind of matching 
process takes place whereby people adopt ideological belief systems (…) that are most 
likely to satisfy their psychological needs and motives”. People’s motivational goals 
affect the endorsement of ideologies, which in turn lead to downstream consequences 
(e.g. intergroup attitudes, Jost et al., 2009). Motivationally driven ideologies serve as 
guidelines for social judgment and shape the value that people assign to groups, social 
practices and institutions (Pratto, 1999).  
The same reasoning can be applied to public attitudes towards the punishment of 
criminal offenders: punishment may have positive value for people to the extent that it 
is perceived as sustaining a specific goal in society. If punishment is perceived as 
symbolising the endorsement of order and security, for example, it will have positive 
value for those who have a psychological need for collective security and a preference 
for highly stable and cohesive societies. Punishment may also be perceived as a means 
to establish and maintain social hierarchies in society, having a positive value among 
those individuals who are motivated to achieve power and dominance and a preference 
to live in highly unequal societies. It follows that two ideological expressions of 
motivational goals will be relevant to punitive attitudes: right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). RWA and SDO express different 
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motivational goals that are made salient by different social worldviews and predisposed 
by different personalities and socialisations (for a review, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).  
Right-wing authoritarianism has been defined by Altemeyer (1981, 1988) as the 
covariation of three attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian 
aggression and conventionalism. Authoritarianism is predisposed by a personality high 
in social conformity, and is made salient by the perception of the world being a 
dangerous and threatening place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). People high in RWA are 
motivated to achieve collective security and will assign negative value to anything that 
hints towards disorder, change, novelty and autonomy, such as groups and situations 
perceived as threatening social order. They are more likely to favour policies that can 
control social threats and bring back order and security, such as the restriction of civil 
liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & 
Kielmann, 2005; Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2005), and military action (Cohrs, 
Moschner, et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005). 
Social Dominance Orientation, on the other hand, has been defined as a “general 
attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally 
prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” and “the extent to which one 
desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (Pratto et al., 1994, 
p. 742). SDO is predisposed by a tough-minded personality and made salient by the 
perception that the world is a competitive place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). People high 
in SDO are motivated to achieve power and dominance and dislike groups that compete 
for relative dominance. They will support situations and policies that are perceived as 
helping to establish and maintain inequality and social hierarchies (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009), such as military actions (Cohrs, Moschner, et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005) and 
the restriction of civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, et al., 2005). Jost and Thompson 
(2000) have argued that SDO measures two different concepts: group-based dominance 
(GBD) and opposition to equality (OEQ). While OEQ can be thought of as a general 
preference for inequality, GBD is argued to relate specifically to one’s in-group and its 
dominance over out-groups (see also Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010). Other research, 
however, has suggested that differences between these two subscales are due to wording 
issues (Xin & Chi, 2010). 
Research so far has found associations between punitive attitudes and each of 
these ideologies taken separately. People high in RWA are more punitive (Altemeyer, 
1981, 1988; Capps, 2002); show retributive reactions to criminal offences (Carroll et al., 
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1987; Feather, 1998; Funke, 2005; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998); perceive 
offences as being more serious (Feather, 1996); and believe that punishment is efficient 
in reforming the criminal (Altemeyer, 1981). But the link between SDO and punitive 
attitudes is less clear. At a macro-level, the relationship between punishment and 
inequality has been widely discussed in the literature. This perspective goes back to the 
Marxist tradition (for a review, see Garland, 1990), in which punishment is a social 
artefact that serves the function of maintaining the power of dominant groups. Western 
(2006) has shown that punishment is both unequally distributed (see also Mitchell & 
Sidanius, 1995; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) and increases the levels of inequality by 
reducing the chances of disadvantaged groups even further. Sidanius et al. (2006) have 
moved this discussion to an individual level of analysis by arguing that given the close 
link between criminal sanctions and social inequalities, people’s endorsement of 
unequal institutions will be associated to attitudes towards punishment. Punishment is 
argued to serve a legitimising function in that the criminal justice system is more likely 
to apply harsh punishment against people of subordinate social groups (see also Green, 
Thomsen, Sidanius, Staerklé, & Potanina, 2009; Mitchell & Sidanius, 1995). SDO has 
been found to be positively related to the support for law and order policies, to painful 
executions, the belief in retribution (Pratto et al., 1994), the support for harsh criminal 
sanctions (Sidanius, et al., 2006), general punitiveness (Capps, 2002) and vengeance 
(McKee & Feather, 2008).  
While these studies suggest a strong link between SDO and punitive attitudes, 
there are inconsistent findings on whether SDO remains a significant predictor after 
controlling for RWA. Only three studies (to my knowledge) have evaluated the joint 
effects of RWA and SDO. While one study (Capps, 2002) found a significant effect of 
SDO after controlling for RWA, two studies found a non-significant effect of SDO after 
controlling for RWA. McKee and Feather (2008) found that support for capital 
punishment was predicted by RWA and vengeance attitudes. SDO was only linked to 
vengeance attitudes and not to the support for capital punishment, suggesting that while 
people high in RWA favour the use of harsh punishment by legal authorities, people 
high in SDO do not necessarily rely on authorities to achieve retribution. A second 
study (Colémont et al., 2011) used RWA and SDO to predict three different punishment 
goals (harsh treatment, moral balance and social constructiveness). Again, only RWA 
was a significant predictor.  
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The present research 
The aim of this paper is to apply the dual-process motivational model to the 
study of punitive attitudes. For the dual-motivational model to hold, RWA and SDO 
should predict unique variance of punitive attitudes. Yet, there is conflicting evidence in 
the literature regarding the role of SDO. In the first section I explore whether RWA and 
SDO have joint effects on punitive attitudes and discuss two possible reasons for the 
inconsistent findings in the literature. First, controlling for RWA might render the effect 
of SDO non-significant because RWA scales usually include items on crime and 
punishment as part of the authoritarian aggression subscale. It is hypothesised that 
RWA and SDO will explain unique variance of punitive attitudes once authoritarian 
aggression is excluded from the measurement of RWA (H1). Second, previous research 
has suggested that the subscales of RWA and SDO relate in different ways to justice 
attitudes (McKee & Feather, 2008) and it is thus relevant to look at their separate 
effects. A strong link has been found between retribution and authoritarian aggression 
and submission, although the link with conventionalism is weaker (Funke, 2005; 
McKee & Feather, 2008). All RWA subscales are hypothesised to affect punitive 
attitudes: punishment is in itself an aggressive response to threatening groups 
(authoritarian aggression, H2a), it symbolises the endorsement of traditional values 
(conventionalism, H2b) and the need to obey authorities (submission, H2c). In relation to 
SDO, only GBD predicted harsh punishment (Ho et al., 2012; Okimoto, Wenzel, & 
Feather, 2011) and capital punishment (McKee & Feather, 2008), while OEQ negatively 
predicted rehabilitation (McKee & Feather, 2008) and restorative justice (Okimoto et 
al., 2011). It is thus hypothesised that GBD (H3a) but not OEQ (H3b) will be related to 
punitive attitudes.  
 A second under-researched topic is whether the reasons why people high in 
RWA and SDO endorse punitive attitudes are different (‘differential mediation 
hypothesis’, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Duckitt and Sibley (2009) have argued that the 
effects of RWA and SDO should be mediated by perceptions of social threat and 
intergroup competitiveness over group dominance, respectively. This hypothesis has 
found support in research on attitudes towards out-groups (Duckitt, 2006) and the 
support for the war in Iraq (McFarland, 2005). The same is expected in the case of 
punitive attitudes. People high in RWA are motivated to achieve collective security; 
they should dislike crime as it endangers their sense of order and security; and they are 
expected to favour punitive policies, because punishment symbolises authority, order 
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and value consensus. This goal is partly consistent with a value restoration motive, 
according to which crime threatens the legitimacy of social bonds and punishment helps 
to restore people’s faith in shared values (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Vidmar & Miller, 
1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). However, according to Duckitt and Sibley (2009) it 
is not only value concerns that drive the attitudes of people high in RWA. Rather, RWA 
is motivated by the goal of establishing and maintaining collective security, which 
comprises the search for value consensus, as well as order, security and stability. People 
high in RWA should be particularly sensitive to crime, as it represents a threat in terms 
of both danger and deviation to common norms and values (as discussed for prejudice 
by Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). The effect of RWA on punitive attitudes is thus predicted 
to be mediated by perceiving crime as a threat to collective security (H4a) and by the 
motive to restore collective security in society (H4b). 
 People high in SDO, on the other hand, are motivated to achieve power and 
dominance; they should perceive crime as a threat to power and status hierarchies in 
society; and favour punitive policies to maintain inequalities and social hierarchies in 
society. They also lack empathy (see Cohrs, Moschner, et al., 2005) and are expected to 
be less caring for criminals when deciding on the right amount of punishment. Breaking 
the law signals power, as norm violators seem to be free to behave the way they like 
(Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011; see also Miller, 2001). 
This goal is consistent with a status and power restoration motive (Vidmar & Miller, 
1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006): by committing crime offenders gain power over the 
victim and society and one way of restoring hierarchies is by degrading the offender’s 
status and power. The effect of SDO on punitive attitudes is predicted to be mediated by 
perceiving crime as a threat to hierarchies in society (H5a), by a lack of care for criminal 
offenders (H5b) and by the motive to restore status and power relationships in society 
(H5c). 
 
Study 1 
The two studies presented in this paper explore the joint effects of RWA and 
SDO on attitudes towards the punishment of criminal offenders. Study 1 draws upon an 
online sample from the United States to evaluate whether RWA and SDO predict 
unique variance of punitive attitudes. Particular attention is placed in exploring the 
inconsistent findings in the literature regarding the role of SDO. A second aim of this 
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study is to test whether the effects of RWA and SDO are mediated by different 
perceptions about the threats posed by crime and criminals.  
 
Method 
 
Sample 
237 persons from the United States completed an online survey posted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1. 46 respondents (19%) were excluded for failing to 
respond correctly to an instructional manipulation check (32 respondents; Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) or a validation question embedded at the end of the study 
(14 respondents). The reported results correspond to 191 respondents. The sample was 
diverse in terms of gender (63% female), age (Min=18, Max=71, M=36, SD=13.0), 
occupation (52% worked, 15% students, 15% did housework) and ideology (51% 
leaning left, 25% centre, 24% leaning right), but less diverse in terms of ethnicity (81% 
white). Respondents read and agreed to a consent form and then completed a 
questionnaire that measured RWA, SDO, punitive attitudes, perceptions of threat posed 
by crime and criminal offenders, care for criminal offenders and socio-demographic 
variables (age, gender, ethnicity, education, occupation and political ideology). They 
were debriefed at the end of the study and paid 0.60 USD for participating. 
 
Measures 
Punitive attitudes were measured using four items. Two items were positively 
phrased: ‘People who break the law should be given harsher sentences’ and ‘With most 
offenders, we need to ‘condemn more and understand less’’. Two items were negatively 
phrased: ‘The use of harsh punishment should be avoided whenever possible’ and ‘If 
prison has to be used, it should be used sparingly and only as a last option’. 
Right-wing authoritarianism was measured using eighteen items, six for each 
subscale, balancing negative and positive items. Authoritarian submission and 
conventionalism were measured using Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss and Heled’s (2010) 
adaptation of Altemeyer’s (1988) right-wing authoritarianism items which allow a clear 
distinction between the subscales (e.g. ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
                                               
1 Data collected through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has been shown to be as reliable as data collected 
through other means while also providing a more diverse sample (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; 
Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
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important virtues children should learn’ and ‘Everyone should have their own lifestyle, 
religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different to everyone 
else, (R)’). Most authoritarian aggression items refer to crime and punishment issues. 
For this study, items were selected that did at least not refer explicitly to crime and 
punishment. Only four items from Duckitt et al.’s (2010) authoritarian aggression scale 
fulfilled this requirement (e.g. ‘We should smash all the negative elements that are 
causing trouble in our society’). These four items were complemented by two items 
drawn from Dunwoody, Hsuing and Funke’s (2009) authoritarian aggression subscale 
(e.g. ‘Using force against people is wrong even if done so by those in authority (R)’). 
Two different RWA scales were constructed to evaluate whether including items on 
authoritarian aggression explains the strong effect of RWA on punitiveness: one 
including and one excluding authoritarian aggression.  
Social dominance orientation was assessed using twelve items from Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle (1994). Six items measured dominance, e.g. ‘It’s 
probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom’; and six items measured equality, e.g. ‘We should do what we can to equalize 
conditions for different groups (R)’.  
The following measures were designed specifically for this survey to be used as 
mediators: 
 Crime as a threat to collective security was measured using three items: ‘Crime 
is a threat to everything I feel is good, normal and decent in society’, ‘Crime 
seriously threatens order, security and stability in society’, and ‘I am afraid that 
crime makes society more dangerous for ordinary people’. 
 Crime as a threat to hierarchies was measured using three items: ‘Through 
crime, people of lower social groups take away resources and power from 
people of higher social groups’, ‘By committing crime, criminal offenders try to 
communicate that they are superior to the rest of society’ and ‘Through crime, 
people of lower social groups try to dominate over people of higher social 
groups’. 
 Care for criminals was measured using four items: ‘I am concerned about the 
wellbeing of criminal offenders’, ‘The human rights and wellbeing of criminal 
offenders should be respected’, ‘I care for the wellbeing of criminal offenders’ 
and ‘I condemn the offense but show respect for the offender as a person’. 
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All items were measured using 7-point likert scales (1=disagree strongly, 
7=agree strongly). Descriptive and reliability statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
Results 
 
Correlational analyses 
Punitive attitudes correlated positively and significantly with all RWA subscales 
(rs>.44, ps<.01) and particularly with authoritarian aggression (r=.65, p<.01). They 
were also positively correlated with both SDO subscales (rs>.30, ps<.01). Perceptions 
of threat to collective security correlated with punitive attitudes (r=.47, p<.01), all RWA 
subscales (rs>.30, ps<.01), but not with SDO subscales (ps>.05). Perceptions of threat 
to hierarchies correlated with punitive attitudes (r=.45, p<.01), and all RWA and SDO 
subscales (rs>.26, ps<.01). Finally, caring for criminal offenders correlated negatively 
with punitive attitudes (r=-.60, p<.01) and all RWA and SDO subscales (rs>-.29, 
ps<.01).  
 
The joint effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes 
Table 2 presents the results of four regression models on the role of RWA and 
SDO on punitive attitudes. The first two models use overall scales of RWA and SDO, 
including (Model 1) and excluding (Model 2) authoritarian aggression as part of the 
measurement of RWA. Models 3 and 4 show the effects of the subscales of SDO, 
controlling for RWA (excluding items on authoritarian aggression). In Model 1, both 
RWA (b=.69, p<.01) and SDO (b=.22, p<.01) significantly predicted punitive attitudes 
and accounted for 44% of its variance. When authoritarian aggression items were 
excluded from the measurement of RWA, RWA had a somewhat smaller effect (b=.54, 
p<.01) and SDO had a somewhat larger effect (b=.26, p<.01). The percentage of 
variance explained decreased to 36%. Models 3 and 4 show that both GBD (b=.23, 
p<.01) and OEQ (b=.20, p<.01) significantly predicted punitive attitudes after 
controlling for RWA. Both models account for 35% of the variance of punitive 
attitudes. 
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Table 2 
Linear regression coefficients for RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes (Study 1, n=191) 
  B SE t R2 
Model 1         
RWA - with authoritarian aggression .69 .07 10.29** 
.44 
SDO .22 .07 3.10** 
          
Model 2         
RWA - without authoritarian aggression .54 .06 8.42** 
.36 
SDO .26 .07 3.60** 
          
Model 3         
RWA - without authoritarian aggression .55 .07 8.52** 
.35 
SDO - GBD  .23 .07 3.37** 
          
Model 4         
RWA - without authoritarian aggression .56 .07 8.66** 
.35 
SDO – OEQ .20 .07 3.05** 
Note. Unstandardised coefficients are presented 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
 
Differential mediations of the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes 
 Figure 1 shows the results of a structural equation model with latent variables 
evaluating whether different beliefs about crime and criminals mediate the effects of 
RWA and SDO on punitiveness. First, a totally mediated model was constructed. A 
direct effect from RWA to punitive attitudes was then added to improve the fit of the 
model. Given the clear overlap between the measurement of authoritarian aggression 
and the punishment of criminal offenders, authoritarian aggression items were excluded 
from the RWA scale. RWA and SDO scales were each represented by two parcels of 
items representing their subscales (authoritarian submission and conventionalism; 
group-based dominance and opposition to equality). The use of item parcels has been 
shown to provide more stable solutions when the sample size is small and has been 
recommended for studies –such as this- where the aim is to explore relationships 
between latent variables and not factor structures (see Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & 
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Widaman, 2002).  The final model shows a relatively good fit according to Hu and 
Bentler’s (1999) criteria (Model fit: χ²(123) = 213.42, p<.01, χ²/df <2; CFI = 0.95; SRMR 
= 0.06). 
 Perceptions of crime threatening collective security (β=.19, p<.01) and 
hierarchies (β=.19, p<.01) were both positively related to punitive attitudes. Caring for 
criminals, on the other hand, had a negative effect on the support for harsh sentencing 
(β=-.33, p<.01). People high in RWA believed that crime threatens collective security 
(β=.43, p<.01) and hierarchies (β=.31, p<.01), and were also less likely to care for the 
wellbeing of criminal offenders (β=-.34, p<.01). The effect of RWA was partially 
mediated by perceptions of threat to collective security (β=.08, p<.01), hierarchies 
(β=.06, p<.05) and by a lack of care for criminal offenders (β=.11, p<.01). The strongest 
effect of RWA, however, was a direct effect (β=.41, p<.01). People high in SDO, on the 
other hand, believed that crime threatens hierarchies in society (β=.40, p<.01) and did 
not care for the wellbeing of criminal offenders (β=-.33, p<.01). The effect of SDO was 
completely mediated by perceptions of threat to hierarchies (β=.08, p<.05) and a lack of 
care for criminal offenders (β=.11, p<.01). This model explained 70.7% of the variance 
of punitive attitudes. 
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Discussion 
The findings show a clear and strong relationship between RWA, all of its 
subscales, and punitive attitudes. Harsh punishment was linked to a preference for 
traditional values, the submission to authorities and an aggressive response to 
threatening groups (H2a-c). Yet, the relationship between punitiveness and authoritarian 
aggression is far from surprising. Most items on authoritarian aggression refer implicit 
or explicitly to crime and punishment issues. Crucially for this research, the effect of 
RWA was stronger when authoritarian aggression was included in its measurement and 
the effect of SDO was somewhat larger when authoritarian aggression items were 
excluded. However, unlike expected, SDO predicted the support for harsh punishment 
both controlling and not controlling for authoritarian aggression (H1). It should be noted 
that this study included items that referred only implicitly to crime and punishment 
issues. It is possible that previous studies included items that made explicit reference to 
crime, and that this was responsible for rendering the effect of SDO non-significant. In 
relation to the subscales of SDO, unlike previous studies (Ho et al., 2012; McKee & 
Feather, 2008) in this study both GBD and OEQ were significantly related to the 
support for harsh punishment (H3a,b) even after controlling for RWA.  
In relation to the differential mediation hypothesis, the findings show that the 
reasons why RWA and SDO predict punitive measures are different, at least to some 
extent. People high in RWA value order and security and were predicted to dislike 
crime as it damages collective security. In line with the expectations, the effect of RWA 
on punitive attitudes was found to be mediated by the belief that crime is a threat to 
collective security (H4a). People high in SDO, on the other hand, are motivated to 
achieve power and dominance and should dislike crime as it can be used by criminals to 
climb the social ladder and take away power and resources from the rest of society. As 
expected, the effect of SDO on the support for punitive measures was mediated by 
perceptions of threat to social hierarchies and group dominance (H5a). Against 
expectations, people high in RWA were also more likely to perceive crime as a threat to 
hierarchies and these concerns mediated in part its effect on punitive attitudes. This 
finding will be discussed in conjunction with the findings of Study 2. SDO, and 
unexpectedly RWA, related to a lack of concern for the wellbeing of criminal offenders 
and the latter accounted for part of the reasons why they predicted punitiveness (H5b). 
This is consistent with Unnever and Cullen (2009) who argued that conservative people 
are punitive precisely because they lack empathy towards criminal offenders. 
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Study 2 
Study 1 provided initial, although partial, evidence for a dual-motivational 
model of punitive attitudes: RWA and SDO predicted the support for harsh punishment 
and their effects were partly mediated by perceptions that crime threatens collective 
security and hierarchies, and by a lack of care for the wellbeing of criminal offenders. 
Study 2 draws upon a second online sample from the United States to provide further 
evidence into whether RWA and SDO predict unique variance of punitive attitudes and 
to extend previous research by considering whether people high in RWA and SDO 
support punishment to achieve different symbolic motives. Instead of examining the 
different perceptions of threats posed by crime, this study explores different beliefs 
about the symbolic messages that punishment should communicate in society and how 
these might help dealing with the psychological needs related to RWA and SDO.  
 
Method 
 
Sample 
188 persons from the United States completed an online survey posted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 21 respondents (11%) were excluded for failing to respond 
correctly to at least one out of two validation questions embedded in the study. The 
reported results correspond to 167 respondents. The sample was diverse in terms of 
gender (58% female), age (Min=18, Max=89, M=36, SD=14.01), occupation (58% 
worked, 14% students, 13% unemployed) and ideology (46% leaning left, 25% centre, 
30% leaning right), but less diverse in terms of ethnicity (80% white). Respondents read 
and agreed to a consent form and then completed a questionnaire that measured RWA, 
SDO, punitive attitudes, symbolic motives of punishment and socio-demographic 
variables (age, gender, ethnicity, education, occupation and political ideology). They 
were debriefed at the end of the study and paid 0.50 USD for participating. 
 
Measures 
Punitive attitudes were measured using three items: ‘People who break the law 
should be given harsher sentences’, ‘With most offenders, we need to ‘condemn more 
and understand less’ and ‘We should make sentences more severe for all crimes’.  
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Right wing authoritarianism was measured using ten items from Altemeyer’s 
(1988) scale. Special attention was placed in excluding items that referred to crime and 
punishment. 
Social dominance orientation was assessed using ten items from Pratto et al.’s 
(1994) scale. As before, five items measured group-based dominance and five items 
measured opposition to equality. 
  Collective security restoration motive was measured using four items. Two items 
were used to measure the restoration of moral balance and legal norms: ‘The 
punishment of the offender should strengthen the consciousness of legal norms in the 
public at large’ and ‘Society should punish to restore the moral balance and justice in 
society’, and two items measured the restoration of order and security: ‘We should 
punish to increase security and order in society’ and ‘Punishment should protect society 
avoiding that the offender can do more harm’. 
Status and power restoration motive was measured using two items. One item 
was drawn from Okimoto et al.’s (2011) status/power reduction goal scale: ‘A just 
response should communicate to the offender that people have low regard for him’. The 
second item was designed for this study: ‘Punishment should humiliate the offender’.  
All items were measured using likert scale items (1=disagree strongly, 7=agree 
strongly). Descriptive and reliability statistics are presented in Table 3. 
 
Results 
 
Correlational analyses 
Table 3 displays the correlations between punitive attitudes, RWA, SDO and 
symbolic motives of punishment. Punitive attitudes correlated positively and 
significantly with RWA (r=.54, p<.01) and both SDO subscales (rs>.28, ps<.01). 
Collective security restoration correlated positively with the endorsement of harsh 
sentencing (r=.56, p<.01), RWA (r=.50, p<.01) and to a smaller degree with the SDO 
subscales (rs>.16, ps<.05). Status and power restoration was positively related to 
punitive attitudes (r=.53, p<.01), RWA (r=.32, p<.01), GBD (r=.31, p<.01) but not 
OEQ (r=.14, p<.01). 
 
89 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between punitive attitudes, RWA, SDO and symbolic 
motives of punishment (Study 2, n=176) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Punitive attitudes -           
2 RWA .54** -         
3 SDO – GBD .29** .28** -       
4 SDO – OEQ .28** .40** .52** -     
5 Collective security restoration .56** .50** .21** .16* -   
6 Status and power restoration .53** .32** .31** .14 .48** - 
Mean 4.05 3.29 2.81 2.63 5.22 3.97 
SD 1.41 1.26 1.30 1.40 1.02 1.61 
α 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.92 0.80 0.79 
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
 
 
Table 4 
Linear regression coefficients for RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes (Study 2, n=176) 
  B SE  t R2 
Model 1         
RWA .55 .08 6.92** 
.31 
SDO .16 .08 1.91† 
          
Model 2         
RWA .56 .08 7.39** 
.31 
GBD .16 .07 2.23* 
          
Model 3         
RWA .57 .08 7.18** 
.30 
OEQ .08 .07 1.05 
† p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01  
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The joint effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes 
Table 4 presents the results of three linear regression models of the effects of 
RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. In Model 1 punitive attitudes are regressed on 
RWA and SDO scales. In Models 2 and 3 the subscales of SDO (GBD and OEQ) are 
used instead to evaluate whether they both predict punitiveness after controlling for 
RWA. RWA was a significant predictor in all three models (bs>.55, ps<.01). After 
controlling for RWA, SDO had only a marginally significant effect (b=.16, p<.10), 
OEQ had no effect at all (b=.08, p>.05), and GBD remained significant (b=.16, p<.05).  
 
Differential mediations of the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes  
 Figure 2 shows the results of a structural equation model with latent variables 
evaluating whether different symbolic motives of punishment mediate the effects of 
RWA and SDO on punitiveness. GBD was entered into the model given that only this 
subscale remained a significant predictor of punitiveness after controlling for RWA. 
Again, RWA and GBD scales were each represented by two parcels of items. Since 
Altemeyer’s (1988) RWA scale does not allow categorising the items clearly into 
subscales, items were randomly assigned to one of the two parcels. The same was done 
with GBD items. The model showed a relatively good model fit (χ²(57)= 94.21, p<.01, 
χ²/df <2; CFI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.05). 
 Collective security (β=.26, p<.05) and status and power (β=.33, p<.01) 
restoration motives both predicted punitive attitudes. As predicted, people high in GBD 
were more likely to endorse a status and power restoration motive than those low in 
GBD (β=.28, p<.01) and the latter mediated the effect of GBD on punitive attitudes 
(β=.09, p<.05). People high in RWA, on the other hand, were more likely to endorse 
both a collective security (β=.58, p<.01) and a status and power (β=.30, p<.01) 
restoration motive. Furthermore, RWA had indirect effects on the support for harsh 
punishment via collective security (β=.15, p<.05) and status and power restoration 
(β=.10, p<.05). As before, the strongest effect of RWA was a direct effect (β=.34, 
p<.01). This model explained 57.6% of the variance in punitive attitudes. 
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Discussion 
As in Study 1, RWA had a strong effect on punitive attitudes. Unlike Study 1, 
however, only GBD but not OEQ predicted punitive attitudes after controlling for 
RWA. This inconsistent finding might be due to the different RWA scales used in both 
studies (Duckitt et al.’s (2010) items in Study 1 and Altemeyer’s (1988) items in Study 
2). However, this is unlikely given the similarity of the content of both scales. The 
findings of this study are consistent with previous research (Ho et al., 2012; McKee & 
Feather, 2008) that found a significant effect of GBD on harsh punishment, but no effect 
of OEQ. The latter might be related to the harsher and negative nature of the GBD 
compared to the OEQ items. But it might also relate to the different aspects that have 
been argued to be captured by both subscales. Crucially, those who support harsh 
punishment can be argued to do so more to establish and maintain a position of 
dominance over criminal offenders than to justify overall inequalities in society. In-
group dominance seems to be especially relevant in the case of criminal offenders, 
where the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ might be very salient and clear-cut. 
Furthermore, high GBD individuals might perceive crime as a zero-sum situation: the 
more power gained by criminal offenders, the less power remains for law-abiding 
citizens. Harsh punishment might be one measure used by high GBD individuals to 
reduce power from criminal offenders.  
However, given the lack of consistency between both studies, further research 
should evaluate whether and under what conditions OEQ predicts punitiveness. One 
possibility pertains to the extent to which respondents think about criminal offenders 
when completing OEQ items. While general desires for group-based dominance might 
be somewhat related to competition for dominance with criminal offenders, justifying 
inequalities more broadly might be far removed from crime issues. Yet, justifying 
inequalities between law-abiding citizens and criminal offenders might be related to the 
endorsement of harsh punishment. This is consistent with findings from social identity 
theorists (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003) who 
have shown that people respond in different ways to RWA and SDO items depending 
on the social group they have in mind. Further research should examine how GBD and 
OEQ relate to punitiveness when people have different social groups in mind when 
completing the scales.  
In relation to the differential mediation hypothesis, the findings show that the 
reasons why people high in RWA and GBD favour punitive measures are different to 
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some extent. People high in GBD were more likely to support punishment to restore 
status and power relationships in society (H4c), while people high in RWA did so to 
restore collective security (H4b). But contrary to prediction, and consistent with Study 1, 
the effect of RWA was also mediated by concerns about status and power hierarchies in 
society.  
 
General Discussion 
Overall, the findings provide an initial –albeit partial– support for a dual-
motivational model of punitive attitudes: RWA was a strong predictor in both studies, 
while SDO (in Study 1) and GBD (in Study 2) explained unique variance of punitive 
attitudes after controlling for RWA. Two reasons were argued to have blurred the effect 
of SDO on punitive attitudes in previous research: the inclusion of the authoritarian 
aggression subscale in the measurement of RWA; and the combination of GBD and 
OEQ subscales in the measurement of SDO. While the inclusion of authoritarian 
aggression as part of the measurement of RWA decreased the effect of SDO to some 
extent, SDO remained a significant predictor in Study 1. Nonetheless, future studies on 
the support for harsh sentences should avoid including RWA items that are somehow 
linked to crime and punishment issues (or even remove authoritarian aggression as a 
whole). In relation to the role of the subscales of SDO, this paper found conflicting 
results. In Study 1, GBD and OEQ predicted punitive attitudes after controlling for 
RWA. In Study 2, on the other hand, OEQ became non-significant after controlling for 
RWA. More research is required to understand under what conditions OEQ will predict 
punitive attitudes. 
Most interestingly, the findings support to some extent Duckitt’s (2009) 
argument that people high in RWA and SDO favour punitive measures for different 
reasons. People high in RWA are motivated to achieve collective security and support 
punishment to maintain order, security and value consensus. Consistently, the effect of 
RWA on punitive attitudes was found to be mediated by the belief that crime is a threat 
to collective security and by the motive to restore values and security in society. People 
high in SDO, on the other hand, are motivated to achieve power and dominance and 
should favour punishment to take away power from criminal offenders and restore 
hierarchies in society. As expected, the effect of SDO on the support for punitive 
measures was mediated by perceptions of threat to social hierarchies and the effect of 
GBD was mediated by the goal of restoring status and power relationships. RWA and 
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SDO were both related to a lack of concern for the wellbeing of criminal offenders and 
the latter accounted for part of the reasons why these two variables predicted 
punitiveness. 
Unlike predicted, however, part of the reasons why RWA predicted punitive 
desires were also related to concerns about status and power relationships in society: 
people high in RWA were inclined to perceive crime as a threat to hierarchies and 
punishment as a means to restore status and power relationships in society. These results 
suggest that people high in RWA are highly motivated to support harsh punishment and 
will agree with all possible justifications for its use. Furthermore, these finding are 
consistent with other research that has found that the effects of RWA and SDO are 
separable only to some extent. As in other studies, while RWA seems to have a clear 
effect on threat-driven variables, it seems to be more difficult to find unique mediators 
or effects for SDO. For example, Cohrs, Moschner et al. (2005) tested the effect of 
RWA and SDO on attitudes in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. They found that 
RWA was the main predictor of threat-related attitudes toward Islam, while both RWA 
and SDO were related to the concern for negative consequences of the military action. 
Similarly, only RWA was related to perceptions of threat from terrorism, while both 
RWA and SDO predicted a lack of support for Saddam Hussein (Crowson et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, these findings are not completely out of expectation if one 
considers that people high in RWA value social conformity and will dislike anything 
that goes against traditional set-ups of society (such as criminals being at the bottom of 
society). Threats to social inequality can thus also be perceived as damaging social 
stability, cohesion and order (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Criminals taking away power 
and status from wealthy groups can also threaten their sense of stability and order, 
particularly because subordinate groups can use this influence to disrupt social order 
(see in relation to prejudice, Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). Overall, people high in RWA 
also have a preference for hierarchies and the submission to authorities. Unlike SDO, 
however, RWA’s concerns for maintaining status inequalities might originate from 
security rather than competitive motivations.  
The common effect of RWA and SDO on status and power restoration might 
also stem from the fact that they are both conservative and system-justifying ideologies. 
The punishment of criminal offenders can be argued to serve the status quo, as it 
reduces the potential for change, both in the normative and hierarchical structures of 
society. The latter suggests that the effect of RWA can be more widespread than the 
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effect of SDO. While people high in RWA care both about the normative and 
hierarchical order in society, people high in SDO do not seem to care about security and 
value issues, and their system justification tendencies are only related to maintaining 
unequal social structures. Future research might look at the relationship between system 
justification and punitive attitudes, and at whether punishment might reduce moral 
outrage and serve a palliative function in society.  
As argued by Duckitt (2006), RWA and SDO do not always predict negative 
attitudes towards the same social groups. Ethnic minorities are often low in power and 
also deviate from common values and norms and prejudice towards them will be related 
to both RWA and SDO. The findings of this paper suggest that criminal offenders are 
also perceived as threatening to both dimensions: by committing crime criminal 
offenders try to gain power over society and threaten security and common norms and 
values.  
  
Conclusions 
 The aim of this paper was to apply the dual-motivational model of ideological 
attitudes to the study of punitive attitudes (Duckitt, 2009). Previous research has found 
that both RWA (e.g. Altemeyer, 1988) and SDO (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 
2006) predict punitive attitudes. Yet, little research so far had evaluated the joint effects 
of RWA and SDO on attitudes towards punishment, nor examined the different reasons 
why people high in RWA and SDO support punitive attitudes. Consistent with a dual-
motivational model of punitive attitudes people high in RWA endorsed harsh 
punishment to maintain order, security and value consensus, as well as power and status 
relationships in society. People high in SDO, on the other hand, were punitive to 
establish a position of dominance over criminal offenders.  
While in this research both RWA and SDO predicted punitive attitudes, one 
might expect to find situations where only one or the other was a relevant predictor. 
Research in other areas has shown that the relationships between RWA, SDO and social 
attitudes depend on whether the objects activate a specific need in a specific context. 
Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) looked at cross-national differences in the effect of RWA and 
SDO on anti-immigrant attitudes and showed that RWA was a stronger predictor in 
countries where people perceived immigrants as increasing crime rates and as being bad 
for economy. SDO, on the other hand, was a stronger predictor in counties where 
immigrants had a higher relative unemployment rate. Other studies have even found 
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different directions of effects depending on the social context. One study conducted by 
McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina-Paap (1992) found that the relationship between 
RWA and attitudes towards equality was positive in Russia and negative in the United 
States: people high in RWA supported equality to the extent that it is status quo. 
Meanwhile, Henry, Sidanius, Levin & Pratto (2005) found that SDO correlated 
positively with the support for violence towards the Middle East in the United States 
and negatively predicted support for violence towards the West in Lebanon. The latter 
suggests that people high in SDO support the use of violence only if it can help superior 
groups to gain more power. In the same line, crime and punishment will not always 
have the same meaning for people high in RWA and SDO. In a context where the target 
of punishment is perceived as both dangerous and of lower class both variables might be 
relevant. But the results could be completely different when talking about white-collar 
crime, or crime committed by authorities (see Feather, 1998). More research is needed 
to understand the social conditions under which RWA and SDO will be more important 
predictors of punitiveness. 
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INTERLUDE 1 
Paper 1 of this dissertation provided initial support for the argument that two 
ideological and motivational antecedents are at the root of punitive attitudes. On the one 
hand, high RWA individuals are particularly sensitive to signs in the environment that 
suggest a lack of normative order. They are likely to agree with the use of harsh 
sentences because they think that punishing criminal offenders can send a message to 
the community that law-breaking behaviours will not be tolerated. On the other hand, 
high SDO individuals (and in particular those high in group-based dominance) perceive 
crime as threatening to status hierarchies and endorse harsh sentences to send a message 
to criminal offenders that people have low regard for them. Interestingly, and against 
expectations, people high in RWA also worry about criminal offenders gaining power in 
society. However, the motives behind status concerns are likely to be different: keeping 
criminal offenders in ‘their place in society’ assures that they will not have the power to 
disrupt social and normative order. 
 The findings of this paper are in accordance with a ‘differential mediation 
hypothesis’ (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), at least in part.  Crucially, harsh punishment is 
justified in terms of re-establishing normative order as well as maintaining the 
hierarchical structure in society. Nonetheless, while both of these symbolic motives are 
related to the support for punitive measures, they can be expected to predict different 
views on the goals that punishment should achieve. Harsh treatment, vindictiveness and 
the denial of respect might be perceived to be necessary to degrade the offender’s status, 
but not to restore values. Paper 2 examines a ‘differential effects hypothesis’ by 
evaluating whether RWA, SDO and symbolic motives of punishment relate in different 
ways to two different dimensions of retribution: retribution as revenge and retribution as 
just deserts. 
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PAPER 2 
 
 
Retribution as revenge and retribution as just deserts: 
On the relationships between two dimensions of retribution, ideological 
dispositions and the harsh treatment of criminal offenders 
 
Monica M. Gerber 
Jonathan Jackson 
 
 
Abstract 
Public attitudes towards law-breakers shape the tone and tenor of crime-control policy. 
The desire for retribution seems to be the main motivation underpinning punitive 
attitudes towards sentencing, yet there is some confusion in the research literature over 
what retribution really means. In this paper we distinguish between retribution as 
revenge (as the desire to punish criminal offenders to retaliate a past wrong by making 
the offender suffer) and retribution as just deserts (as the preference to restore justice 
through proportional compensation from the offender). Results from an online survey 
(n=176) provide evidence of two distinct dimensions of retribution, but we also show 
that these two dimensions have different ideological and motivational antecedents, and 
have different consequences in terms of the treatment of criminal offender. We find that 
retribution as revenge is associated with the motivation to enforce status boundaries 
with criminal offenders, as well as ideological preferences for power and dominance (as 
expressed by social dominance orientation) and in-group conformity (as expressed by 
right-wing authoritarianism). Endorsement of retribution as revenge also predicts the 
support of harsh punishment and the willingness to deny fair procedures. By contrast, 
retribution as just deserts is mainly predicted by a value restoration motive and by right-
wing authoritarianism. After controlling for revenge, retribution as just deserts predicts 
support for procedural justice in the criminal courts. We conclude with the idea that 
beliefs about proportionality and compensation work as a buffer against the negative 
effects of revenge. 
 
Keywords: retribution, revenge, just deserts, right-wing authoritarianism, social 
dominance orientation 
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Why do people call for the harsh punishment of criminal offenders? According 
to the available empirical evidence, the guiding motivation seems to be a desire for 
retribution (e.g. Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 
1997), which is defined inter alia as the support of punishment to restore justice and 
balance in society, or as a preference for retaliation and an expression of vindictiveness. 
Yet, thus far there has been little clarity over what retribution actually means. The first 
of three contributions in this paper is to provide conceptual and methodological 
refinement to the central psychological motivation to punish law-breakers.  
Going back to an old distinction (Finckenauer, 1988; Von Hirsch, 1976), we 
argue that there are two dimensions to retribution. One is concerned with allowing the 
offender to compensate for the harm done and restoring a sense of justice through 
proportional punishment (retribution as just deserts). The other comprises a less 
constructive use of punishment to get back at the offender and make him suffer 
(retribution as revenge). Von Hirsch (1976) and Finckenauer (1988) first proposed the 
need to distinguish between both dimensions but provided no evidence on whether they 
are indeed empirically different1. Other studies have distinguished between a vengeful 
deservingness perspective and a more constructive moral or justice restoration motive 
(De Keijser, Van Der Leeden, & Jackson, 2002; Ho, ForsterLee, ForsterLee, & Crofts, 
2002; McKee & Feather, 2008), but have combined in their measurements items on the 
goals of punishment with the sentencing process (Ho et al., 2002) and the message that 
punishment seeks to communicate (De Keijser et al., 2002).   
We provide further clarity on the distinction between these two dimensions of 
retribution. We clarify the meaning of retribution as revenge and just deserts, develop 
scales to measure each retributive perspective and disentangle the goals of punishment 
from the process by which punishment is assigned. We then examine whether these two 
dimensions have different motivational antecedents and whether they relate in different 
ways to beliefs about how criminal offenders should be treated (e.g. that they should be 
denied procedural justice in court and they should be given a harsh and punitive 
sentence if convicted). Presenting findings from an online survey (n=176) we provide 
evidence that retribution as revenge and retribution as just deserts are better 
conceptualised as being two distinct concepts. On the one hand, retribution as revenge is 
found to stem from ideological preferences for group-based dominance (as captured by 
                                               
1 Finckenauer (1988) proposed scales to measure both concepts and some of his items are used for the 
current research. 
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social dominance orientation, SDO) and collective security (as captured by right-wing 
authoritarianism, RWA). Harsh treatment of criminal offenders – both in terms of the 
process of assigning punishment and punishment itself – is positively related to the 
support of retribution as revenge. On the other hand, retribution as just desert is found to 
be predicted only by RWA; after controlling for revenge, retribution as just desert is 
related to the endorsement of fair treatment of criminal offenders.   
 
Punishment goals 
Punishment goals are people’s views on the purpose of punishment, and they are 
typically divided into instrumental goals and retributive goals. Instrumental goals justify 
punishment in terms of future benefits for society (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003), reducing the likelihood 
of future harm by means of incapacitation, deterrence or rehabilitation. An instrumental 
mindset works under the assumption of rational choice: offenders are expected to stop 
committing crime to avoid punishment, so citisens should determine their punitive 
reactions in terms of the likelihood of recidivism (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Some 
research has found support for such an utilitarian perspective in that crime related 
concerns predict punitive attitudes (e.g. Costelloe, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2009; De Keijser 
& Elffers, 2009; Hogan, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2005), yet most research has failed to find 
effects of victimisation experiences (e.g. Baron & Hartnagel, 1996; Cullen, Clark, 
Cullen, & Mathers, 1985; Hough & Roberts, 1999; King & Maruna, 2009), personal 
fear of crime (Baron & Hartnagel, 1996) and crime concerns (Cullen et al., 1985; King 
& Maruna, 2009) on the support for harsh sentencing.  
By contrast, support for punitive responses has been more robustly linked to a 
range of non-crime related factors. Moral outrage (Darley, 2009; Darley & Pittman, 
2003; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Lerner, Goldberg, & 
Tetlock, 1998), concerns about social cohesion and moral decline (Tyler & Boeckmann, 
1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010), and generational and economic anxieties (King & 
Maruna, 2009) are better predictors of the support for punitive responses than 
instrumental crime concern variables. Studies also show that people determine 
sentencing more in terms of moral (e.g. severity of the offense or intention) than 
utilitarian factors (e.g. likelihood of recidivism) (Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith & Darley, 
2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000), even though they 
might not be aware of their own reasons to support punishment (Carlsmith, 2008). 
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Intriguingly, people tend to support capital punishment even after being provided with 
evidence that deterrence is not efficient in reducing crime (see Carlsmith et al., 2002). 
A retributive goal of punishment is concerned with retaliating a wrong more 
than preventing future crimes (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Vidmar 
& Miller, 1980; Weiner et al., 1997). Retribution is usually defined as the belief that 
criminal offenders deserve to be punished for the violation of society’s rules, and that 
this punishment should be proportional to the wrong committed (Banks, 2008; 
Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Finckenauer, 
1988).2 Punishment is considered an end in itself, and should be determined by the 
perceived seriousness of the offence and the intention and responsibility of the offender 
(Carlsmith, 2006; Feather, 1996; Vidmar, 2000). Yet, while retribution seems to relate 
to the repayment of wrongful acts (Finckenauer, 1988), it also captures a rather 
unstructured range of different non-instrumental aspects of punishment, including 
concerns about justice, proportionality, morality, social cohesion, deservingness and the 
retaliation of wrongdoing. Consistent with this, retribution is often measured as a mix of 
items capturing some of these dimensions (e.g. Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2012; 
Orth, 2003; Tam, Leung, & Chiu, 2008; Wenzel, Okimoto, & Cameron, 2012).  
This reflects a lack of clarity in the definition of retribution. But importantly, 
there have been a few attempts to bring structure to the research within this field. Von 
Hirsch (1976; see also Finckenauer, 1988; Weiner et al., 1997) argues for two 
dimensions to retribution: retribution as just deserts and retribution as revenge. In 
retribution as just deserts, the criminal offender pays back for the harm done and justice 
is restored through proportionality and fair process. By paying a debt, positive and 
negative experiences are distributed and social balance is restored (Weiner et al., 1997). 
In retribution as revenge, people want to punish to get even and retaliate, and this is not 
constrained by a proportional, fair and due process. According to Banks (2008), 
criminologists thought of retribution as revenge until the 1970s and in the 1980s, a 
theory of just deserts became more relevant. Ho et al., (2002), on the other hand, argue 
that revenge and justice motivations are often confused, and that the state justifies the 
harshest punishments by referring to needs for ‘justice’. 
                                               
2 There are parallels here to Durkheim’s (1964, 1973) argument that punishment should be considered a 
moral phenomenon: while crime violates the moral order in society, punishment serves an expressive role 
of reaffirming social bonds and defining the boundaries of social groups. 
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Retribution as just deserts seeks to restore equity through a rational assignment 
of punishment that is proportional to the severity of the crime. To achieve justice, the 
process by which the offender is sentenced needs to be just and fair, and legal guidelines 
need to be followed. Crucially, both the process to allocate punishment and the severity 
of the sentence need to be fair (Ho et al., 2002). In retribution as just deserts, the 
seriousness of the offense sets a limit for the harshness of the punishment. Revenge –by 
contrast– knows no limit (Nozick in Banks, 2008; see also Stuckless & Goranson, 
1992). Unlike just desert motivations, the desire for vengeance does not seek to restore 
equity or justice: vengeance involves the emotional pleasure of seeing the offender 
suffer (Nozick in Banks, 2008; Ho et al., 2002; Weiner et al., 1997); and while revenge 
is often considered to be a personal matter, in retribution as just deserts there may be no 
tie to the victim (Nozick, in Banks, 2008; Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; Ho et al., 2002; 
Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). 
There are, then, some important arguments that retribution comprises at least 
two separate dimensions. Empirical studies also support this claim. For example De 
Keijser et al. (2002) asked Dutch judges to evaluate a range of items on punishment 
goals. Using factor analysis, they found two factors for retribution: just desert (what we 
here call revenge) and moral balance (what we here call just deserts). The first one 
considered items on deservingness, suffering and vengeance, while the second one 
included items on restoring legal and moral order in society, as well as beliefs that the 
offender should compensate society for the harm done. Similarly McKee & Feather 
(2008) distinguish between a legitimate desire for retributive punishment and personal 
revenge, finding that vengeance attitudes were positively related to retribution and 
incapacitation and negatively to the goal of rehabilitation. They concluded that: “At 
least some component of support for capital punishment does have a basis in attitudes 
related to vengeance” (McKee & Feather, 2008, p. 159). Finally Ho et al. (2002) used 
factor analysis to clarify the distinction between what they call vengeance-oriented and 
justice-oriented decisions. The authors highlight as main aspects of vengeance the role 
of emotions and the intensity of the response, while justice is measured as preferences 
for a fair and legal response. They developed a Justice-Vengeance Scale, which 
distinguished between two components of vengeance (emotionality and intensity of 
response) and two components of justice (fairness and legality of response).  
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Three objectives to the study 
One might thus argue that there are two dimensions to retribution:  one 
pertaining to the restoration of a sense of justice through proportional compensation 
from the offender (retribution as just deserts); the other comprising a less constructive 
use of punishment to retaliate a past wrong by making the offender suffer (retribution as 
revenge) (von Hirsch, 1976; see also Finckenauer, 1988; Ho et al., 2002). Yet, previous 
studies have either provided no empirical evidence of their distinction (e.g. von Hirsch, 
1976; Finckenauer, 1988) or combined in their measurement characteristics of 
punishment with the message that punishment seeks to communicate (De Keijser et al., 
2002) and the process by which sentences are assigned (Ho et al., 2002). In our study, 
we seek to disentangle what we understand as the core components of each retributive 
perspective (get even/suffer; compensation/proportionality) from the message 
punishment should send to society (e.g. restore moral balance) and the characteristics of 
the sentencing process (e.g. whether offenders should be treated harshly and denied 
procedural fairness). We build on previous research by considering both dimensions of 
retribution, as well as measures on the symbolic motives of punishment and the ways in 
which criminal offenders should be treated (harshness of punishment and sentencing 
decisions).  
The aims of this paper are threefold. First, we provide further evidence into the 
distinction between retribution as revenge and just deserts, developing measures that 
capture the core aspects of retribution. Second, we explore the motivational antecedents 
of both dimensions of retribution by looking at their relationship with ideological 
preferences and symbolic motives of punishment. Third, we examine the consequences 
of retribution as revenge and just deserts by looking at their relationship with 
preferences for harsh punishment and the denial of procedural fairness. In this paper we 
build on previous studies by proposing an encompassing model that describes the 
different motives that lie behind each retribution dimension, as well as the different 
consequences they carry in terms of beliefs about how criminal offenders should be 
treated.   
Figure 1 shows the theoretical model. Importantly, the directional arrows are not 
meant to suggest causality, reflecting plausible layers of ordered direct and indirect 
statistical effects, from ideological positions on the left to preferences on the treatment 
of law-breakers by the criminal courts. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework 
 
Objective 1: Defining and measuring two dimensions of retribution 
We start by defining what we understand by retribution as revenge and just 
deserts, testing whether they measure different concepts. Based on von Hirsch’s (1976; 
see also Finckenauer, 1988) distinction, we define retribution as revenge as the desire to 
get even with criminal offenders by making them suffer. Following De Keijser et al. 
(2002), to measure retribution as revenge we consider the aim of harming the offender 
and the desire to get even and retaliate a past wrong. This is also consistent with 
Finckenauer’s (1988) argument that in retribution as revenge it is society that evens the 
score with the offender and not the offender who compensates for the wrong done. 
Unlike Ho et al., (2002) we do not consider measures on the role of emotions in the 
decision process or the strength of the response as part of the measurement of retributive 
punishment. Rather, we consider separate measures on the fairness of procedures by 
which criminal offenders are punished (in terms of neutrality and whether emotions 
should play a role, as well as respecting the offender during the sentencing process) and 
the harshness of punishment.  
We define retribution as just deserts as the desire to restore justice by allowing 
the offender to compensate society proportionally to the harm he has done. Following 
von Hirsch’s  (1976; see also Finckenauer, 1988; De Keijser et al., 2002) point that in 
retribution as just desert, the offender pays back for the harm he has done, we also 
consider a dimension on punishment as a way in which the offender compensates for his 
wrongdoing. We highlight two dimensions of retribution as just deserts: proportionality 
and compensation. Note, however, that we have left out from this definition the 
restoration of moral balance in society. While communicative theories of punishment 
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are often classified as part of retribution (e.g. De Keijser et al., 2002), we consider the 
restoration of moral balance as not being part of the core concept of just deserts, but 
rather a symbolic motive of punishment. Crucially, moral balance might be relevant to 
both types of retribution and we seek to explore this relationship by separating 
conceptually and practically between goals and symbolic motives of punishment. We 
hypothesise that:  
 
H1:  One dimension of retribution will capture preferences for getting back at the 
offender and making him suffer (retribution as revenge) while the other 
dimension will comprise elements of proportionality and compensation 
(retribution as just deserts).  
 
Vidmar (2000) argues that regardless of differences in intensity and personal 
involvement between retribution and revenge, the social and psychological mechanisms 
that underlie both punishment goals are the same. In our study, we argue that different 
ideological preferences lie behind retribution as just deserts and revenge.  
 
Objective 2: Antecedents of retribution 
We hypothesise two layers of antecedents: symbolic motives of punishment 
(because different goals of punishment might communicate different messages to the 
community) and ideological positions (because people’s preferences for how society 
should be structured may drive how people perceive crime and appropriate institutional 
response to law-breaking). 
 
Symbolic motives of punishment. Two symbolic justice-related motives of 
punishment are often named in the literature: the first is status and power and the second 
is value restoration (Okimoto, Wenzel, & Feather, 2011; Vidmar, 2000; Vidmar & 
Miller, 1980; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). 
First, through crime, criminal offenders take advantage, assume superiority, and show 
disrespect for the victim and society (Miller, 2001; Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, 
Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011). Harsh punishment can degrade the offender’s status, 
empower the victim and society, and hereby restore the status quo in society (Okimoto 
& Wenzel, 2008, 2010; Vidmar, 2000; Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Wenzel et al., 2008; 
Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006).  
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Second, crime threatens common rules and values in society. Punishment  
symbolically labels the offence as wrong, thereby restoring people’s faith in shared 
values (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004; Vidmar & 
Miller, 1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Importantly, Wenzel and collaborators 
(Wenzel et al., 2008, 2012; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006) and Okimoto et al. (2011) have 
provided consistent evidence that status/power restoration motives are related to a 
retributive response to crime, while value restoration motives relate to a restorative 
perspective of punishment. However, retribution might also be related to value 
restoration motives (Vidmar, 2000; Wenzel et al., 2012) because harsh punishment can 
communicate to the community that crimes are unacceptable. Interestingly, Okimoto et 
al. (2011) found a relationship between value restoration directed at the community and 
retribution, concluding that harsh punishment can help restoring the values of the 
community. 
 In our study, we argue that status/power restoration motives are particularly 
relevant to a revenge perspective on retribution. Retaliating a past wrong by making the 
offender suffer demeans the status of the offender and returns power to victim and 
society. Retribution as revenge implies low commitment to procedural fairness and 
might thus be better suited to communicate to the offender that he is not part of the 
community and that people have low regard for him. Value restoration, in contrast, is 
argued to be relevant to a just deserts perspective on retribution: moral balance can be 
restored in society by assigning a punishment that allows the offender to compensate in 
proportion to the harm that he has done. We hypothesise that: 
 
H2:  Status and power restoration will be positively associated with retribution as 
revenge 
H3:  Value restoration will be positively associated with retribution as just deserts 
 
Ideological dispositions. Ideological attitudes are relevant to punishment goals, 
in that they are linked to different viewpoints about the causes of crime and the ways in 
which society should deal with it (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987). 
Carroll and colleagues showed that conservative ideologies relate to the belief that 
crime is committed by people who lack self-control and moral conscience and that harsh 
punishment is appropriate to bring offenders back on the right track. Liberal ideologies, 
on the other hand, are associated with the belief that crime is caused by structural 
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economical inequalities and problems of discrimination, and that rehabilitation and 
system reformation are appropriate to solve the crime problem. Two ideological 
dispositions have consistently been found to predict attitudes towards the punishment of 
criminal offenders: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) and 
social dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius, Mitchell, & Navarrete, 2006). However 
in line with a dual-motivational model (Duckitt, 2001) –and given that RWA and SDO 
have different motivational antecedents– they should predict punitive attitudes for 
different reasons and under different circumstances. Part of the contribution of this 
research is to examine whether RWA and SDO predict different retributive goals of 
punishment. 
Right-wing authoritarianism has been defined as the covariation of three 
attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and 
conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981). Capturing the motivational goal of collective 
security, RWA is thought to be rooted in a personality high in social conformity and 
made salient by social situations perceived to be dangerous. People high in RWA are 
motivated to achieve collective security and in-group conformity and should support 
punitive attitudes to restore value consensus (Duckitt, 2009). Linked to the support of 
harsh punishment (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988; Capps, 2002; Colémont, Van Hiel, & 
Cornelis, 2011; McKee & Feather, 2008) and to retributive reactions to criminal 
offences (Carroll et al., 1987; Feather, 1998; Funke, 2005; Lerner et al., 1998), RWA is 
also associated with moral balance, social constructiveness (Colémont et al., 2011), 
deterrence and incapacitation, but not with personal vengeance (McKee & Feather, 
2008). Overall, people high in RWA seem to be more likely to support punishment if it 
is conducted by legal authorities, but not if the victim seeks personal revenge (McKee & 
Feather, 2008). People high in RWA protect legitimised authorities, which seems to be 
more important than punishment itself. Feather (1998) showed that people high in RWA 
were more punitive towards someone who challenged authorities but less when it came 
to punishing a police officer.  
RWA has been shown to predict punishment undertaken by legal authorities and 
not to achieve personal vengeance. We argue that people high in RWA reject personal 
vengeance not so much because of concerns for its harshness (recall that RWA has been 
related to the support for harsh punishment and retribution, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), but 
because it is not sanctioned by legal authorities. Then the question is what happens with 
state-sponsored revenge. We hypothesise that people high in RWA will be more likely 
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to endorse retribution as revenge to the extent that it is undertaken by authorities. RWA 
should thus be positively associated with both dimensions of retribution.3 Furthermore, 
high RWA individuals seek to maintain in-group conformity (‘in-group conformity 
hypothesis’, Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008) and they should favour harsh 
punishment to restore people’s faith in shared values. The effect of RWA on 
punitiveness should be mediated by a symbolic motive to restore values. We 
hypothesise that:  
  
H4:  RWA will be positively related to retribution as just deserts and revenge, and its 
effect will be mediated by a value restoration motive 
 
  Social dominance orientation has been defined as a preference for hierarchical 
relations between social groups as well as for in-group domination over out-groups 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO captures the motivational goal of 
group dominance, power and superiority. SDO is predisposed by a tough-minded 
personality and made salient by the view that society is a competitive place (Duckitt, 
2001). SDO captures two dimensions: a general preference for inequality, expressed by 
the subscale of opposition to equality (OEQ), and a preference for one’s in-group 
dominating over out-groups, expressed by group-based dominance  (GBD, Jost & 
Thompson, 2000; see also Ho et al., 2012; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010). Group-
based dominance reflects an active preference for overtly hierarchical relationships of 
dominance over subordinate groups, and it has been found to be related to aggressive 
intergroup attitudes (Ho et al., 2012). Opposition to equality, on the other hand, reflects 
a more subtle preference for unequal relationships, and has been found to predict 
conservatism and the opposition to policies of redistribution (Ho et al., 2012). Justice 
attitudes have also been found to relate in different ways to GBD and OEQ (McKee & 
Feather, 2008) and it is thus important to distinguish between these two subscales. 
  People high in SDO have been shown to endorse attitudes that allow reinforcing 
status boundaries (Thomsen et al., 2008 ) and are predicted to support punitive attitudes 
to take away power and status from criminal offenders and to justify inequalities more 
broadly (status and power restoration motive). In fact, SDO has been linked to support 
                                               
3 While it is also possible to evaluate the separate role of the sub-dimensions of RWA (conventionalism 
and submission to authorities), preliminary analyses of our data suggest that they relate in similar ways to 
punitive attitudes and we thus consider them together. 
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for harsh criminal sanctions (Sidanius et al., 2006), general punitiveness (Capps, 2002), 
retribution (Pratto et al., 1994) and personal vengeance (McKee & Feather, 2008). 
McKee and Feather (2008) hypothesised and provided evidence that SDO and vengeful 
attitudes achieve common goals, namely, the goals of power and dominance over 
others, and a lack of concern for equality and welfare. Crucially, the authors argued that 
people who value power would be motivated to get even when they perceive a threat to 
their own personal power and social position.  
  Nonetheless, few studies have evaluated the effect of SDO controlling for RWA. 
While one study found a significant effect of SDO after controlling for RWA (Capps, 
2002), two studies found no relationship between SDO and punitive attitudes after 
controlling for RWA (Colémont et al., 2011; McKee & Feather, 2008). First, Colémont 
et al. (2011) found no effect of SDO on moral balance, harsh punishment (a 
combination of instrumental and retributive goals) and social constructiveness. Second, 
McKee and Feather (2008) found no effect of SDO on support for capital punishment, 
after controlling for personal vengeance and RWA. These inconsistent findings might 
be due to the confounding of different punishment goals, the fact that they controlled for 
RWA and authoritarian aggression (which usually includes items on the harsh 
punishment of criminal offenders) and the fact that they have considered SDO as a 
whole, while only GBD has been found to predict punitive attitudes.  
  In relation to the subscales of SDO, Okimoto et al. (2011) found a link between 
GBD and retribution and concluded that people high in GBD compete with criminal 
offenders for status and power.  OEQ had a negative relationship with the support for 
rehabilitation, but no relationship with retribution. In this study we evaluate the effects 
of GBD and OEQ separately, excluding items on authoritarian aggression from the 
RWA scale. Knowing that SDO –and in particular, GBD- predicts preferences for 
personal revenge, we evaluate whether it also predicts state-sponsored revenge in cases 
where there is no personal involvement. In line with McKee and Feather’s (2008) 
finding on personal revenge, we expect SDO to be especially relevant to retribution as 
revenge because both seek the goal of power and dominance over others. Group-based 
competition for power and status is likely to lead to a vengeful response to crime 
because revenge is especially demeaning to criminal offenders and might help to 
reinforce status boundaries. A just deserts response, on the other hand, implies a 
minimum respect for the offender and will not help restoring power and status 
relationships. Thus, we do not expect SDO to be a relevant predictor of just deserts. 
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This is, unlike RWA, only retribution as revenge will satisfy the needs of those high in 
SDO to see the offender excluded from society and restore status boundaries. We 
hypothesise that: 
 
H5:  SDO will be positively related to retribution as revenge and its effect will be 
mediated by a status and power restoration motive 
 
Objective 3: Treatment of criminal offenders 
What are some of the consequences of different retribution beliefs? We examine 
the relationship between retributive dimensions and the beliefs people hold about how 
criminal offenders should be treated, both doing court proceedings and in the 
sentencing. Previous research has shown a close relationship between retributive 
perspectives of punishment, harsh punitive responses (Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug, & 
Gabriel, 2002) and the denial of voice and respect to criminal offenders (Okimoto et al., 
2011). Yet, we expect different preferences for the treatment of criminal offenders 
depending on people’s beliefs about the goals of punishment.  
We rely on procedural justice theory to provide an explanation on the 
relationship between theories of punishment and the treatment of criminal offenders. 
Procedural justice highlights the importance of the process by which outcomes are 
determined, more than the outcomes themselves (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990). 
According to the group value theory (Lind & Tyler, 1988), people care about being 
treated fairly because fair treatment communicates group status and membership. 
Crucially, people derive information on their social identities and whether they are 
respected within the group based on the ways in which they are treated (Boeckmann & 
Tyler, 1997). It follows that denying procedural fairness to criminal offenders 
communicates that they are not considered as members of the in-group (Boeckmann & 
Tyler, 1997) or at least that they are considered to be low in status. Boeckmann & Tyler 
(1997) argued and provided evidence that people are willing to deny procedural fairness 
to criminal offenders when they are perceived as a physical or financial threat 
(instrumental model) or when they threaten common values (symbolic model). This is, 
offenders perceived to be different from or outsiders to the community are likely to be 
denied procedural protections. To deny procedural justice in court is to communicate 
low status to people being tried for a crime. 
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Harsh treatment of criminal offenders and the denial of procedural fairness to 
people being prosecuted for a crime are thus likely to go hand in hand with the 
motivation to restore status and power relationships in society. The motivation to get 
even and retaliate a past wrong has been argued to allow reinforcing status boundaries 
with criminal offenders: applying harsh punishment and denying procedural fairness 
demeans the offender’s status. It is thus argued that those who favour retribution to 
achieve revenge will be more likely to support harsh punishment and deny procedural 
fairness to criminal offenders. A just deserts perspective, on the other hand, assumes 
some level of commitment with legal and fair processes and should thus be negatively 
related to the denial of procedural fairness. Given its focus on proportionality, the extent 
to which a just deserts perspective relates to preferences for harsh punishment should 
depend on the severity of the crime. Since we are measuring punishment goals in 
general, we do not specify a hypothesis about the relationship between just deserts and 
harsh punishment. We hypothesise that: 
 
H6:  The support for harsh punishment will be positively related to retribution as 
revenge  
H7:  Denial of procedural fairness will be positively related to retribution as revenge 
and negatively related to retribution as just deserts 
 
Type of crime 
On a final note, respondents may favour different types of retribution depending 
upon the type of crime, or depending upon characteristics of criminals that come to 
mind when completing the survey. Previous research has shown that people are more 
willing to deny procedural fairness to suspects with prior records (McClosky & Brill, 
1983). Similarly, violent crime might elicit harsher responses and lower concerns for the 
wellbeing of criminal offenders. In this study, we asked respondents the type of crime 
they had in mind when completing the survey and used this as a control variable. Again, 
we do not make any predictions in relation to the role of the type of crime.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
211 persons from the US participated in an online study posted on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk.4  35 participants (17%) were excluded for failing to respond correctly 
to at least one out of two validation questions embedded in the study. The reported 
results correspond to 176 participants. The sample was diverse in terms of gender (50% 
female), age (Min=17, Max=72, M=34, SD=13.3), occupation (52% worked, 22% 
students, 14% unemployed) and ideology (56% leaning to the left, 21% centre, 24% 
leaning to the right); although less diverse in terms of ethnicity (86% white).   
 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in a study on crime and punishment. They 
were paid 0.50 US dollars for their participation and requested to give informed 
consent. Before taking part in the study, an instructional manipulation check 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) was used to make sure that participants 
were reading the instructions. Participants were requested to skip rather than answer a 
question and only participants who did not answer the question were able to participate 
in the study. This manipulation was used to screen out people who do random clicking 
and to increase attention of the remaining participants (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). 
Participants were then asked to answer a questionnaire measuring background socio-
demographic questions, RWA, SDO, punishment goals, symbolic motives of 
punishment and attitudes towards due process. Finally, respondents were asked to 
provide information on the type of crime they had in mind when completing the survey, 
and debriefed.  
 
Measures 
Retribution. Scales of retribution were reviewed (De Keijser et al., 2002; 
Finckenauer, 1988; Ho et al., 2002; Okimoto et al., 2011) and items were adapted to 
measure retribution as revenge and retribution as just deserts. Retribution as revenge has 
been defined as the use of harsh punishment to get even with the offender, and is 
                                               
4 Studies on the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to collect data have concluded that not only is the data 
as reliable as data collected through other means, but participants are also more diverse in terms of socio-
demographic variables (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
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hypothesised to go hand in hand with the thought that punishment should make the 
offender suffer. Two subscales were designed to capture retribution as revenge: 
suffering and getting even. Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, has been 
defined as a desire to restore justice by allowing the offender to compensate to society 
proportionally to the harm he has done. It was measured using two subscales: 
proportionality and compensation. Table 1 displays the items of each subscale and 
descriptive statistics.  7-point likert scales were used for these and all other measures in 
the survey.  
 
Table 1 
Items on retribution as revenge and retribution as just deserts (n=176) 
  Mean SD 
Retribution as revenge 
Suffer 
    
Infliction of suffering should be an explicit element in every sanction 3.38 1.63 
Punishment without an element of suffering is no punishment 4.13 1.60 
Punishment is deserved suffering 4.30 1.64 
   
Get even 
  
We should punish to get even with the offender 3.00 1.63 
Society should punish to get back at criminal offenders 3.50 1.72 
Society has the right to take revenge on criminal offenders 3.52 1.75 
      
Retribution as just deserts     
Proportionality     
The severity of the punishment should be proportional to the harm done 5.69 1.10 
Criminals should be punished proportionally to the harm done to society 5.53 1.18 
The severity of the punishment should fit the severity of the crime  5.72 1.18 
 
Compensation 
    
By undergoing punishment, a criminal pays off his debt to society 4.76 1.54 
Justice is restored when an offender pays back for the harm he has caused 4.86 1.46 
By means of punishment the criminal offender compensates for the harm 
he caused to society 
4.73 1.55 
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Ideological attitudes. RWA was measured using 12 items from Duckitt, 
Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled’s (2010) adaptation of Altemeyer’s (1998) items. Six items 
measured conventionalism and six items measured authoritarian submission. Half of the 
items of each scale were reverse coded to control for acquiescence response bias. 
Authoritarian aggression items usually refer to crime and punishment issues either 
explicitly (e.g. ‘Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take 
advantage of your weakness, so it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with 
them’, Duckitt et al., 2010) or implicitly (e.g. ‘We should smash all the negative 
elements that are causing trouble in our society’, Duckitt et al., 2010). While these items 
might be useful in predicting prejudice and other intergroup attitudes, including them in 
our study would lead to tautological conclusions of aggression against criminal 
offenders predicting the support for their harsh punishment. In our study we thus 
excluded items on authoritarian aggression. SDO was measured using 12 items from 
Pratto et al. (1994), six for group-based dominance and six for opposition to equality. 
Symbolic motives of punishment. Value restoration was measured using two 
items  adapted from Okimoto et al.’s (2011) other-value restoration scale: ‘Punishment 
should reinforce for others the values that the offender’s behavior undermined’ and 
‘Punishment should express to others that the offender’s behavior violated the values we 
should all share’. Status and power restoration motive was measured using two items. 
One item was adapted from Okimoto et al.’s (2011) status/power reduction goal scale: 
‘Punishment should communicate to the offender that people have low regard for him’. 
The second item was designed for this study: ‘Punishment should humiliate the 
offender’.  
Treatment of criminal offenders. Two scales were developed to measure 
people’s beliefs about how criminal offenders should be treated: harsh punishment and 
denial of procedural fairness (see Appendix). Four items – two positively phrased and 
two negatively phrased – measured the support for harsh punitive measures (e.g. 
‘People who break the law should be given harsher sentences’). Based on procedural 
fairness literature (e.g. Tyler, 1990) two dimensions were considered to measure denial 
of procedural fairness: whether the criminal offender should be treated with respect (3 
items) and whether the sentencing process should be neutral or allow emotional 
sentencing (6 items). In this way, items on emotional sentencing (Ho et al., 2002) were 
considered as part of a belief that the courts should not have to follow neutral 
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procedures when deciding on the appropriate punishment. Descriptive statistics and 
correlations are presented in Table 3. 
Type of crime. Finally, we asked respondents to report the type of crime they 
had primarily in mind when completing the survey. The options were: property crimes 
(e.g. theft or burglary), violent crime (e.g. assault or murder), sexual crime (e.g. rape), 
drug offences, fraud, vandalism and other. Most respondents chose violent crime 
(64.2%), followed by property crimes (11.9%) and drug offences (11.4%). This measure 
was recoded into a dummy variable, with 1 corresponding to violent or sexual crime and 
0 to the rest.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Baseline models for retributive justice 
 
 
Analysis 
The first aim of this paper was to evaluate whether retribution as vengeance and 
retribution as just deserts in fact measured two different concepts. Confirmatory factor 
analysis with MPLUS was carried out to model the dimensions specified above (suffer, 
getting even, proportionality, and compensation). A model where all dimensions loaded 
on one higher order factor (Figure 1, Model 1) was compared to a model where 
suffering and getting even loaded on one higher order factor (‘retribution as revenge’) 
and proportionality and compensation loaded on a second higher order factor 
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(‘retribution as just deserts’, Figure 1, Model 2). Fit statistics were then used to compare 
the adequacy of both models. In a second stage structural equation modeling was used 
to examine the relationship between retribution, ideology, symbolic motives of 
punishment and attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders.  
 
Results 
 
The dimensionality of retribution 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to compare the fit of a one-factor 
and a two-factor model of retribution. Figure 2 shows the models tested and Table 2 
presents the fit statistics for both models. Model 1 predicts that the four sub-dimensions 
(getting even, suffer, proportionality and compensation) are part of a second order factor 
called retribution. Model 2, on the other hand, predicts that two dimensions capture the 
relationship between the sub-dimensions: retribution as revenge (getting even and 
making the offender suffer) and retribution as just deserts (proportionality and 
compensation). Second order factors were used given that different dimensions are 
hypothesised to underlie both retribution types. 
 
Table 2 
Fit statistics for one- and two-factor models (n=176) 
Model χ2 df p SRMR CFI 
1 factor 89.0 50 0.001 0.07 0.96 
2 factors 70.3 49 0.025 0.05 0.98 
 
 
The two-factor model showed a very good fit according to Hu and Bentler’s 
(1999) criteria (Model 2: χ2(49)=70.3, p=.025; CFI=0.98; SRMR=0.05). The fit of the 
one-factor model was slightly worse (Model 1: χ2(50)=89.0, p=.001; CFI=0.96; 
SRMR=0.07), although its fit was still close to conventional levels. While one could 
reasonably argue in favour of both models, we explore the two-factor option as it 
provides a slightly better fit. It is also of theoretical interest to evaluate whether these 
two dimensions of retribution are differentially related to ideological preferences and 
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the treatment of criminal offenders. Figure 3 presents the factor loadings for the first 
and second order factors. Note that while a two factor model fits the data better, 
retribution as revenge and just deserts are still highly correlated (r=.61, p<.01) and 
special caution was placed in the remaining analyses to rule out multicollinearity issues. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Confirmatory factor analysis of a two-factor model of retribution (n=176) 
Notes. Standardised coefficients are shown. For all coefficients p<.01.  
 
 
Ideological and motivational antecedents of retribution as revenge and just deserts 
We start by exploring the relationship between retribution as revenge, just 
deserts, ideological dispositions and symbolic motives of punishment. Table 3 presents 
the bivariate correlations between all variables in the study. Factor scores derived from 
Model 2 (Figure 3) were used for retribution as revenge and just deserts. Means were 
used for all other variables.   
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Retribution as revenge was positively and significantly correlated with RWA, 
GBD (r=.32, p<.01) and value restoration (r=.35, p<.01), and particularly with status 
and power restoration (r=.64, p<.01), harsh punishment (r=.59, p<.01) and the denial of 
fair process (r=.54, p<.01). The correlation with opposition to equality was very modest 
(r=.18, p<.05). Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, was positively and 
significantly correlated with RWA, values and status restoration, harsh punishment 
(rs>.41, ps<.01), but not with the subscales of SDO (ps>.05). The association with the 
denial of fair process was positive but rather small (r=.20, p<.01). 
Structural equation modeling was then used to model the relationship between 
retribution, treatment of criminal offenders, ideological dispositions and symbolic 
motives of punishment. Given that opposition to equality showed only a modest 
statistical effect on both retribution as revenge and just deserts, we decided to exclude it 
from the structural equation model. To avoid complicating the model by using second 
order factors, derived factor scores were used for the sub-dimensions of retribution. 
Parcels were also used to measure RWA, GBD, and the denial of procedural fairness. 
To maintain the dimensions of RWA, one parcel was constructed to measure 
authoritarian submission and the other one to measure conventionalism. In relation to 
GBD, items were randomly assigned to one of two parcels. Finally, two dimensions 
were used as parcels for the denial of procedural fairness: respect and neutrality of 
procedures. The use of item parcels has been shown to improve model fit and provide 
more stable solutions when the sample size is small (see Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & 
Widaman, 2002). Also, Little et al. (2002) recommend this approach for studies –such 
as this– where the aim is to explore relationships between latent variables and not factor 
structures.5 
First, a model was fitted where GBD and RWA predicted symbolic motives of 
punishment and these, in turn, predicted vengeance and deserts. Vengeance and deserts, 
on the other hand, were modeled to predict harsh punishment and denial of procedural 
fairness.6 This model, however, did not fit the data very well. Modification indices 
                                               
5 Given the high correlation between the fitted factor scores for retribution as revenge and just deserts 
(r=.70, p<.01) we first tested for multicollinearity. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were all below 3.1, 
which suggests that despite the high correlation, multicollinearity problems were only moderate.  
6 We should note, however, that we do not wish to imply a causal path from ideological dispositions to 
symbolic motives of punishment, retributive justice and the treatment of criminal offenders. Our use of 
structural equation model seeks to organise and disentangle variables and their relationships more than 
proposing that some variables are temporarily prior to others. While it may be possible to argue that 
RWA and SDO are prior to attitudes towards punishment and criminal offenders, respondents are likely 
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recommended adding direct effects from RWA to retribution as revenge and just 
deserts, as well as harsh punishment and due process. Also, a direct effect from 
status/power restoration to denying due process was added. Figure 4 displays the final 
model, which had a good overall fit: χ2(127)=196.74, χ2/df=1.55; CFI=0.97; 
SRMR=0.06. 
The findings showed that status and power restoration was predicted by GBD 
(β=.42, p<.01) and to a lesser degree by RWA (β=.20, p<.05). The model predicted 
30.9% of the variance of status restoration. Value restoration, on the other hand, was 
positively predicted by RWA (β=.49, p<.01) and negatively predicted by GBD (β=-.21, 
p<.01). RWA and GBD explained 23.3% of the variance in value restoration. 
Status and power restoration was the main predictor of retribution as revenge 
(β=.62, p<.01), followed by RWA (β=.27, p<.01). Interestingly, both GBD (β=.26, 
p<.01) and, to a lesser degree, RWA (β=.12, p<.05) had indirect effects on revenge 
mediated by the restoration of status and power. The model explained 57.7% of the 
variance in retribution as revenge. Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, was 
predicted by value restoration (β=.29, p<.01), status restoration (β=.24, p<.01) and 
RWA (β=.26, p<.01). RWA had also indirect effects via value restoration (β=.14, 
p<.01). GBD, on the other hand, had both a positive indirect effect on just deserts 
mediated by status restoration (β=.10, p<.05) and a negative indirect effect mediated by 
value restoration (β= -.06, p<.05). However, the total effect of GBD on just deserts was 
non-significant. This model predicted 39.5% of the variance of retribution as just 
deserts. 
 It should be noted that the presented model controlled for the type of crime 
respondents were thinking about when completing the survey. A dummy for type of 
crime (1=violent) was added as a predictor of symbolic motives of punishment, 
retribution and the treatment of criminal offenders. Only status restoration (β=.22, 
p<.01) and harsh punishment (β=.22, p<.01) were affected by the type of crime: 
Respondents who had violent or sexual crime in mind when completing the survey were 
more likely to seek punishment to restore status and power relationships in society and 
were more supportive of applying harsh punitive measures.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
to think of symbolic motives, retribution and the treatment of criminal offenders as dimensions of the 
same attitude.  
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Finally, harsh punishment was predicted by retribution as revenge (β=.34, 
p<.01) and RWA (β=.52, p<.01). After controlling for revenge and RWA, just deserts 
had no effect on the support for stiff sentences. These variables explained 62.8% of the 
variance in harsh punishment. Denial of procedural fairness, on the other hand, was 
strongly and positively predicted by revenge (β=.66, p<.01), status restoration (β=.44, 
p<.01) and RWA (β=.23, p<.05). After controlling for these variables, just deserts 
became a negative predictor of denying procedural fairness (β=-.47, p<.01), and so did 
value restoration (β=-.28, p<.01). Taken together these variables explained 75.3% of the 
variance in procedural fairness.  
It is also worth noting that RWA had both positive and negative indirect effects 
on the denial of procedural fairness. On the one hand, it had positive indirect effects 
through revenge (β=.18, p<.01) and status restoration (β=.09, p<.10). On the other hand, 
it had negative indirect effects through just deserts (β=-.12, p<.05) and value restoration 
(β=-.14, p<.05). This is, people high in RWA seek to avenge crimes to restore status 
relationships, but they are also concerned about values and proportionality. Overall, 
these indirect effects cancelled each other out and the only significant effect was its 
positive direct effect on the denial of procedural fairness (β=.23, p<.05). GBD, on the 
other hand, had a positive indirect effect on the denial of procedural fairness, through 
the desire to restore status relationships (β=.39, p<.01). Both RWA (β=.14, p<.01) and 
GBD (β=.09, p<.01) had positive indirect effects on harsh punishment, mediated by 
revenge and status restoration. 
 
Discussion 
Based on the arguments of Von Hirsch (1976) and Finckenauer (1988), and 
previous research that have tested this distinction empirically (Ho et al., 2002; De 
Keijster et al., 2002), in this paper we proposed new measures of retribution that sought 
to capture their core components. Crucially, we sought to disentangle punishment goals 
from the message punishment should communicate and characteristics of the sentencing 
process.  The findings presented in this paper show further evidence for the utility of 
distinguishing between retribution as revenge and just deserts, especially when linking 
beliefs about the purpose of punishment to people’s preferences for the treatment of 
law-breakers. First, as predicted (H1) a two-factor model of retribution showed a better 
fit than a one-factor model. One dimension (retribution as revenge) involved dimensions 
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of getting even and making the offender suffer, while the second dimension (retribution 
as just deserts) comprised dimensions of compensation and proportionality.  
Second, and perhaps most interestingly, retribution as revenge and just deserts 
differed in their motivational antecedents and preferences for the treatment of criminal 
offenders. Our findings suggest that the desires to get even and make the offender suffer 
are rooted in the motivation to endorse status boundaries with criminal offenders: both a 
status restoration motive (H2) and the desire to dominate over out-groups (as expressed 
by GBD, H5) predicted retribution as revenge. Also, as predicted (H4) those high in 
RWA were also more likely to endorse revenge to the extent that it was conducted by 
authorities. Consistent with the motivation to communicate low status to criminal 
offenders, revenge predicted the support for harsh punitive measures (H6) as well as the 
denial of procedural fairness (H7). That is, revenge, harsh punishment and the denial of 
procedural fairness seem to be the preferred means to re-establish a position of 
dominance over criminal offenders and communicate that people have low regard for 
them. 
 Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, was rooted in right-wing 
authoritarianism (H4), and the motivations to restore values (H3) and, unlike predicted, 
status and power. That is, unlike revenge, just deserts was also motivated by a more 
constructive desire to communicate good moral values to society. In terms of its 
relationship with the treatment of criminal offenders, just deserts had positive 
correlations with harsh punishment and the denial of procedural fairness (although the 
latter was very small). However, once revenge was controlled for, the effect of just 
deserts on harsh punishment became non-significant and the effect on the denial of 
procedural fairness became negative (H7).  The high correlation between just deserts 
and revenge shows that people who support punishment to achieve just deserts tend to 
support punishment to achieve revenge as well. However, at any given level of 
vengefulness, concerns about proportionality and compensation may actually reduce 
people’s desires to deny due process and respect to criminal offenders.  
 The present research also provides interesting information on the differential 
reasons why people high in SDO and RWA support punitive policies. Previous research 
has shown that people high in SDO seek to clarify status boundaries by persecuting 
immigrants who seek to assimilate to the host culture (Thomsen et al., 2008). This status 
boundary enforcement hypothesis is consistent with our findings that people high in 
GBD endorsed a status and power restoration motive of punishment and that this motive 
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mediated its effect on retribution as vengeance (H5). This is, individuals high in GBD 
might perceive a negative interdependence with criminal offenders and seek harsh 
punishment to dominate over them. Past research showed that GBD predicts personal 
revenge (McKee and Feather, 2008). The present study provides evidence that high 
GBD individuals will also support state-sponsored punishment to get even with the 
offender, even if there is no personal involvement. The common factor here seems to be 
the desire to take away status and power from criminal offenders, regardless of who is 
in charge of the punishment. The latter suggests that people high in GBD do not only 
respond to personal threats to their power and position in society; they might also 
perceive crime as a threat to general hierarchies and power relationships in society.  
 The effect of RWA was more widespread. High RWA individuals sought to 
restore values in society and the latter mediated their preferences for retribution as just 
deserts (H4). This is consistent with an in-group conformity hypothesis (Thomsen et al., 
2008) according to which people high in RWA will express negative attitudes to people 
who deviate from common norms and values. However, RWA also predicted status and 
power restoration motives and revenge. This result is inconsistent with findings on the 
lack of relationship between RWA and personal vengeance (McKee & Feather, 2008). 
Overall, people high in RWA seem to support punishment to the extent that it is 
undertaken by legitimised authorities, but not when an individual seeks personal 
revenge. Interestingly, while the crucial factor for GBD seems to be the content (get 
even and reduce the offender’s status), the crucial factor for RWA appears to be the 
form (punishment conducted by legal authorities). The effect of RWA on status 
restoration is consistent with the argument that criminal offenders gaining influence can 
also disrupt order and security in society (see Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009 for a discussion 
on prejudice). 
Revenge and just deserts might correspond to two different strategies used by 
high RWA individuals to restore in-group conformity: reforming the criminal offender 
and including him back into society (which might be achieved by restoring values, 
compensation and a proportional punishment) or excluding the offender from society 
and protect the identity of the group (which might be achieved through status restoration 
and vengeance). The preference for one or the other strategy might depend on whether 
the criminal offender is perceived to be part of the in-group or to belong to an out-
group. People are likely to choose revenge and the exclusion of the criminal offender 
when they do not feel identified with the offender and when he is perceived to be part of 
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an out-group. In this case, exclusion can help protect the identity of the group. This is 
also consistent with a negative bias towards out-group members, as proposed by social 
identity theory (Feather & Souter, 2002; see also Boeckmann & Tyler, 1997 for 
research on denying procedural fairness). On the other hand, people are likely to show a 
positive bias towards in-group members and favour just deserts and the restoration of 
values when they identify with the criminal offender. Consistent with this argument, 
previous research (Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006; see also Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010) has 
found that just deserts was a stronger predictor of punitive decisions when respondents 
had low identification with the nation, while alternative punishment and the desire to 
restore values was relevant when respondents were highly identified.  However, the 
opposite might also be true: according to the ‘black sheep effect’ devaluing the offender 
might help to protect the identity of the group (Marques, 1990; Okimoto & Wenzel, 
2010). Indeed, Marques (1990) showed that reactions to norm violations tend to be 
stronger when the offender is part of the in-group. The perceived social identity of the 
offender might also interact with dispositional variables. Kemmelmeier (2005), for 
example, found stronger support for the punishment of Black defendants among high 
SDO individuals, while low SDO individuals were more punitive towards White 
defendants. This is, perceiving the offender as part of a disadvantaged out-group might 
lead people high in SDO to support punishment as a way of enhancing inequalities. On 
the contrary, egalitarian people may want to compensate for discrimination that is 
usually directed at minority groups (see also Green, Thomsen, Sidanius, Staerklé, & 
Potanina, 2009). More research is required on the interaction between identification 
with the criminal offender, ideological dispositions and retributive reactions to crime. 
 
Conclusions and study limitations 
In this paper we have sought to provide further evidence into the distinction 
between two types of retribution: retribution as revenge and retribution as just deserts. 
We have argued that these two dimensions are better conceptualised as being two 
distinct –albeit empirically associated– concepts, and we have shown that they differ (at 
least to some extent) in their ideological antecedents and consequences in terms of the 
treatment of criminal offenders. Retribution as revenge was defined as a desire to get 
even with the offender by making him suffer. It was found to be rooted in ideological 
preferences for group-based dominance as well as goals to restore status and power 
relationships in society. It strongly predicted preferences for harsh punishment and the 
132 
 
denial of procedural fairness. Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, has been 
defined as the desire to restore justice by allowing the perpetrator to compensate 
proportionally to the harm done. It was found to stem from ideological preferences for 
collective security, order and value consensus, as well as a desire to restore status and 
power relationships. Crucially, once revenge was controlled for, retribution as just 
deserts predicted the belief that criminal offenders deserve respect and due process. 
The main limitation of this study is that punishment goals were measured 
directly. Ellsworth and Ross (1983) have shown that respondents tend to agree with all 
possible justifications that are consistent with their position on capital punishment. The 
authors concluded that justifications do not drive respondent’s positions on punishment, 
but positions drive their justifications. Similarly, Carlsmith (2008) has shown a 
discrepancy between people’s preferences for utilitarian and retributive goals and the 
actual way in which they assign punishment. Crucially, while people endorse utilitarian 
views, they assign punishment in line with retributive factors. To deal with this 
problem, Carlsmith et al. (2002) have designed vignettes that refer to factors that are 
relevant only to one goal of punishment (e.g. seriousness of the offence or likelihood of 
recidivism). Yet, in our study the distinction between retribution as revenge and just 
deserts lies in characteristic of punishment more than characteristics of the crime. Such 
approach might thus not be possible. Future research might, however, design 
descriptions of punishments that are consistent with revenge and just deserts 
perspectives and ask participants to rate their appropriateness. 
A second limitation of this study refers to the generality of talking about ‘crime 
in general’. Studies have shown that when asked to think about crime, people usually 
think of violent crime (Roberts & Doob, 1990; Stalans, 2009). People’s preferences for 
revenge or just deserts might thus depend on the type of crime, with more serious 
crimes evoking stronger support for revenge.  In our study we asked participant the type 
of crime they had in mind when completing the scales and were able to control for this. 
However, future research could measure punishment goals in relation to particular 
crimes types and examine whether the patterns of relationships change. Finally, short 
scales were used to measure retribution as just deserts and revenge and the treatment of 
criminal offenders. It is for future research to provide further evidence using longer and 
more reliable scales. 
It should also be noted that the distinction between retribution as revenge and 
just deserts is just one of a number of possible dimensions of punishment goals. For 
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example, Vidmar and Miller (1980; see also Orth, 2003; Oswald et al., 2002) 
differentiate punishment goals regarding whether they focus on a micro (offender and 
victim) or macro (society) perspective. It can be argued that retribution as revenge is 
concerned with the relationship between victim and offender while just deserts refers to 
concerns about restoring balance in society as a whole. More research is required to 
evaluate how different dimensions of retribution relate to the objects of punishment.  
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Appendix 
 
Items on the treatment of criminal offenders  
 
Harsh punishment 
- People who break the law should be given harsher sentences 
- The use of harsh punishment should be avoided whenever possible 
- We should make sentences more severe for all crimes 
- If prison has to be used, it should be used sparingly and only as a last option 
 
Procedural justice: respect 
- After committing an offense, criminal offenders lose the right to be treated with 
respect 
- Despite what has happened, criminal offenders are entitled to treatment with 
respect and politeness 
- Criminal offenders deserve to be treated with dignity and respect 
 
Procedural justice: neutral sentencing 
- When deciding on the appropriate punishment, criminal offenders do not 
deserve to be treated according to fair rules and procedures 
- It is essential to ensure fairness and consistency when deciding on the 
appropriate punishment of criminal offenders 
- In deciding a criminal case, it is important to be objective when considering the 
evidence 
- In deciding a criminal case, it is okay to allow emotions to influence judgements 
- In deciding a criminal case, it is alright to allow anger toward the defendant to 
play a part in the decision 
- In deciding a criminal case, the decision should be based in part, on subjective, 
personal feelings  
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INTERLUDE 2 
High RWA and high SDO individuals differ in the reasons why they call for 
harsher sentences. Paper 2 provides further evidence that they also differ –at least to 
some extent– in their views about the purpose of punishment in society. People high in 
SDO are concerned about maintaining status boundaries with criminal offenders and 
seek for revenge, harsh punishment and a disrespectful treatment of criminal offenders 
to achieve this. Importantly, denying a fair sentencing process to criminal offenders has 
been argued to communicate that people have low regard for them. As in Paper 1, the 
effect of RWA was more widespread. People high in RWA sought to restore values, as 
well as status and power relationships, and they were in favour of assigning punishment 
to achieve revenge as well as just deserts.  
Papers 1 and 2 presented correlational evidence into the different reasons why 
high RWA and high SDO individuals seek to punish, as well as their views on the 
appropriate role of punishment in society. These findings show that there are two 
underlying motives of punishment: to restore collective security, on the one hand, and 
power and status relationships, on the other. It remains to be seen under what conditions 
each of these motives will be relevant in predicting punitive reactions. Paper 3 and 4 
present findings from experimental research on the role of the social and experimental 
context in shaping the relationships between RWA, SDO and punitive attitudes.
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PAPER 3 
 
 
 
On the interplay between disposition and situation:  
The effects of priming dangerous and competitive worldviews on the relationship 
between ideology and punitive attitudes 
 
Monica M. Gerber 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper looks at the ways in which different social worldviews activate the effects of 
ideological dispositions on attitudes towards the punishment of criminal offenders. 
Applying Duckitt’s (2001) dual-motivational model and Duckitt and Sibley’s (2009) 
differential moderation hypothesis, dangerous and competitive world conditions are 
predicted to moderate the effects of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social 
dominance orientation (SDO) on punitive attitudes and symbolic motives of 
punishment. In an online experiment (n=246) dangerous and competitive worldviews 
were primed using a scramble sentence exercise. Results showed that only when the 
social condition was primed to be competitive did people high in group-based 
dominance (GBD) support the harsh sentencing of criminal offenders; moreover, this 
effect was in part mediated by increasing support for a status and power restoration 
motive. RWA, on the other hand, had a consistent effect across experimental conditions: 
it predicted punitive attitudes, and this effect was mediated by motivations to restore 
both collective security, and power and status in society. The paper concludes that 
people high in RWA are chronically inclined to perceive the world as a dangerous place 
and to perceive criminal offenders as threatening collective security, while people high 
in SDO do not seem to be readily predisposed to think of criminals as threats to the 
hierarchical structure of society. 
 
Keywords: punitive attitudes, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, 
social conditions, dangerous worldview, competitive worldview 
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An ideological perspective of attitudes towards the punishment of criminal 
offenders understands these as being rooted in different views about the proper order of 
society and how people and institutions ought to behave. Consistent with a dual-
motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, 
& Birum, 2002), two conservative ideological attitudes have been found to predict the 
support for harsh sentencing: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance 
orientation (SDO). People high in RWA show retributive reactions (Carroll, Perkowitz, 
Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987; Feather, 1998; Funke, 2005; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 
1998), general punitiveness (Capps, 2002), and support the use of harsher punishment 
towards criminal offenders (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998). Similarly, people high in SDO 
support harsh criminal sanctions (Sidanius, Mitchell, Haley, & Navarrete, 2006), 
general punitiveness (Capps, 2002), the use of painful executions, retribution (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and vengeance (McKee & Feather, 2008).  
However, given their differential motivational basis, these ideologies can be argued to 
predict punitive attitudes for different reasons and through different mechanisms (see 
Duckitt, 2009). People high in RWA are motivated to achieve collective security and 
should favour punishment to restore security and in-group conformity threatened by 
crime. This is in part consistent with a value restoration motive of punishment, 
according to which punishment can help restoring people’s faith in social bonds and 
shared values that have been threatened by crime (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008; Vidmar & 
Miller, 1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). People high in SDO, on the other hand, are 
motivated to achieve power and dominance and they should favour harsh sentencing to 
restore power and status relationships in society, and to enforce status boundaries with 
low-class criminal offenders (see also Sidanius et al., 2006). This motive resembles a 
status and power restoration motive (Vidmar & Miller, 1980; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006), 
according to which by committing crime offenders show disrespect towards and assume 
superiority over the victim and society (Miller, 2001; Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, 
Gündemir, & Stamkou, 2011) and punishment degrades the offender’s status and power 
restoring hierarchies.  
Applying the dual-motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001) to 
the study of punitive attitudes (see Duckitt, 2009), high RWA and SDO individuals are 
expected to favour harsh sentencing for different reasons and through different 
mechanisms. One prediction made by the dual-motivational model is that the social 
conditions under which RWA and SDO will predict punitive attitudes are different 
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(‘differential moderation hypothesis’, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Consistent with an 
interactionist view (Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 
2002) this paper examines whether priming dangerous and competitive worldviews 
activates the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes.  
Past research has looked at how social situations characterised by threats to 
social order increase people’s desire for harsh sentencing. In a study conducted by 
Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock and Scott (2004) people became more punitive of moderately 
severe crimes when the social order was threatened (see also Tetlock et al., 2007). 
Similarly, Fischer et al. (2007) primed terror salience and observed an increase in 
punitive attitudes towards unrelated crimes. Interestingly, however, an extensive body 
of research suggests that social situations have an interactive rather than direct effect on 
social attitudes. For example, Stenner (2005) hypothesises and presents evidence that 
people’s authoritarian predispositions interact with perceptions of normative threat in 
affecting social attitudes (see also Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), 
including the support for harsh punishment.  
Yet, thus far there have been no studies on the differential social conditions that 
activate the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. This paper presents findings 
of an online experiment (n=246) priming dangerous and competitive worldviews and 
examining their moderating role on the support for harsh sentencing and symbolic 
motives of punishment. By examining whether the effects of RWA and SDO are 
mediated by different symbolic motives of punishment, this study also provides further 
evidence on the different reasons why people high in RWA and SDO endorse harsh 
sentences for criminal offenders. 
 
Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and social conditions 
A dual-motivational model of ideological attitudes (Duckitt, 2001) provides a 
framework to understand the combined effects of RWA and SDO on the support for 
harsh punishment of criminal offenders. According to this model, RWA and SDO are 
conservative ideologies that tend to predict similar social outcomes. But they represent 
expressions of different motivational goals; they are predisposed by different 
personalities; and most importantly for this research, they are made salient by different 
social worldviews.  
Altemeyer (1981) defined right-wing authoritarianism as the covariation of three 
attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and 
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conventionalism. Conceptualised by Duckitt and collaborators (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt 
et al., 2002) as the goal of collective security and in-group conformity as opposed to 
autonomy and personal freedom, RWA is thought to stem from a personality high in 
social conformity and to be made salient by the view that society is a dangerous place 
where the values and way of life of good people are threatened by bad people. People 
high in RWA seek to preserve the social order and defend policies that can help 
controlling social threats and bring back order and security, such as military action 
(Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; McFarland, 2005) and the restriction of 
civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Cohrs, Moschner, et al., 
2005; Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2005). 
  Social dominance orientation, on the other hand, represents a preference for 
one’s in-group domination over out-groups, as well as a general preference for 
hierarchical relations between social groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994). Duckitt (2001, 2006) conceptualised SDO as measuring the motivational goal of 
group dominance, power and superiority as opposed to an egalitarian and altruistic goal 
of helping others. It is predisposed by a tough-minded personality and made salient by 
the view that society is a competitive jungle where people struggle for power and 
resources.  Jost and Thompson (2000) have shown that SDO measures two different 
concepts: groups-based dominance (GBD) and opposition to equality (OEQ). OEQ can 
be understood as a general preference for inequality, while GBD is concerned 
specificially with the desire to see one’s in-group dominating over outgroups (see also 
Ho et al., 2012; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010)1. People high in SDO favour policies 
that can help establishing and maintaining social hierarchies, such as military actions 
(Cohrs, Moschner, et al., 2005; McFarland, 2005) and the restriction of civil liberties 
(Cohrs, Kielmann, et al., 2005). 
While some authors have conceptualised RWA and SDO as stable personality 
traits (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 
1998), there seems to be more and more agreement in the literature in treating them as 
ideological attitudes instead (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Duckitt (2001) reconceptualised 
RWA and SDO as ideological attitudes and as expressing motivational goals that are 
made chronically salient by the individuals’ personalities and social worldviews. Sibley 
                                               
1 It should be noted that previous research has found that only one of the subscales of SDO (group-based 
dominance and not opposition to equality) is relevant to punitive attitudes (e.g. McKee & Feather, 2008). 
To simplify, in this research hypotheses are stated in reference to SDO as a whole. However, this paper 
starts by evaluating the separate effects of GBD and OEQ on punitiveness.   
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and Duckitt (2008) summarised three arguments against treating RWA and SDO as 
personality measures. First, the items in the RWA and SDO scales refer to social 
attitudes and values more than behavioural dispositions. Second, RWA and SDO 
correlate more strongly with social attitudes than with personality measures. Third, and 
most relevant for this research, RWA and SDO are highly sensitive to situational 
factors. 
Empirical findings show that RWA (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Duckitt & 
Fisher, 2003; Perrin, 2005; Sales, 1972; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007) and SDO 
(Sibley et al., 2007) vary according to social contexts. Duckitt (2006) has argued that 
dangerous and threatening social situations should increase levels of authoritarianism, 
while highly unequal and competitive situations should increase people’s social 
dominance orientation. Consistently, Sibley et al. (2007) found that competitive and 
dangerous worldviews, respectively, predicted RWA and SDO over a five-month 
period.  
Yet, social conditions might not only shift the levels of dispositional variables, 
they might also interact with dispositions in affecting different social outcomes. Lavine 
et al. (2005, 2002) proposed an interactionist view according to which situational 
variables increase the relevance of dispositions, and strengthen the link between these 
and attitudinal consequences. Similarly, in line with a cultural analysis of motives, 
accessible schema-driven interpretations of reality –worldviews– have the capacity to 
make motivational goals salient (see Duckitt, 2001). Social conditions can thus affect 
outcome variables by impacting on individuals’ worldviews and hereby activating 
different ideological dispositions. Stenner (2005), at the same time, proposes that 
authoritarian predispositions exert their effect on attitudes when they are activated by 
conditions of normative threat. Consistent with these arguments, authoritarian 
predispositions have been shown to become activated under the presence of different 
types of threat (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Lavine et al., 2005, 
2002; Rickert, 1998; Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005; Stenner, 2005; Cohrs, Kielmann et al., 
2005). Interestingly, though, Stenner (2005) reasons that it is only threats to the 
normative order – and not mere threats to security or personal threats – that trigger 
authoritarian dispositions.  
Cohrs and Ibler (2009) sought to clarify the different ways in which RWA 
interacts with threat in affecting prejudice. In two experimental studies in which they 
manipulated and measured threat from Turks, the authors showed that there were at 
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least two ways in which threat interacted with RWA. First, people high in RWA were 
more likely than people low in RWA to sway their perceptions of actual threat in the 
light of threatening information. Second, they were also more likely to react negatively 
to perceived actual threat. That is, perceiving threat seemed to be more relevant to the 
motivational goals of high RWA individuals and to determining their levels of 
prejudice. 
SDO seems to be more difficult to prime, with only a few studies finding an 
interaction between situational forces and SDO. Pratto and Shih (2000), for example, 
found that attacking the in-group status increased implicit prejudice only for people high 
in SDO. Similarly, SDO only predicted intergroup discrimination when status 
distinctions or intergroup status concerns were salient (Pratto, 1999). Sidanius, Pratto 
and Mitchell (1994) showed similar findings: SDO predicted intergroup bias only for 
those who identified with their group in a minimal group experiment, allegedly because 
intergroup distinctions are salient for high identifiers.  One interesting study conducted 
by Federico (1999) showed that SDO was a stronger predictor of in-group favouritism 
for the high-status group when intergroup status differentials were believed to be 
unstable.  
The relationship between RWA, SDO and attitudes has also been shown to vary 
across countries. For example, McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina-Paap (1992) found a 
positive relationship between RWA and attitudes towards equality in Russia and a 
negative relationship in the United States. Similarly, a positive association has been 
found between SDO and support of violence toward the Middle East in the United 
States, while the association between SDO and violence toward the West is negative in 
Lebanon (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005).  
Only a few studies have looked at the situational variables that activate RWA 
and SDO simultaneously. A study conducted by Cohrs and Asbrock (2009) found that 
depicting an out-group as being threatening moderated the effect of RWA on prejudice. 
Depicting the out-group as competitive did not, however, moderate the effect of SDO. 
Duckitt and Sibley (2010) conducted a similar study manipulating the extent to which a 
bogus immigrants group, the Sandrians, was described as (a) a threat to conventional 
norms and values, (b) being low in status, (c) economically competitive and (d) non-
competitive, non-disadvantaged and non-threatening. RWA predicted opposition to 
Sandrian migration when they were depicted as threatening to norms and values, as well 
as when they were described as being economically competitive. SDO, on the other 
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hand, was a significant predictor when they were described as being disadvantaged or 
economically competitive. Priming different self-categorisation forms, Dru (2007) 
found that RWA was a stronger predictor of prejudice when in-group norms were 
primed (see also Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001) and SDO was a stronger 
predictor when competitive group memberships were made salient. In a similar vein, 
Thomsen, Green and Sidanius (2008) presented findings that people high in RWA 
supported the persecution of immigrants when these were presented as refusing to 
assimilate into the dominant culture (‘in-group conformity hypothesis’), while people 
high in SDO did so when immigrants were presented as wanting to assimilate (‘status 
boundary enforcement hypothesis’) (see also Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki, & 
Sidanius, 2010). Finally, Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) looked at cross-national differences in 
the effect of RWA and SDO on anti-immigrant attitudes. The authors found that RWA 
was a stronger predictor in countries where immigrants were perceived as increasing 
crime rates. RWA was a less relevant predictor in countries with high income inequality 
and where people thought immigrants were beneficial for economy. SDO, on the other 
hand, was a stronger predictor in countries where immigrants had a higher relative 
unemployment rate. The authors discuss possible reasons for the different effect sizes of 
RWA and SDO across countries. First, their effects depend on whether immigrants in a 
specific country are perceived as threatening to values, norms and collective security, or 
rather as socially inferior. Second, cultural factors may affect the salience of RWA and 
SDO, with RWA being more salient in cultures emphasising dangerous worldviews and 
SDO being more relevant in highly unequal and hierarchical cultures. 
Overall, these studies show that RWA is a stronger predictor of attitudes when 
the context or the out-group is depicted as threatening to social order or when in-group 
norm preservation is made salient. SDO, on the other hand, is a stronger predictor when 
competition, status concerns or group distinctions are salient, when the out-group is 
depicted as competing for resources and power (although there are some mixed findings 
here) or when status differentials are believed to be unstable.  
Notably, an interactive approach focuses on how dispositional attitudes are 
activated or made salient under certain social conditions. Nonetheless, one could also 
expect social conditions to affect attitudes directly. An important body of research has 
shown that people respond supporting harsher punishment when they are either 
dispositionally inclined or induced to believe that the social order is being threatened 
(Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Rucker et al., 
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2004; Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2007). In addition, in line with the unified 
instrumental model of group conflict (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005) 
perceived material or symbolic competition between groups is argued to lead to 
negative attitudes towards out-groups and the attempt of reducing the source of 
competition. Both ideological (e.g. SDO, RWA) and situational (such as resource 
scarcity and economic instability) factors are argued to increase perceived competition. 
Consistent with this model, Esses, Jackson and Armstrong (1998) found only additive 
and not interactive effects of SDO and a competitive immigrants manipulation on 
attitudes towards immigrants. Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby and Hansen (2007) found 
further support for the argument that increased competition affects attitudes towards 
out-groups. The authors primed competition and observed higher levels of prejudice in 
an unrelated intergroup context.  
 
The present research 
The dual-process motivational model predicts that RWA and SDO are related to 
similar social and political variables but that the social conditions under which they do 
so are different (“differential moderation hypothesis”, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). The aim 
of this paper is to apply this model to the study of punitive attitudes by exploring 
whether the effects of RWA and SDO on attitudes towards the punishment of criminal 
offenders are (a) moderated by different social conditions, and (b) mediated by different 
symbolic motives of punishment. Duckitt et al. (2002) argue that dangerous and 
competitive worldviews activate the motivational goals of RWA and SDO, respectively. 
Social worldviews can be understood as “… a coherent set of beliefs about the nature of 
the social world, and specifically about what people are like, how they are likely to 
behave to one, and how they should be responded to and treated.” (Duckitt, 2001, p. 
61). Duckitt et al. (2002) describe a dangerous worldview as the belief that the world we 
live in is a dangerous and threatening place in which bad people threaten the ways of 
life and values of basically good people. A competitive worldview, on the other hand, is 
described as the belief that we live in a world that is competitive in which people 
struggle for power and resources. The aim of this paper, then, is to evaluate whether 
priming dangerous and competitive worldviews differentially activate the effects of 
RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. A complementary aim is to develop an instrument 
to prime worldviews in the context of survey-based experiments.  
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RWA (H1a) is hypothesised to predict punitive attitudes overall and its effect 
should be stronger when the social conditions are primed to be dangerous (H1b). 
Overall, people high in RWA are motivated to achieve collective security and in-group 
conformity and they are expected to support punishment to restore collective security in 
society (H2a), which in turn should mediate their support for harsh sentencing (H2b). 
When the social conditions are primed to be dangerous, people high in RWA are 
hypothesised to be even more likely to look for punishment as a measure to restore 
collective security (H2c). 
SDO, on the other hand, should predict punitiveness (H3a) and its effect should 
be stronger when the social conditions are primed to be competitive (H3b). High SDO 
individuals are motivated to achieve power and dominance and should endorse harsh 
sentencing to restore status and power relationships in society (H4a) and the latter should 
mediate the effect of SDO on punitive attitudes (H4b). When a competitive world is 
made salient, people high in SDO are hypothesised to be even more likely to look for 
punishment to restore status and power relationships in society (H4c). Figure 1 
summarises the predictions of this paper. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesised model: the effects of SDO and RWA on symbolic motives of 
punishment and punitive attitudes moderated by dangerous and competitive world conditions  
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Past research suggests that social conditions can by themselves translate into 
harsher punitive reactions: perceived threats to the social order lead people to endorse 
harsh sentencing (e.g. Tetlock et al., 2007) and competitive situations affect attitudes 
towards immigrants (Esses, et al., 1998) and prejudice (Sassenberg et al., 2007). One 
could thus expect direct effects of social conditions on attitudes towards punishment. 
However, the focus of this paper is on the extent to which social conditions activate 
ideological dispositions. No particular hypothesis is thus established in relation to the 
direct effect of priming dangerous and competitive worldviews on punitive attitudes and 
punishment goals. Also, given that this paper is interested in the role of priming social 
conditions on the effect of RWA and SDO, no predictions are made regarding the 
effects of collective security and status/power restoration motives under the different 
experimental conditions.  
 
Method 
Participants 
272 persons from the United States participated in an online study posted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk2.  26 participants (10%) were excluded for having solved 
less than 70% of the scrambled sentence exercises (14 participants, see below), for not 
having English as a first language (14 participants) or for reporting a suspicion that the 
sentence scramble exercise had a role in priming certain words (2 participants; as 
recommended by Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The reported results correspond to 246 
participants. The sample was diverse in terms of gender (62% female), age (Min=18, 
Max=82, M=35, SD=13.8), occupation (51% worked, 20% students, 11% unemployed) 
and ideology (52% leaning to the left, 26% centre, 21% leaning to the right); although 
less diverse in terms of ethnicity (81% white).  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of three experimental conditions: dangerous worldview condition (N=83), 
competitive worldview condition (N=83) and control group (N=80).   
 
Materials and Procedure 
Pretest. Prior to the experiment, an online study was conducted on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk to select the words that would be used to prime dangerous and 
                                               
2 Studies on the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to collect data have concluded that not only is the data 
as reliable as data collected through other means, but participants are also more diverse in terms of socio-
demographic variables (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
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competitive worldviews. A second aim of this study was to obtain a separate evaluation 
of whether the words would prime the desired worldviews and avoid including a 
manipulation check that would make participants read about the opposite worldview. 
For the pretest 161 native English-speakers from the United States read descriptions of 
dangerous and competitive worldviews (as defined by Duckitt et al., 2002) and rated the 
degree to which these were associated to different words. They were paid 0.40 USD for 
their participation in this study. Each participant was randomly assigned to rate 42 out 
of 84 words on a 5-point scale (1=not at all associated, 5=extremely associated), 
yielding an average of 81 evaluations for each word. These ratings were used to choose 
14 words for each condition. To avoid overlap between the words corresponding to a 
dangerous and a competitive worldview, special attention was placed in finding words 
that had significantly higher ratings in one of the worldviews but not the other (p<0.01 
for all words in both conditions). For the dangerous worldview condition, all chosen 
words had significantly higher rating on a dangerous worldview (M=4.1, SD=0.73) than 
a competitive worldview (M=2.6, SD=0.93). The chosen words were: unsafe, 
dangerous, hazard, menace, endangered, bad, wicked, threatening, immoral, degenerate, 
evil, chaos, warning and terrible. For the competitive worldview condition, all chosen 
words had a significantly higher rating on a competitive worldview (M=4.2, SD=0.78) 
than a dangerous worldview (M=2.7, SD=0.89). The chosen words were: contest, 
competition, championship, winning, challenge, competitive, ranking, status, rival, 
superior, hierarchy, power, dominance, contenders. For the control condition, words 
with the lowest rating on a dangerous (M=1.7, SD=0.91) and competitive worldview 
(M=1.9, SD=0.91) were chose. The chosen words were: park, apple, chairs, table, green, 
walk, hand, student, friend, boring, meeting, house, car, this.  
Pilot. 230 persons from the United States participated in a pilot online study 
posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The pilot was conducted to evaluate the sentence 
scramble exercise, the cover story and the questionnaire. The main reason for 
conducting this pilot was to make sure that participants were reading the instructions 
and would work carefully on the priming exercise. Two validation questions were 
embedded in the questionnaire. The pilot showed no major problems with the study 
design. However, it revealed that a number of participants did not pay careful attention 
when answering the questionnaire: 14% and 16% of participants did not pass the 
validation questions, respectively. To avoid this from happening, an instructional 
manipulation check was included in the next study (see below). Regarding the sentence 
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scramble exercise, 84% of participants completed all exercises, with 96% answering 
more than 24 out of 28 exercises.  Participants were allowed to write a comment at the 
end of the survey. No relevant problems were observed.  
Procedure. Participants were invited to take part in two allegedly unrelated 
studies: one communication study concerned with the ways in which people construct 
sentences and the second one on social attitudes. They were paid 0.60 USD for their 
participation. After obtaining informed consent, an instructional manipulation check 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) was used to make sure that participants 
were reading the instructions. In this check, participants were requested to skip rather 
than answer a question and those participants who answered the question were not able 
to proceed. Previous studies have shown that confronting participants with a 
manipulation check increases attention (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Right after the 
manipulation check, but before taking part in the study on communication, participants 
were asked to answer some background socio-demographic questions (age, gender, 
education, occupation, ethnicity and political ideology), RWA and SDO measures. 
Participants were debriefed at the end of the study. 
Individual differences. RWA was measured using ten items from Altemeyer’s 
(1998) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale. To control for acquiescence response bias, 
half of the items were reverse coded. Sample items are: ‘The “old-fashioned ways” and 
the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live’ and ‘There is no “ONE right 
way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way’ (R). Questions on 
authoritarian aggression often refer to the treatment of criminal offenders. In this study, 
special attention was placed in excluding items that related to crime and punishment. 
Given the nature of Altemeyer’s scale (1998), it is not possible to distinguish between  
authoritarian submission, conventionalism and aggression, and thus the scale was 
considered as a whole. SDO was measured using ten items from Pratto et al.’s (1994) 
measure of Social Dominance Orientation. Five items measured group-based dominance 
and five items measured opposition to equality. Sample items are: ‘Some groups of 
people are simply inferior to other groups’ and ‘We would have fewer problems if we 
treated people more equally’. Centred values of RWA and SDO (and its subscales) were 
used for correlation, regression and path analyses.  
Experimental manipulation. A scrambled sentence test was used to prime 
social conditions. This supraliminal conceptual priming is used to activate 
representations in a specific context and test its influence in an unrelated context (see 
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Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Participants were provided with 28 sets of five words and 
asked to construct grammatically correct sentences using four out of these five words. 
To prime a dangerous worldview, the 14 words chosen in the pretest for being closely 
related to a dangerous world were embedded in half of the sentences. The remaining 14 
sentences did not refer to any worldview in particular. To increase the effect of the 
prime, participants were asked to answer four questions adapted from Duckitt et al.’s 
(2002) dangerous and threatening social world view scale (a sample item is ‘It seems 
that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more 
persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else’). These questions were 
included at the beginning of what participants thought was the second study (on social 
attitudes). For the competitive worldview condition the 14 words chosen in the pretest 
for being closely related to a competitive world were embedded and participants were 
asked to answer four questions adapted from Duckitt et al.’s (2002) competitive jungle 
social world view (a sample item is ‘It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be 
ruthless at times’). In the control condition, participants did the same exercise but the 
embedded words were the words chosen for not being related to dangerous and 
competitive worldviews. The questions that followed were on the relevance of the 
Internet in society3.  
Dependent variables. Attitudes towards the harsh sentencing of criminal 
offenders were measured using six items, four items in favour and two items against 
applying harsh sentences. Sample items are: ‘People who break the law should be given 
harsher sentences’ and ‘The use of harsh punishment should be avoided whenever 
possible’. The symbolic motive of collective security restoration was measured adapting 
three items from Okimoto, Wenzel and Feather’s (2011) others-value restoration scale 
(sample item is ‘Punishment should convey to others that the offender's behavior was 
wrong’) and adding three items on the restoration of security (sample item is ‘We 
should punish to increase security and order in society’). The items on security were 
added to resemble the goal of restoring collective security as a whole (which considers 
the need for value consensus, security, and order; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). The 
symbolic motive of restoring status and power was measured adapting four items from 
Okimoto et al.’s (2011) status/power reduction goal scale. Sample item is ‘Punishment 
                                               
3 These questions were chosen to keep up with the cover story and because they have been found to be 
uncorrelated to political ideology in other unreported studies.  
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should signal to the offender that he is in no way superior’. Seven point likert scales 
were used for all items (ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Table 1 
displays descriptive reliability statistics for all variables before being centred. 
 
Analysis 
 Correlation and regression analyses are conducted separately for each 
experimental group. Z- and T-tests are used to compare the correlation and regression 
coefficients across conditions. Given the one-sided nature of the hypotheses of this 
paper, one-tailed p-values are reported for correlation and regression analyses, as well 
as for Z- and T-tests. Path analysis is then used to evaluate whether symbolic motives of 
punishment mediate the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes and whether 
these mediations are stronger when the corresponding worldview is salient. To simplify 
the analysis of looking at the role of three conditions and two mediator variables, Cohrs 
and Ibler’s (2009) approach of using multigroup path analysis to examine moderated 
mediation is conducted. MPLUS and maximum-likelihood estimation are used to test 
whether punishment goals mediate the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes 
and whether the different paths vary across experimental conditions.  
 
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses 
As should be the case, one-way ANOVA did not show significant differences in 
levels of RWA and SDO between experimental conditions, RWA: F(2, 243)=0.23, 
p=0.80; SDO: F(2, 243)=0.08, p=0.92; nor were there significant differences in levels of 
punitive attitudes between experimental groups, F(2,243)=0.82, p=0.44. This is, 
priming dangerous and competitive worldviews did not increase levels of overall 
punitiveness. 
Table 1 presents correlations between all variables in the study for all 
participants taken together (n=246). RWA and SDO were positively correlated with 
each other (r=.43, p<0.01) and with punitive attitudes (RWA: r=0.44, p<0.01; SDO: 
r=0.27, p<0.01; GBD: r=0.28, p<0.01; OEQ: r=0.20, p<0.01).  Collective security 
restoration correlated with punitive attitudes (r=.58, p<0.01), RWA (r=.33, p<0.01), and 
GBD (r=.23, p<0.01). The same was true for status and power restoration (Punitive 
attitudes: r=.59, p<0.01; RWA: r=.44, p<0.01; GBD: r=.34, p<0.01. A multiple linear 
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regression analysis was then conducted to evaluate whether RWA and SDO had 
significant effects after controlling for each other. This analysis was relevant given that 
previous research had shown that the effect of SDO tends to be significantly decreased 
when controlling for RWA (Colémont, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2011; McKee & Feather, 
2008). The same analysis was replicated using GBD and OEQ instead of SDO. RWA 
remained significantly related to punitive attitudes after controlling for SDO, GBD and 
OEQ (βs>0.42, ps<0.01). However, after controlling for RWA, SDO (β=0.11, p<0.10) 
had only a marginal effect and OEQ (β=0.05, p>0.05) had no significant effect on 
punitive attitudes. Only GBD had a significant effect (β=0.11, p<0.05). This is 
consistent with previous research that has found GBD and not OEQ to be related to 
punitive attitudes (Okimoto et al., 2011). For all further analyses, GBD was used instead 
of SDO. 
 
Table 1 
Bivariate correlations and reliability statistics of all variables in the study for all participants 
(n=246) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Punitive attitudes -             
2 RWA .44** -           
3 SDO .27** .43** -         
4 GBD .28** .41** .90** -       
5 OEQ .20** .36** .89** .60** -     
6 Collective security restoration .58** .33** .11 .23** -.02 -   
7 Status and power restoration .59** .44** .25** .34** .11 .64** - 
Mean 4.10 3.02 2.66 2.75 2.57 5.15 4.54 
SD 1.33 1.26 1.20 1.35 1.33 0.98 1.23 
α 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.84 0.78 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Punitive attitudes 
Table 2 presents the zero-order correlations between RWA, GBD and punitive 
attitudes in the three experimental conditions. Punitive attitudes correlated strongly and 
significantly with RWA in all conditions (rs>0.42; ps<0.01) and this correlation did not 
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differ significantly between conditions (zs<0.4). The correlation with GBD was 
strongest in the competitive world condition (r=0.44, p<0.01), followed by the 
dangerous world condition (r=0.25, p<0.05) and the control condition (r=0.15, p<0.10). 
The correlation between GBD and punitive attitudes was significantly higher in the 
competitive condition compared to the control condition (z=2.01, p=0.02) and 
marginally higher than in the dangerous world condition (z=1.37, p=0.09).  
 
Table 2 
Bivariate correlation between punitive attitudes, RWA and GBD in the three experimental 
conditions (n=246) 
  Dangerous world 
condition (N=83) 
Competitive world 
condition (N=83) 
Control condition 
(N=80) 
RWA .47** .45** .42** 
GBD .25* .44** .15† 
†p <.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01  
 
 
Table 3 
Linear regression coefficients of punitive attitudes on RWA and GBD in the three experimental 
conditions (n=246) 
  Dangerous world 
condition (n=83) 
Competitive world 
condition (n=83) 
Control condition 
(n=80) 
  B SE t B SE t B SE t 
RWA .46 .11 4.06** .36 .13 2.83** .40 .11 3.74** 
GBD .07 .11 0.65 .31 .12 2.51** .02 .10 0.17 
†p <.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Multiple linear regression analyses by experimental groups (Table 3) show that 
in the dangerous world (b=.46, p<.01) and control conditions (b=.40, p<.01) only RWA 
predicted punitive attitudes. In the competitive world condition both RWA (b=.36, 
p<.01) and GBD (b=.31, p<.01) were significant predictors. T-tests comparing the 
slopes between conditions showed that the regression coefficients for RWA did not 
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differ significantly across conditions (ts<1). Nonetheless, the regression coefficient for 
GBD was significantly higher in the competitive condition compared to the control 
condition (t(162)=1.86, p=0.03) and marginally higher than in the dangerous world 
condition (t(159)=1.47, p=0.07).  
An analysis regressing punitive attitudes on RWA, GBD, experimental 
conditions and interaction effects between GBD and experimental conditions revealed a 
significant interaction between GBD and the competitive world condition (Main GBD 
effect: β=.01, p>.05; Main competitive world condition effect: β=.22, p>0.05; 
Interaction between GBD and competitive world condition: β=.27, p<0.05), but not with 
a dangerous world condition (Main dangerous world condition: β=.28, p>0.05; 
Interaction between GBD and dangerous world condition: β=.08, p>0.05). Figure 1 
presents fitted values of punitive attitudes for -/+ 1 standard deviations in GBD, 
showing that GBD had no effect in the control condition and a small but positive effect 
in the dangerous world condition. Most importantly, the effect was strongest in the 
competitive world condition.  
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted punitive attitudes as a function of the interaction between GBD and 
experimental conditions, controlling for RWA (n=246) 
Note. GBD is centred and results are shown for the range between -/+ 1 SD.  
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Symbolic motives of punishment 
One-way ANOVA did not show significant differences in people’s support for 
the motivation to restore collective security, F(2,243) =0.82, p=0.44, and status and 
power relationships, F(2,243)=0.10, p=0.91, across experimental conditions. 
Considering all conditions (n=246), people high in GBD were more likely to support 
punishment to restore status and power relationships in society (r=0.34, p<0.01), but 
also to restore collective security (r=0.23, p<0.01). People high in RWA were more 
likely to support punishment to restore collective security (r=0.33, p<0.01), but also to 
restore status and power relationships (r=0.44, p<0.01).  
   
Table 4 
Linear regression coefficients of symbolic motives of punishment on RWA and GBD in the three 
experimental conditions (n=246) 
  Dangerous world 
condition (N=83) 
Competitive world 
condition (N=83) 
Control condition 
(N=80) 
  B SE t B SE t B SE t 
Value and security restoration             
RWA .28 .09 3.14** .16 .10 1.61† .23 .08 2.73** 
GBD .03 .08 0.33 .16 .10 1.60† .07 .10 0.90 
                    
Status and power restoration             
RWA .44 .10 4.45** .19 .12 1.55† .41 .10 4.37** 
GBD .04 .09 0.46 .32 .12 2.62** .18 .09 2.09* 
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Table 4 presents regression coefficients of collective security restoration as well 
as status and power restoration on RWA and GBD in the three experimental conditions. 
After controlling for GBD, RWA predicted value and security restoration in the 
dangerous world (b=0.28, p<0.01) and control conditions (b=0.23, p<0.01), and both 
161 
 
RWA and GBD were marginally significant predictors in the competitive world 
condition (p<0.10). T-tests comparing the slopes between conditions showed that the 
regression coefficients for RWA and GBD did not differ across conditions (ts<1). In 
relation to status and power restoration, after controlling for GBD only RWA was a 
significant predictor in the dangerous world condition (b=0.44, p<0.01). In the 
competitive world condition, GBD significantly predicted status and power restoration 
(β=0.32, p<0.01) and RWA had a marginal effect (b=0.19, p<0.10). In the control 
condition, both RWA (b=0.41, p<0.01) and GBD (b=0.18, p<0.05) predicted the motive 
to restore status and power. T-tests reported a marginally higher slopes of RWA in the 
dangerous condition compared to the competitive condition (t(162)=1.60, p=0.06) and a 
significantly higher slope of GBD in the competitive world compared to the dangerous 
world condition (t(162)=1.87, p=0.03). 
 
Moderated mediation of symbolic motives of punishment 
Multigroup path analysis was then used to evaluate the effect of RWA and GBD 
on symbolic motives of punishment and their indirect effect on punitive attitudes across 
different experimental conditions. A model was fitted where punitive attitudes were 
predicted by symbolic motives, and these were in turn predicted by RWA and GBD. 
Direct effects of RWA and GBD were added to the model. Only the direct effect from 
RWA to punitive attitudes was significant and the direct effect of GBD was excluded 
from the model. First, an unconstrained model was fitted where parameters were 
allowed to vary from group to group. This model showed a good overall fit according to 
Hu and Bentler’s (1999) criteria (χ2(3)=3.00, p=0.39, RMSEA=0.00; CFI=1.00). Single 
paths were then constrained one by one to be equal across groups. Differences in CFI 
and RMSEA were used to evaluate the fit of the constrained model. Following Chen’s 
(2007) recommendations for testing invariance between models, a change of ≤ –0.005 in 
CFI supplemented by a change of ≥ 0.01 in RMSEA were considered a significant 
decrease in the fit of the model. Most paths could be constrained to be equal across 
groups without a decrease in the model fit (ΔCFI=0; ΔRMSEA=0). However, 
constraining the paths from GBD (ΔCFI=0.004; ΔRMSEA=0.06) and RWA 
(ΔCFI=0.003; ΔRMSEA=0.05) to status/power restoration decreased the fit. These 
paths were allowed to vary between experimental conditions. Note that no particular 
hypothesis was postulated about the effect of symbolic motives on punitive attitudes 
varying as a result of experimentally manipulated social conditions. However, 
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constraining the path from collective security restoration to punitive attitudes decreased 
the model of the fit (ΔCFI=0.006; ΔRMSEA=0.07) and was thus allowed to vary across 
groups. The final model fit was very good (χ2(15)=7.18, p=0.95, RMSEA=0.00; 
CFI=1.00).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Multigroup path analysis predicting punitive attitudes in terms of punishment goals, 
GBD and RWA (n=246) 
Note. Paths showing only one estimate were constrained to be equal across experimental 
conditions. In paths showing more than one estimate, the first estimate corresponds to the 
dangerous world condition, the second to the competitive world condition and the third to the 
control condition. Centred values are used for RWA and GBD. Unstandardised coefficients are 
shown as standardised coefficients vary across experimental conditions fixed to be equal. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
 The fitted model (Figure 3) showed that regardless of the experimental 
condition, people high in RWA were more likely to support punishment to restore 
collective security (b=.23, p<0.01) and to endorse punitive attitudes in general (b=.23, 
p<0.01). In all experimental conditions, supporting the use of punishment to restore 
status and power relationships in society predicted punitive attitudes (b=.32, p<0.01). 
However, the extent to which GBD and RWA predicted status/power restoration varied 
across experimental conditions. RWA was the only predictor of status/power restoration 
in the dangerous world condition (b=.41, p<0.01) and the most relevant predictor in the 
control condition (b=.42, p<0.01). GBD, on the other hand, was the strongest predictor 
in the competitive world condition (b=.26, p<0.01). It had a smaller, but still significant 
effect in the control condition (b=.19, p<0.05) and a non-significant effect in the 
dangerous world condition (b=.08, p>0.05). While collective security restoration 
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predicted punitive attitudes in all conditions, the strongest effect was observed under the 
competitive world condition (b=.60, p<0.01). This unexpected effect could be an 
artefact of decreasing the indirect effect of RWA via power and status restoration in a 
context where GBD became a strong predictor. In terms of indirect effects, in all three 
conditions the effect of RWA was mediated by status and power restoration 
(Dangerous: b =.13, p<0.01; Competitive: b =.07, p<0.05; Control: b =.14, p<0.01) and 
collective security restoration motives (Dangerous: b =.07, p<0.05; Competitive: b =.14, 
p<0.01; Control: b =.07, p<0.05). The effect of GBD was mediated by status and power 
restoration in the competitive (b =.09, p<0.05) and control conditions (b =.06, p<0.05).  
 
Discussion 
The results of this study provide partial support for a dual-motivational model of 
punitive attitudes: while RWA had a consistent and strong effect on punitive attitudes 
even after controlling for SDO (H1a), only group-based dominance (and not SDO as a 
whole or opposition to equality) was a relevant predictor after controlling for RWA 
(H3a). These findings are in agreement with previous research that has found group-
based dominance to be more important than opposition to equality in predicting the 
support for justice attitudes (McKee & Feather, 2008); and suggest that people high in 
SDO do not perceive punishment as a way of maintaining and justifying inequalities in 
general, but as an issue of competition for dominance with criminal offenders.  
Against expectations, this study did not find significant differences between 
experimental conditions in the effect of RWA on punitive attitudes (H1b). On the 
contrary, the results showed an effect of RWA on punitive attitudes that was consistent 
and strong across situational primes. People high in RWA were more likely to endorse 
the symbolic motive of collective security restoration in society (H2a) and this effect 
partly mediated the effect of RWA on punitive attitudes (H2b). But against expectations, 
RWA predicted value and security restoration regardless of experimental condition 
(H2c). In contrast to other research (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Dru, 2007; Feldman & 
Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Thomsen et al., 2008), in this study priming threat to the 
social order did not activate the effect of RWA on social attitudes. This result may be 
explained by a number of different factors.  
First, it may be argued that RWA is indeed independent of context and that it 
resembles a personality trait more than an ideological attitude. This is unlikely given the 
strong evidence for situational variability in RWA (see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). 
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Second, people high in RWA may be chronically primed to perceive the world as 
dangerous place that lacks in-group conformity, and criminal offenders as being 
dangerous and deviating from common norms and values. Previous research has shown 
that authoritarians are more likely to perceive a situation as threatening to social order. 
Lavine et al. (2002), for example, showed that high authoritarians were quicker in 
responding to threatening words compared to low authoritarians.  That people high in 
RWA may be already primed to perceive criminal offenders as dangerous does not 
mean that RWA is context-independent, only that the situational prime used in this 
study did not add anything new to the link between RWA, perceptions of crime, and 
punitive attitudes. Third, as argued and shown by Stenner (2005), it is normative threat 
more than threats to security that activates authoritarian predisposition. While the 
dangerous world condition was designed to capture both a perception that the world is 
insecure and lacks social consensus, it might have been that the words and statements 
used in this study related to a greater extent to security issues.  
Another unanticipated finding was the strong link between RWA and status and 
power restoration motive. In the control condition both RWA and GBD predicted the 
goal of power and status restoration. However, when one of the ideologies was activated 
by its corresponding worldview, a trade-off was observed: RWA was the only 
significant predictor when a dangerous world was made salient and GBD was the only 
significant predictor when a competitive world was made salient. A possible 
explanation for this might be that criminals gaining power and status can also be 
perceived as disrupting the social order and stability in society (see for research on 
prejudice, Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009), particularly if social inequalities are status quo. 
Overall, both RWA and GBD are conservative ideologies that favour hierarchies in 
society, be it in terms of increasing the submission of criminal offenders or the 
domination of the rest of society.  
Although RWA and SDO are both related to a preference for hierarchical social 
relations, the more specific meaning is quite different. For people high in RWA, 
criminal offenders gaining power in society may represent a lack of submission towards 
authorities and a disruption of social order and stability. For those high in SDO, on the 
other hand, criminal offenders may be perceived as competing for dominance in society. 
This difference is evidenced in the fact that RWA became a stronger predictor of status 
and power restoration when the conditions were primed to be dangerous, suggesting 
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motivations to restore status and power that are different from competitive motivations4.  
Further work needs to be done to establish whether and how these two motives differ.  
GBD predicted punitive measures in the sample as a whole (H3a). The most 
interesting finding of this study, however, was that people high in GBD were especially 
likely to support harsh punishment when the social conditions were primed to be 
competitive (H3b). Overall, people high in GBD supported the use of punishment to 
restore status and power relationship in society (H4a). GBD was a stronger predictor of 
status and power restoration when the social conditions were primed to be competitive 
(H4c).  Interestingly, in the competitive and control conditions, the motive of power and 
status restoration mediated the effect of GBD on punitive attitudes (H4b). These findings 
can be interpreted in two ways. First, priming competition might have activated desires 
for group-based dominance. This supports previous research on how competitive social 
conditions or increased salience of competition against particular out-groups increase 
the effect of SDO on different social attitudes (Dru, 2007; Pratto & Shih, 2000; 
Thomsen et al., 2008). Second, priming competition might also have changed the 
meaning of crime and punishment items. While people can be argued to have security 
issues in mind when completing crime and punishment items, the competitive world 
prime might have lead respondents to think about dominance issues and the competition 
for resources and power with criminal offenders. People high in GBD do not seem to be 
predisposed to perceive crime as a threat to hierarchies in society and punishment as a 
way of restoring status positions in society. Only when the social conditions were 
primed to be competitive, did people high in GBD support harsh sentencing and the use 
of punishment to restore status and power in society. 
Interestingly, however, there were no direct effects of worldviews on punitive 
attitudes. Unlike previous research, threats to social order (e.g. Tetlock et al., 2007) and 
competition (Esses et al., 1998, Sassenberg et al., 2007) did not affect attitudes in 
general. Priming a competitive worldview activated intergroup competition over 
superiority and dominance only for those people who had a disposition to favour group-
based dominance over outgroups. Whilst these findings support an interactive effect of 
social conditions, it is also possible that the current priming was not strong enough to 
shift people’s views about the world. The implicit priming of a competitive worldview 
might have been enough to activate concerns about dominance for those people who are 
                                               
4 Although it is also possible that the effect of RWA was stronger in the dangerous world condition 
because here GBD was not as relevant. 
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already concerned about power and dominance issues. Low SDO individuals, on the 
other hand, might not be sensitive enough towards competitive issues and will have 
failed to respond to the prime. Further research should replicate these findings using a 
more explicit prime. 
On a separate note, while the findings of this study showed that high SDO’s 
were more punitive when the social conditions were primed to be competitive, more 
research is required on the particular processes by which competition moderates the 
effect of SDO. Cohrs and Ibler’s (2009) approach to testing the different ways in which 
threat and authoritarianism interact in predicting prejudice could be extended to 
understanding the interaction between SDO and competition. Importantly, it remains to 
be seen whether high SDO individuals are more likely to perceive competition or 
whether perceiving competition is more relevant for them to determine negative 
attitudes towards criminal offenders.   
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of the current paper was to apply the dual-motivational model to the 
study of punitive attitudes. According to this perspective, while people high in RWA 
and SDO should both be inclined to support harsh sentencing of criminal offenders, the 
reasons why they do so are predicted to be different. This paper examined whether the 
effects of RWA and SDO were (a) moderated by different social conditions, and (b) 
mediated by different symbolic motives of punishment. The findings showed a 
consistent and strong effect of RWA across experimental conditions and symbolic 
motives. The effect of SDO, nevertheless, was more modest: only group-based 
dominance was relevant to punitive attitudes and its effect was restricted to competitive 
social conditions and to the motivation to restore status and power hierarchies in 
society. While part of punitiveness seems to be related to a group-based competition for 
status and power with criminal offenders, people high in SDO are not necessarily 
predisposed to perceive criminals as a threat to the hierarchical structure of society. 
Also, the lack of relevance of opposition to equality suggests that punishment is not so 
much perceived as a way of justifying social inequalities. Rather, it seems to be an issue 
of competition for dominance with criminal offenders. Crucially, high GBD individuals 
are likely to perceive the relationship with criminal offenders as a zero-sum situation: 
the more power and influence gained by criminal offenders, the less power and 
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influence remains for the rest of society. An aggressive pursuit of domination might be 
the chosen mean to avoid criminal offenders assuming superiority over society.  
Furthermore, the overlap between RWA and SDO in the motivations for status 
and power restoration generates doubts about whether the reasons why these two 
ideologies predict punitive attitudes are in fact different. As argued above, however, the 
underlying motivations to take away power and status from criminal offenders are likely 
to be different. People high in RWA might want to restore status and power 
relationships to bring back social order and stability, while people high in SDO might 
do so to restore social hierarchies. Further research should look at whether these two 
motivations are indeed different. 
As a side goal, this paper developed an instrument that can be used to prime 
dangerous and competitive worldviews in the context of survey-based experiments. 
However, some limitations should be addressed.  The study reported in this paper used 
an online experiment to prime different worldviews. While special attention was placed 
in making sure that participants followed instructions and in detecting suspicion in 
relation to the experimental design, online studies inevitably involve the risk of 
participants getting distracted. It is thus possible that the dangerous world prime was not 
strong enough to activate authoritarian dispositions or to produce a direct effect on 
punitive attitudes. Further research might explore whether conducting the experiment in 
a controlled setting activates the effect of RWA on punitive attitudes. Also, the words 
and statements used to prime a dangerous world in this paper were more related to 
perceptions of threat to security than to threats to the normative order. More research is 
required to evaluate whether using words and statements that are more in line with 
threats to the normative aspect of a dangerous world is able to activate the effect of 
RWA on punitive attitudes.   
Finally, priming dangerous and competitive worlds might also have activated 
related values. Previous research has shown that priming certain values might also have 
indirect effects on related values (Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009). The current 
study did not include a manipulation check (to avoid overlap between the conditions) 
and was thus unable to confirm that undesired worldviews were primed. Future research 
is needed to evaluate whether the priming method used in this study primed different 
concepts than it was intended to prime.  
168 
 
References 
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. New York: Norton. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 
Press. 
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality.” In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 47–92). Academic 
Press.  
Bargh, J., & Chartrand, T. (2000). The mind in the middle. A practical guide to priming 
and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of 
research methods in social and personality psychology. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s mechanical turk: A 
new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6(1), 3–5.  
Capps, J. S. (2002). Explaining punitiveness: Right-wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance. North American Journal of Psychology, 4(2), 263–278. 
Carroll, J. S., Perkowitz, W. T., Lurigio, A. J., & Weaver, F. M. (1987). Sentencing 
goals, causal attributions, ideology, and personality. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 52(1), 107–118.  
Chen, F. F. (2007). Sensitivity of goodness of fit indexes to lack of measurement 
invariance. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 14(3), 
464–504.  
Cohrs, J. C., & Asbrock, F. (2009). Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance 
orientation and prejudice against threatening and competitive ethnic groups. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(2), 270–289.  
Cohrs, J. C., & Ibler, S. (2009). Authoritarianism, threat, and prejudice: An analysis of 
mediation and moderation. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 81–94.  
Cohrs, J. C., Kielmann, S., Maes, J., & Moschner, B. (2005). Effects of right-wing 
authoritarianism and threat from terrorism on restriction of civil liberties. 
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 5(1), 263–276.  
Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes, J., & Kielmann, S. (2005). The motivational bases of 
right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Relations to 
169 
 
values and attitudes in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(10), 1425–1434.  
Cohrs, J. C., & Stelzl, M. (2010). How ideological attitudes predict host society 
members’ attitudes toward immigrants: Exploring cross‐national differences. 
Journal of Social Issues, 66(4), 673–694.  
Colémont, A., Van Hiel, A., & Cornelis, I. (2011). Five-factor model personality 
dimensions and right-wing attitudes: Psychological bases of punitive attitudes? 
Personality and Individual Differences, 50(4), 486–491.  
Crowson, H. M., DeBacker, T. K., & Thoma, S. J. (2005). Does authoritarianism predict 
post-9/11 attitudes? Personality and Individual Differences, 39(7), 1273–1283.  
Doty, R. M., Peterson, B. E., & Winter, D. G. (1991). Threat and authoritarianism in the 
United States, 1978–1987. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(4), 
629–640.  
Dru, V. (2007). Authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice: Effects of 
various self-categorization conditions. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 43(6), 877–883.  
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and 
prejudice. Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 41–113). 
Amsterdam: Academic Press.  
Duckitt, J. (2006). Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from 
and competitiveness to outgroups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
32(5), 684–696.  
Duckitt, J., & Fisher, K. (2003). The impact of social threat on worldview and 
ideological attitudes. Political Psychology, 24(1), 199–222.  
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A dual-process motivational model of ideology, 
politics, and prejudice. Psychological Inquiry, 20(2-3), 98–109.  
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation differentially moderate intergroup effects on prejudice. European 
Journal of Personality, 24(7), 583–601.  
Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of 
ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 83(1), 75–93.  
170 
 
Esses, V. M., Jackson, L. M., Dovidio, J. F., & Hodson, G. (2005). Instrumental 
relations among groups: Group competition, conflict, and prejudice. In J. F. 
Dovidio, P. Glick, & L. Rudman (Eds.), On The Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years 
After Allport (pp. 227–243). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Esses, V. M., Jackson, L. M., & Armstrong, T. L. (1998). Intergroup competition and 
attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: An instrumental model of group 
conflict. Journal of Social Issues, 54(4), 699–724.  
Federico, C. M. (1999). The interactive effects of social dominance orientation, group 
status, and perceived stability on favoritism for high-status groups. Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2(2), 119–143.  
Feather, N. T. (1998). Reactions to penalties for offenses committed by the police and 
public citizens: Testing a social–cognitive process model of retributive justice. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(2), 528–544.  
Feldman, S., & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived threat and authoritarianism. Political 
Psychology, 18(4), 741–770.  
Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Kastenmüller, A., Frey, D., & Oßwald, S. (2007). Terror 
salience and punishment: Does terror salience induce threat to social order? 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(6), 964–971. 
Funke, F. (2005). The dimensionality of right‐wing authoritarianism: Lessons from the 
dilemma between theory and measurement. Political Psychology, 26(2), 195–
218.  
Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Rage and reason: the psychology 
of the intuitive prosecutor. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(5-6), 
781–795.  
Guimond, S., De Oliveira, P., Kamiesjki, R., & Sidanius, J. (2010). The trouble with 
assimilation: Social dominance and the emergence of hostility against 
immigrants. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 34(6), 642–650. 
Henry, P. J., Sidanius, J., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (2005). Social dominance orientation, 
authoritarianism, and support for intergroup violence between the Middle East 
and America. Political Psychology, 26(4), 569–584.  
Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Levin, S., Thomsen, L., Kteily, N., & Sheehy-
Skeffington, J. (2012). Social dominance orientation: Revisiting the structure 
and function of a variable predicting social and political attitudes. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(5), 583–606.  
171 
 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1–55.  
Jost, J. T., & Thompson, E. P. (2000). Group-based dominance and opposition to 
equality as independent predictors of self-esteem, ethnocentrism, and social 
policy attitudes among African Americans and European Americans. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 36(3), 209–232.  
Kugler, M., Cooper, J., & Nosek, B. (2010). Group-based dominance and opposition to 
equality correspond to different psychological motives. Social Justice Research, 
23(2), 117–155.  
Lavine, H., Lodge, M., & Freitas, K. (2005). Threat, authoritarianism, and selective 
exposure to information. Political Psychology, 26(2), 219–244.  
Lavine, H., Lodge, M., Polichak, J., & Taber, C. (2002). Explicating the black box 
through experimentation: Studies of authoritarianism and threat. Political 
Analysis, 10(4), 343–361.  
Lerner, J. S., Goldberg, J. H., & Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Sober second thought: The 
effects of accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of 
responsibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(6), 563–574.  
Maio, G. R., Pakizeh, A., Cheung, W.-Y., & Rees, K. J. (2009). Changing, priming, and 
acting on values: Effects via motivational relations in a circular model. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(4), 699–715.  
McFarland, S. G. (2005). On the eve of war: Authoritarianism, social dominance, and 
American students’ attitudes toward attacking Iraq. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 31(3), 360–367.  
McFarland, S. G., Ageyev, V. S., & Abalakina-Paap, M. A. (1992). Authoritarianism in 
the former Soviet Union. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(6), 
1004–1010.  
McKee, I., & Feather, N. (2008). Revenge, retribution, and values: Social attitudes and 
punitive sentencing. Social Justice Research, 21(2), 138–163.  
Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 52(1), 527–553.  
Okimoto, T. G., & Wenzel, M. (2008). Punishment as restoration of group and offender 
values following a transgression: value consensus through symbolic labelling 
and offender reform. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39(3), 346–367.  
172 
 
Okimoto, T. G., Wenzel, M., & Feather, N. T. (2011). Retribution and restoration as 
general orientations towards justice. European Journal of Personality, 26(3), 
255–275.  
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation 
checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 867–872. 
Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon 
mechanical turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(5), 411–419. 
Perrin, A. J. (2005). National threat and political culture: Authoritarianism, 
antiauthoritarianism, and the September 11 attacks. Political Psychology, 26(2), 
167–194.  
Pratto, F. (1999). The puzzle of continuing group inequality: Piecing together 
psychological, social, and cultural forces in social dominance theory. In M. P. 
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 31, pp. 191–
263). Amsterdam: Academic Press/Elsevier.  
Pratto, F., & Shih, M. (2000). Social dominance orientation and group context in 
implicit group prejudice. Psychological Science, 11(6), 515–518.  
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance 
orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 741–763.  
Reynolds, K. J., Turner, J. C., Haslam, S. A., & Ryan, M. K. (2001). The role of 
personality and group factors in explaining prejudice. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 37(5), 427–434. 
Rickert, E. J. (1998). Authoritarianism and economic threat: Implications for political 
behavior. Political Psychology, 19(4), 707–720.  
Rucker, D. D., Polifroni, M., Tetlock, P. E., & Scott, A. L. (2004). On the assignment of 
punishment: The impact of general-societal threat and the moderating role of 
severity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(6), 673–684.  
Sales, S. M. (1972). Economic threat as a determinant of conversion rates in 
authoritarian and nonauthoritarian churches. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 23(3), 420–428.  
Sassenberg, K., Moskowitz, G. B., Jacoby, J., & Hansen, N. (2007). The carry-over 
effect of competition: The impact of competition on prejudice towards 
173 
 
uninvolved outgroups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(4), 529–
538.  
Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2008). Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and 
theoretical review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12(3), 248–279.  
Sibley, C. G., Wilson, M. S., & Duckitt, J. (2007). Effects of dangerous and competitive 
worldviews on right‐wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
over a five‐month period. Political Psychology, 28(3), 357–371.  
Sidanius, J., Mitchell, M., & Navarrete, N. (2006). Support for harsh criminal sanctions 
and criminal justice beliefs: A social dominance perspective. Social Justice 
Research, 19(4), 433–449.  
Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Mitchell, M. (1994). In-group identification, social dominance 
orientation, and differential intergroup social allocation. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 134(2), 151–167.  
Stellmacher, J., & Petzel, T. (2005). Authoritarianism as a group phenomenon. Political 
Psychology, 26(2), 245–274.  
Stenner, K. (2005). The authoritarian dynamic. New York, NY; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tetlock, P. E. (2002). Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: 
Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors. Psychological Review, 109(3), 
451–471.  
Tetlock, P. E., Visser, P. S., Singh, R., Polifroni, M., Scott, A., Elson, S. B., Mazzocco, 
P., & Rescober, P. (2007). People as intuitive prosecutors: The impact of social-
control goals on attributions of responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 43(2), 195–209.  
Thomsen, L., Green, E. G. T., & Sidanius, J. (2008). We will hunt them down: How 
social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism fuel ethnic 
persecution of immigrants in fundamentally different ways. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 44(6), 1455–1464. 
Van Kleef, G. A., Homan, A. C., Finkenauer, C., Gündemir, S., & Stamkou, E. (2011). 
Breaking the rules to rise to power how norm violators gain power in the eyes of 
others. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(5), 500–507.  
Vidmar, N., & Miller, D. T. (1980). Socialpsychological processes underlying attitudes 
toward legal punishment. Law & Society Review, 14, 565–602. 
174 
 
Wenzel, M., & Thielmann, I. (2006). Why we punish in the name of justice: Just desert 
versus value restoration and the role of social identity. Social Justice Research, 
19(4), 450–470.  
 
 
  
175 
 
Appendix 
 
Items on punitive attitudes, collective security and status and power restoration  
 
Punitive attitudes 
- People who break the law should be given harsher sentences 
- With most offenders, we need to ‘condemn more and understand less’ 
- The use of harsh punishment should be avoided whenever possible 
- We should make sentences more severe for all crimes 
- I support the death penalty for serious crimes 
- If prison has to be used, it should be used sparingly and only as a last option 
 
Collective security restoration 
- Punishment should convey to others that the offender's behavior was wrong 
- Punishment should reinforce for others the values that the offender’s behavior 
undermined 
- Punishment should restore the 'moral balance' in society disrupted by crime 
- We should punish to increase security and order in society 
- Punishment should protect society avoiding that the offender can do more harm 
- Punishment should restore order and stability in society 
 
Status and power restoration 
- Punishment should signal to the offender that he is in no way superior 
- A just response should communicate to the offender that people have low regard 
for him 
- Punishment should humiliate the offender 
- Punishment should take away the power that the offender assumed over others 
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INTERLUDE 3 
Paper 3 examined whether the effects of RWA and SDO could be activated by 
different social contexts. The findings suggested a consistent effect of RWA on punitive 
attitudes: RWA was a strong predictor of the support for harsh sentences and symbolic 
motives of punishment across experimental conditions. The effect of SDO, on the other 
hand, was only significant when the social conditions were primed to be competitive. 
This is high SDO individuals want to punish criminal offenders but only when they 
think of them in terms of competitive relationships. 
 This interactive view (Lavine et al., 2005, 2002) understands the role of the 
context as activating people’s dispositions. Others, however, refer to studies on the 
context-sensitivity of the effects of RWA and SDO to argue that they capture attitudes 
towards social inequalities salient in context (see Sibley & Liu, 2010). To evaluate the 
generality of the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes, the final paper of this 
dissertation compares the effects of RWA and SDO in two different experimental 
contexts: one where participants have criminal offenders in mind when completing the 
survey and one where they have general attitudes in mind. 
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PAPER 4 
 
 
 
 
Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and punitive attitudes: 
An evaluation of the context-specificity of their relationships 
 
Monica M. Gerber 
 
 
 
Abstract 
There has been an important debate on whether right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and 
social dominance orientation (SDO) are general attitudes that predict social outcomes or 
whether they measure dominance over groups that are salient in context. This paper 
addresses the context-specificity of the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. 
In two studies I examine whether general measures of RWA and SDO or criminal 
offender-specific group-based dominance predict the support for harsh punishment. In 
Study 1 (n=78) participants were primed to think about social attitudes in general or 
criminal offenders as a group when completing RWA and SDO scales. In Study 2 
(n=106) participants filled out general RWA and SDO scales, as well as a criminal 
offender-specific measure of SDO. The findings show little evidence for context-
specific effect of RWA. The effect of SDO, however, varied greatly depending on 
whether participants had criminal offenders in mind when completing the SDO scale. 
Part of punitiveness seems to be related to a group-based competition for dominance 
with criminal offenders, yet people high in SDO do not seem to be readily disposed to 
think of punishment as a mechanism to maintain hierarchies. This paper finishes 
discussing implications on the RWA and SDO generality discussion.  
 
Keywords: punitive attitudes, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, 
context-specificity  
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Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) 
are among the individual difference variables most used to predict intergroup attitudes 
such as prejudice (e.g. Duckitt, 2001), attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Cohrs & 
Stelzl, 2010) and the support for harsh sentencing of criminal offenders (e.g. McKee & 
Feather, 2008). The extent to which they predict social outcomes, however, has been 
shown to depend on contextual factors: the strengths of associations vary from country 
to country (e.g. Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005; McFarland, Ageyev, & 
Abalakina-Paap, 1992) and according to contextual country-level factors such as crime 
rates and income inequality (e.g. Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010). This context-sensitivity has 
been interpreted by some as evidence of an interactionist view (Lavine, Lodge, & 
Freitas, 2005; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002) according to which ideological 
dispositions are activated by the social context, which in turn strengthens the link 
between these and attitudinal consequences. But others (e.g. Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; 
Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003) 
interpret these findings as an important criticism of the generality of RWA and SDO 
measures. The argument here is that the ways in which people respond to RWA and 
SDO scales depend on the forms of self-categorisation or group dominations that are 
salient in context. The extreme version of this argument posits that RWA and SDO are 
nothing else than attitudes towards specific forms of social inequalities salient in context 
(see Sibley & Liu, 2010). 
In this paper, I examine the extent to which general measures of RWA and SDO 
predict attitudes towards the punishment of criminal offenders. I start from an empirical 
observation made in unreported studies that the strength of association between RWA, 
SDO and punitive attitudes varies depending on whether the studies are introduced as 
being on social attitudes in general or on crime and punishment. Crucially, people seem 
to respond in different ways to RWA and SDO items depending on whether they have 
criminal offenders in mind or not. Unlike other studies, however, I do not seek to 
evaluate whether RWA and SDO are indeed general ideological views. Rather, and in 
line with Sibley and Liu’s (2010) argument, I assume that RWA and SDO can be made 
to measure general or context-specific attitudes depending on the context in which they 
are measured. The question then is whether overall measures of RWA and SDO predict 
punitive attitudes or whether they predict punitive attitudes only when people have 
criminal offenders in mind when completing the questionnaire.  
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RWA has consistently been found to predict the support of harsh sentencing 
(e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998; Capps, 2002). Findings regarding the role of SDO are 
conflicting, with a number of studies finding strong effects of SDO (e.g. Capps, 2002; 
Ho et al., 2012; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Mitchell, & 
Navarrete, 2006) and others finding that after RWA is controlled for, SDO does not 
predict punitive attitudes (Colémont, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2011; McKee & Feather, 
2008). Given the closer proximity between attitudes towards authorities, crime and 
punishment issues, people are hypothesised to think about criminal offenders and 
deviants to a greater extent when completing the RWA scale. Measures on acceptance 
of inequality, on the other hand, might not be easily linked to crime and punishment, 
and people are hypothesised to think less about criminal offenders when completing the 
SDO scale.  
In Study 1 (n=78) participants completed RWA and SDO scales after having 
read a description of the study as being either on social issues in general or on criminal 
offenders. I then evaluated whether the effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes 
were stronger when people had criminal offenders in mind when completing the scales. 
In Study 2 (n=106) I followed Sibley and Liu’s (2010) approach and elaborated a 
criminal offender-specific measure of SDO. I then examined whether general measures 
of RWA and SDO predicted punitive attitudes above and beyond criminal offenders-
specific SDO. I finish this paper discussing the implications of these studies on the 
RWA and SDO generality discussion. 
 
RWA and SDO: an individual differences approach 
Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are often used as 
measures of individual differences to predict prejudice and other intergroup attitudes. 
As observed by Altemeyer (1998), RWA and SDO together account for an important 
amount of variance of a diverse range of social attitudes. Duckitt (2001) has developed 
a framework to understand the combined effects of RWA and SDO. According to his 
dual-process motivational model RWA and SDO tend to predict similar social outcomes 
but given that they express different motivational goals, they predict attitudes for 
different reasons and through different mechanisms.  
Right-wing authoritarianism has been defined by Altemeyer (1981) as the 
covariation of three attitudinal clusters: conventionalism, authoritarian submission and 
authoritarian aggression. It has been conceptualised as the ideological expression of the 
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motivational goal of collective security and in-group conformity in opposition to 
personal freedom and autonomy (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 
2002). RWA has been shown to stem from a personality high in social conformity and 
to be made salient by a dangerous worldview. People high in RWA are motivated to 
maintain order and security in society and will defend policies that can help controlling 
social threats. 
Social dominance orientation, on the other hand, expresses a general preference 
for hierarchical relations between social groups, as well as preferences for one’s in-
group to dominate over out-groups (Pratto et al., 1994). According to social dominance 
theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), SDO is the mechanism by which social inequalities 
are maintained. People high in SDO are more likely to endorse hierarchy enhancing 
legitimising myths that justify unequal social arrangement (Pratto et al., 1994). Duckitt 
(2001, 2006) conceptualised SDO as being the ideological expression of the 
motivational goal of group dominance, superiority and power as opposed to an altruistic 
and egalitarian goal of helping others. SDO has been shown to be predisposed by a 
tough-minded personality and made salient by a competitive worldview. People high in 
SDO are motivated to achieve power and dominance and will favour ideologies that can 
help maintaining social inequality. 
RWA and SDO have often been conceptualised as stable personality traits (e.g. 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1998), but today 
there seems to be more and more agreement in the literature in treating RWA and SDO 
as ideological attitudes that are highly sensitive to situational factors (Sibley & Duckitt, 
2008). Social conditions have been found to shift levels of RWA and SDO (e.g. Sibley, 
Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007) and to interact with RWA and SDO in affecting social 
outcomes (e.g. RWA: Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; SDO: Pratto & Shih, 
2000). Duckitt (2001) has argued that worldviews increase the salience of motivational 
goals, while social dominance theorists make the claim that the context affects absolute 
but not relative levels of SDO (Ho et al., 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 2003).  
An important number of studies have shown that social conditions activate the 
effects of RWA and SDO on social attitudes. Lavine et al (2005, 2002) proposed an 
interactionist view on ideological attitudes, according to which situational variables 
make dispositional factors salient and strengthen the link between these and social 
attitudes. Stenner (2005; see also Feldman & Stenner, 1997), for example, found that 
social attitudes (including the support for harsh punishment) were the product of an 
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interaction between authoritarian predispositions and perceptions of threats to social 
norms (see also on the interaction effect between threat and authoritarianism, Cohrs & 
Ibler, 2009). The effects of RWA and SDO on attitudes also vary from country to 
country. McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina-Paap (1992), for example, showed that 
RWA was a positive predictor of attitudes towards equality in Russia and a negative 
predictor in the United States. Also, while SDO positively predicted support of violence 
toward the Middle East in the United States, the association between SDO and violence 
towards the West was negative in Lebanon (Henry et al., 2005). These findings provide 
evidence that SDO predicts attitudes depending on the particular interests that are at 
stake. Looking at cross-national differences in the relationships between RWA, SDO 
and anti-immigrant attitudes, Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) presented evidence that the effects 
of RWA and SDO varied depending on contextual data. RWA was a stronger predictor 
in countries where immigrants were perceived as increasing crime rates, but it was less 
relevant in countries with high income inequality and where people thought immigrants 
were beneficial for economy. SDO, on the other hand, was a stronger predictor in 
countries where immigrants had a higher relative unemployment rate.  
 
RWA and SDO: a context specific approach 
Research on RWA and SDO often takes the social conditions into account, but 
RWA and SDO are still hypothesised to be general orientations: RWA being a general 
preference for in-group conformity and collective security and SDO being a general 
preference to group-based hierarchies. From a self-categorisation and social identity 
perspective, however, authors have questioned the generality and causal status of SDO 
(e.g. Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; Schmitt et al., 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003) and 
RWA (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007). Schmitt et al. (2003) reason that people are 
motivated to protect the identity of the social group they belong to and will support 
attitudes toward inequality to the extent that these help maintaining a positive group 
identity. Attitudes towards inequality thus depend on the specific interest that inequality 
serves.  
Furthermore, and in accordance with self-categorisation theory, Reynolds et al. 
(2001) argue that a range of different types of intergroup categorisations are possible 
and people’s preferences for inequality are dependent on the self-categorisation and 
intergroup comparison that is active. RWA and SDO measures, as well as the 
relationship between these and prejudice, are argued to vary depending on the salient 
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context and self-categorisation form. Crucially, correlations will be a higher when the 
salient identity increases people’s awareness about ideological tensions and differences 
between groups. The relevance of the categorisation that is salient is particularly 
relevant for SDO, since its scale was developed to measure attitudes towards groups that 
are salient in context and which generate the strongest differences in power within a 
specific society (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). While research usually does not prime a 
specific identity, respondents are likely to think about different forms of intergroup 
relations when they complete RWA and SDO scales and these will predict support for 
different forms of intergroup domination (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007).  
 A great amount of research has supported these claims. First, some studies have 
explored the role of priming the relative position of the in-group in people’s levels of 
acceptance of inequality. Schmitt et al. (2003) manipulated perceptions of the in-
group’s relative position and observed that participants in the privileged condition were 
more positive towards inequality than participants in the disadvantaged condition. It 
should be noted, however, that the authors used only GBD items in their measure of 
SDO and the latter might have affected the results. In a similar way, Huang and Liu 
(2005) showed that only when gender was salient were men higher than women in 
SDO, and only when demographic groups were salient, where people from the dominant 
Taiwanese group higher in SDO (see also Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 
2003; Liu, Huang, & McFedries, 2008; Levin in Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Likewise, 
Rios Morrison and Ybarra (2008) showed that respondents exhibited higher levels of 
SDO when inequality benefitted their in-group. 
Second, studies have shown the extent to which RWA and SDO predict attitudes 
depends on the social categorisation that is salient when respondents complete RWA 
and SDO measures. Schmitt et al. (2003) showed that SDO was a stronger predictor of 
attitudes when participants were primed to think about the social categorisation that is 
relevant to the specific attitude being considered. For example, SDO was related to 
racism only when race was salient at the moment of completing SDO items, and it was 
related to sexism only when gender was salient. Reynolds et al. (2001) found stronger 
relationships between RWA and prejudice when social identities in terms of gender or 
age were made salient, as compared to when national identities were salient (see for 
similar results, Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998). Finally, Huang and Liu (2005) found 
only moderate (r=.48) test-retest stability when comparing SDO across contexts that 
primed different self-categorisations (race and demographics). 
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A third group of studies has examined how RWA and SDO interact with 
different forms of intergroup relations. In one interesting study, Dru (2007) primed 
different self-categorisation forms and found that RWA was a stronger predictor of 
prejudice when group values and in-group norms were salient, while SDO was a 
stronger predictor when competitive group memberships were salient. In another study, 
Lehmiller and Schmitt (2007) primed different intergroup relations, and evaluated the 
effects of RWA and SDO on support for military aggression. RWA and SDO were 
found to be stronger predictors when participants were induced to think about the 
United States dominating over people of Iraq than when they were primed to think 
about Saddam Huseein’s regime dominating Iraq.  
Fourth, other studies have manipulated the ways in which immigrant groups are 
portrayed and found different effects of RWA and SDO. Thomsen, Green and Sidanius 
(2008) found that people high in RWA endorsed the persecution of immigrants when 
these were presented as refusing to assimilate into the dominant culture (‘in-group 
conformity hypothesis’), while people high in SDO did so when immigrants were 
presented as wanting to assimilate (‘status boundary enforcement hypothesis’) (see also 
Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki, & Sidanius, 2010). Duckitt and Sibley (in Sibley & 
Liu, 2010) found that RWA predicted prejudice against a fictitious immigrant group 
when the group was described as morally deviant, while SDO predicted prejudice when 
it was described as being either economically competitive or disadvantaged. Other 
research, nevertheless, has not found moderating effects of self-categorisation on SDO 
(Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Heaven & St. Quintin, 2003). 
Lehmiller and Schmitt (2007) and Schmitt et al. (2003) conclude from these 
findings that SDO –and RWA in Lehmiller and Schmitt’s studies– capture attitudes 
towards inequality that are specific to the social group and social-structural position of 
this group that are salient at the moment of completing the scales. This is, when a 
particular form of inequality or social categorisation is salient, people seem to answer 
RWA and SDO items in terms of their attitudes towards that specific form of inequality. 
Meanwhile, RWA and SDO correlate with attitudes only if these are associated to the 
form of group domination that was salient when completing the scales. At best, this 
means that the measurement of RWA and SDO is highly sensitive to the forms of group 
domination that are salient at the moment of completing their scales. At worst, this 
means that RWA and SDO are nothing else than attitudes towards specific forms of 
group domination and social inequality relevant in context: “SDO and RWA scores are 
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better understood not as general orientations affecting support for specific forms of 
group dominance, but as measuring support for the specific forms of group dominance 
most relevant in context (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; p. 707, italics in original; see also 
Turner & Reynolds, 2003).  
In favour of a causal perspective of SDO, studies have found effects of SDO on 
discrimination in the context of minimal groups experiments (e.g. Sidanius, Pratto, & 
Mitchell, 1994). Also, longitudinal designs have provided effects of cross-lagged effects 
of SDO (Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011; Sibley & Liu, 2010; Sibley et al., 2007; 
Thomsen et al., 2010). For example, Sibley et al. (2007) showed that Time 1 SDO 
predicted hostile sexism at Time 2, after controlling for hostile sexism in Time 1. 
Similarly, Kteily et al. (2011) found a significant cross-lagged effect of SDO on 
prejudice in a four year period. The opposite was also true, but the effect was 
considerably smaller. These findings suggest that while SDO can be considered as both 
cause and effect of intergroup attitudes.  
Also in support of an individual differences approach, Sibley and Liu (2010) 
argue that SDO is often made to measure something different than it was intended to 
measure, and that it is also possible to measure general individual differences. To 
evaluate whether global or group-specific SDOs predicted prejudice, Sibley and Liu 
(2010) reworded SDO items to capture attitudes towards specific types of inequality 
(based on ethnicity, gender and age). They found that group-specific SDOs predicted 
shared but also unique variance in SDO, suggesting that SDO is not equivalent to 
attitudes towards inequality in any one domain in particular (see also Kteily, Ho, & 
Sidanius, 2012). Similarly, Perry and Sibley (2011) primed ethnic and personal 
identities and found stronger relationships between SDO and racism in the ethnic 
identity condition. Importantly, however, SDO was a significant predictor in both 
conditions. Longitudinal analyses showed that SDO had a cross-lagged effect on 
attitudes towards group-specific inequalities, while the reverse was also true. The 
authors concluded that general attitudes towards inequality seem to shape attitudes to 
specific social groups, while these in turn feed into general attitudes. Furthermore, 
overall SDO predicted racism even after controlling for ethnicity-based attitudes 
towards inequality.  
Sibley and Liu (2010) propose understanding SDO as a set of cognitive-
motivational ideological attitudes, which contains attitudes that are specific to a 
particular stratification (such as gender or ethnicity) and a more abstract global 
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motivation for domination that works across situations and domains. The effect that this 
global motivation has on prejudice and discrimination will depend on a combination of 
self-categorisation processes, personality traits and sociocultural characteristics (such as 
power relations and levels of competition). Situational and self-categorisation processes 
that highlight competitive group relations can thus moderate the effect of SDO, leading 
people high in SDO to become even more in favour of hierarchical relationships. The 
key here is whether self-categorisation and situational processes account for all of the 
effect of SDO or only part of it. If SDO predicts attitudes above and beyond situational 
and self-categorisation processes, then it is possible to argue that there are individual 
differences in preferences for hierarchy that predict attitudes (see also Kteily et al., 
2012). Sibley and Liu (2010) conclude that the context in which attitudes towards 
inequality are assessed must be taken into account as it is possible to change the 
interpretation of items. 
 
This research 
The aim of this paper is to explore whether general measures of RWA and SDO 
(unrelated to particular groups) predict punitive attitudes or if they predict attitudes only 
when people have criminal offenders in mind when completing the questionnaire. 
Previous research has shown that RWA (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998; Feather, 1998; 
Funke, 2005) and SDO (e.g. Ho et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius et al., 2006) 
predict the support for harsh sentences. Other studies, however, find that after 
controlling for RWA, the effect of SDO becomes non-significant (Colémont et al., 
2011; McKee & Feather, 2008). One possible reason for these inconsistent findings is 
the context in which studies measured RWA and SDO. There is a close proximity 
between RWA items and crime and punishment issues. Actually, most RWA scales 
refer implicit or explicitly to the harsh treatment of criminal offenders and respondents 
are likely to have criminal offenders in mind when completing RWA items. As a result, 
the extent to which RWA predicts punitive attitudes should not vary greatly whether the 
study is introduced as being on general attitudes or crime and punishment. SDO items, 
in contrast, are not easily linked to crime and punishment issues and respondents are 
likely to have other social groups in mind when completing SDO items. Indeed, Schmitt 
et al. (2003) showed that most people think about ethnic groups when completing SDO 
scales. In Study 1 (n=89) participants were primed to think about social attitudes, in 
general, or criminal offenders, specifically, when completing RWA and SDO scales. 
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Comparing a situation where respondents are induced to think about social attitudes in 
general to one where they are induced to think about criminal offenders when answering 
the scales will provide information on whether general or only criminal offender-
specific measures of RWA and SDO predict punitive attitudes. It will also give some 
preliminary indication of whether people think about criminal offenders when 
answering the scales. Reliability statistics can also be used to examine the consistency 
of people’s responses when completing RWA and SDO measures having one specific 
group in mind as opposed to having no group in mind. It is hypothesised that: 
 
H1:  The relationship between RWA and punitive attitudes will be significant 
regardless of whether respondents are primed to think about social attitudes or 
criminal offenders when completing the scale 
H2:  The relationship between SDO and punitive attitudes will be stronger when 
respondents are primed to think about criminal offenders when completing the 
scale 
 
The effect of SDO is hypothesised to be stronger when people have criminal 
offenders in mind. However, and in line with Sibley and Liu’s (2010) findings in 
research on prejudice, a general measure of SDO should predict attitudes above and 
beyond group-specific attitudes towards inequality. Furthermore, higher levels of SDO 
should increase desires of dominance towards criminal offenders. In Study 2 (n=125) 
respondents filled out general measures of RWA and SDO, as well as a criminal 
offender-specific measure of SDO (adapted from Sibley and Liu, 2012). In line with 
previous findings it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3:  A general measure of SDO will predict punitive attitudes over and above a 
criminal offender-specific measure of SDO 
H4:  A criminal offender-specific measure of SDO will mediate the effect of SDO on 
punitive attitudes  
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Study 1 
 
Method 
Participants 
89 persons from the United States participated in an online study posted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1. 11 participants (12%) were excluded for not responding 
correctly to an instructional manipulation check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 
2009) or a validation question embedded at the end of the study (3 participants). The 
reported results correspond to 78 participants. The sample was diverse in terms of, age 
(Min=17, Max=59, M=28, SD=10.7), occupation (51% worked, 28% students, 10% 
unemployed) and ideology (64% leaning to the left, 22% centre, 14% leaning to the 
right); although less diverse in terms of gender (71% men). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions: social attitudes condition (N=39) or 
criminal offenders condition (N=39).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Procedure. The aim of the experimental manipulation was to compare a 
situation where participants were thinking of criminal offenders when responding to the 
RWA and SDO scales to a situation where participants had no particular social group in 
mind. As observed in previous unreported research, the simple fact of describing the 
study as being on social attitudes or criminal offenders seemed to affect the ways in 
which participants responded to RWA and SDO scales. The study was posted on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a research on social attitudes but participants were then 
randomly assigned to read a consent form describing the study as being on attitudes 
towards social issues or criminal offenders. An instructional manipulation check 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009) was then used to increase the strength of the prime, while 
also working as a manipulation check. In this check participants were requested to 
respond affirmatively to a statement that basically repeated the information on the topic 
of the study: ‘This survey contains questions about social issues [criminal offenders as a 
group]’. Only those participants who responded ‘true’ to this statement were allowed to 
proceed. Participants were then asked to answer RWA and SDO scales (presented in a 
                                               
1 Data collected through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has been shown to be as reliable as data collected 
through other means. Furthermore, participants are more diverse in terms of socio-demographic variables 
than student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). 
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random order to avoid a stronger effect of the prime on one of them) and punitive 
attitudes. To increase the effect of the prime, the title of the study was repeated in each 
page. At the end, participants were asked to report background socio-demographic 
questions (age, gender, occupation and political ideology) and their thoughts about the 
aim of the study. No participant reported suspicion on the aim of the study. Participants 
were debriefed at the end of the study and paid 0.40 USD for their participation. 
Individual differences. Twelve items from Altemeyer’s (1998) Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism scale were used to measure RWA. Half of the items were reverse 
coded to control for acquiescence response bias. Sample items are: ‘The “old-fashioned 
ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live’ and ‘There is no 
“ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way’ (R). Since 
questions on authoritarian aggression often refer to the treatment of criminal offenders, 
special attention was placed in excluding crime and punishment related items. Only 
overall RWA was considered as Altemeyer’s items (1998) combine elements from the 
different subscales. Ten items from Pratto et al.’s (1994) measure of Social Dominance 
Orientation were used to measure SDO. SDO has been shown to measure two different 
concepts: opposition to equality (OEQ), measuring a general preference for inequality, 
and group-based dominance (GBD), measuring a preference for one’s in-group 
dominating over out-groups (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010). 
Since these two subscales show different relationships with justice attitudes (McKee & 
Feather, 2008), their effects are examined separately. Five items captured group-based 
dominance and five items captured opposition to equality. Sample items are: ‘Some 
groups of people are simply inferior to other groups’ and ‘We would have fewer 
problems if we treated people more equally’.  
Dependent variable. Punitive attitudes were measured using six items, four 
items in favour and two items against applying harsh sentences. Sample items are: 
‘People who break the law should be given harsher sentences’ and ‘The use of harsh 
punishment should be avoided whenever possible’.  
Seven point likert scales were used for all items (ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree). Descriptive results and reliability statistics are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Analysis 
 To evaluate the consistency of response under the social issues and criminal 
offenders conditions, scale reliability indices were obtained for RWA, SDO and 
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punitive attitudes in each experimental group. Correlation analyses between punitive 
attitudes, RWA and SDO were conducted for each experimental group and z-tests were 
used to compare coefficients across conditions. Regression analyses were then carried 
out to evaluate the joint effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes. T-tests were 
carried out to compare coefficients across conditions. Given the nature of the 
hypotheses of this paper and the small sample size, for all analyses one-sided tests were 
used. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive and reliability statistics across experimental conditions (Study 1, n=78) 
  
Mean SD 
α 
  Social issues Criminal offenders 
Punitive attitudes 3.74 1.24 0.80 0.78 
RWA 2.72 1.26 0.90 0.96 
GBD 3.14 1.36 0.83 0.84 
OEQ 2.34 1.09 0.77 0.94 
 
 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
No significant differences were observed between experimental groups in 
measures of punitive attitudes, RWA and SDO (Fs<1.5, p>.10). Table 1 reports 
reliability coefficients for all variables in each experimental condition. Almost no 
differences in reliability were observed for punitive attitudes and group-based 
dominance. For RWA the reliability was somewhat higher in the criminal offenders 
condition. The largest difference was in the opposition to equality scale, with 0.18 
points of difference between the social issue and criminal offenders conditions. This is, 
when respondents had criminal offenders in mind, they were more consistent in 
completing the OEQ scale. In line with Perry and Sibley’s (2011) analysis, it was 
evaluated whether the manipulation affected the variance of punitive attitudes, RWA 
and SDO. Variance homogeneity tests showed no significant differences in variance for 
RWA, GBD and punitive attitudes (Levene statistic (1, 76)<1.2, p>.05). There was, 
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however, a marginally significant difference in the variance of OEQ (Levene statistic (1, 
76)=3.14, p>.10; Social attitudes condition, SD=0.83; Criminal offenders condition, 
SD=1.31). 
 
RWA, SDO and punitive attitudes 
 Table 2 reports bivariate correlations between punitive attitudes, RWA, SDO, 
GBD and OEQ in both experimental conditions. Fisher’s z-tests comparing the 
correlation under the criminal offenders and social issues condition are also displayed. 
The correlation between punitive attitudes and RWA was positive and significant in 
both experimental conditions. While it was slightly higher in the criminal offenders 
condition, this difference was not statistically significant (z=.53, p>.05). SDO, on the 
other hand, had stronger correlations with the support of harsh punishment in the 
criminal offenders condition (SDO: r=.60, p<.01; GBD: r=.64, p<.01; OEQ: r=.42, 
p<.01) compared to the social issues condition (SDO: r=.40, p<.05; GBD: r=.33, p<.05; 
OEQ: r=.36, p<.05). For GBD, this difference was statistically significant (z=1.76, 
p<.05). 
 
Table 2 
Bivariate correlation coefficients between punitive attitudes, RWA and SDO across 
experimental conditions (Study 1, n=78) 
  Social issues 
(n=39) 
Criminal offenders 
(n=39) Fisher's Z-Test 
RWA .56** .64** 0.53 
SDO .40* .60** 1.14 
GBD .33* .64** 1.76* 
OEQ .36* .42** 0.30 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
Separate linear regression models were then carried out for each experimental 
group (see Table 3). In Model 1 the endorsement of harsh sentencing was regressed on 
RWA and SDO. Given the somewhat different findings for GBD and OEQ, Models 2 
and 3 show the effects of RWA and each of the subscales of SDO on punitive attitudes.  
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Table 3 
Effects of RWA and SDO on punitive attitudes across experimental conditions (Study 1, n=78) 
  Social issues Criminal offenders 
T-Test (df=76) 
  B SE t B SE t 
Model 1               
RWA .54 .17 3.24** .44 .10 4.43** -0.51 
SDO .28 .20 1.40 .46 .12 3.87** 0.77 
R2 .35 .59   
                
Model 2               
RWA .58 .17 3.41** .44 .09 4.68** -0.51 
GBD .11 .14 0.77 .44 .09 4.62** 1.98* 
R2 .33 .63   
                
Model 3               
RWA .57 .15 3.70** .51 .11 4.58** -0.32 
OEQ .35 .20 1.75† .25 .12 2.09* -0.43 
R2 .37 .48   
†p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
In Model 1 RWA positively and significantly predicted harsh punishment in 
both experimental conditions and regression slopes did not differ significantly between 
groups (t(76)=-.51, p>.05). The somehow smaller slope of RWA in the criminal 
offenders condition (b=.44, p<.01) compared to the social issues condition (b=.54, 
p<.01) can be attributed to SDO capturing part of the effect in the criminal offenders 
condition. Similar results were found for RWA after controlling for GBD and OEQ in 
Models 2 and 3.  
As for SDO, the regression coefficient was higher in the criminal offenders 
condition (b=.46, p<.01) than in the social issues condition (b=.28, p>.05). Furthermore, 
the effect of SDO was only significant when respondents had criminal offenders in 
mind when completing the scale. However, probably due to the small sample size, this 
difference was not statistically significant (t(76)= .77, p>.05). Similarly, the effect of 
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GBD was high and significant in the criminal offenders condition (b=.44, p>.05) and 
not in the social issues condition (b=.11, p>.05), and this time the difference was 
statistically significant (t(76)=1.98, p<.05). Model 3 shows that the effect of OEQ was 
higher in the social attitudes condition (b=.35, p>.10) than in the criminal offenders 
condition (b=.25, p>.05). However, given the high standard error in the social attitudes 
condition (which is likely to be related to the lower reliability of the scale), OEQ had a 
significant effect in the criminal offenders condition and this effect was only marginally 
significant in the social attitudes condition. RWA and SDO explained a higher 
proportion of variance in the criminal offenders condition (> 48%) compared to the 
social issues condition (>33%).  
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted punitive attitudes as a function of the interaction between GBD and 
experimental conditions, controlling for RWA (Study 1, n=78) 
Note. GBD is centred and results are shown for the range between -/+ 1 SD.  
 
An analysis regressing punitive attitudes on RWA, GBD, experimental condition 
and an interaction effect between GBD and experimental condition revealed a 
significant interaction (Main GBD effect: β=.14, p>0.05; Main experimental condition 
effect: β=-.08, p<0.05; Interaction effect between GBD and experimental condition: 
β=.28, p<0.05). Figure 1 presents fitted values of punitive attitudes for -/+ 1 standard 
193 
 
deviations in GBD, showing that GBD had a stronger effect on punitive attitudes when 
respondents completed SDO scales having criminal offenders in mind.  
 
Discussion 
 The findings in Study 1 showed a persistent relationship between RWA and 
punitive attitudes, regardless of whether participants were led to think about criminal 
offenders when completing the RWA scale (H1). The effect of RWA was practically 
insensitive to contextual factors in this study. Two interpretations are possible. First, 
people high in RWA might be predisposed to think about crime and punishment when 
answering to RWA items. That is criminal offenders are an accessible social group that 
threatens motivational goals of in-group conformity and collective security. Thus, 
reminding people to think about criminal offenders does not change the way in which 
they respond to RWA items. A second possibility is that while RWA measured different 
concepts in the social issues and criminal offenders conditions, both a general and a 
criminal offender-specific measure of RWA were relevant to punitive attitudes.  
 The most interesting finding of this study was that SDO –and particularly GBD- 
had a significantly higher effect on punitive attitudes when criminal offenders were 
salient at the time of responding to SDO questions (H2). After controlling for RWA, 
overall SDO, GBD and OEQ were only significant predictors of punitive attitudes in the 
criminal offenders condition. It might be argued that the SDO scale captured different 
concepts when people were thinking about social attitudes in general compared to when 
they were thinking about criminal offenders. This is very likely given the lack of 
specificity of SDO items.  
 The fact that SDO –and particularly GBD- predicted punitive attitudes only in the 
criminal offenders condition leads to three conclusions. First, criminal offenders are not 
an accessible social group that people think about when answering to SDO items. 
Second, that even though people do not think of criminal offenders when completing the 
SDO scale, punishment is related to preferences for group-based dominance over 
criminal offenders. Third, as shown by the variance homogeneity test, respondents 
varied to a greater extent in their responses to OEQ in the criminal offenders condition 
compared to the social attitudes condition. In the criminal offenders condition 
respondents were more likely to categorise themselves as group members than in the 
general social attitudes condition, and self-categorisation theory (Turner, Oakes, 
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) would predict more uniform responses in the former. The 
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finding that respondents varied to a greater degree in their OEQ responses in the 
criminal offenders condition might be due to higher social desirability when talking 
about inequality in general as compared to criminal offenders: it might be less 
politically incorrect to express preferences for inequalities between law-abiding citizens 
and criminal offenders than across other social groups. Stronger effects of OEQ might 
thus be due to respondents expressing less biased and more varied opinions in the 
criminal offenders condition. It should be noted, however, that respondents did not 
express higher levels of SDO or punitive attitudes.  
 A fourth possibility should also be taken into account. Priming criminal offenders 
before measuring RWA and SDO might have made intergroup status differences salient. 
Previous research has found that SDO is a stronger predictor when status distinctions 
are salient or when status differentials are threatened. Pratto (1999) reported that SDO 
predicted intergroup discrimination only when status distinctions or intergroup status 
concerns were salient. Similarly, Pratto and Shih (2000) found that people high in SDO 
showed higher implicit prejudice when in-group status was attacked. Sidanius et al. 
(1994) showed similar findings. They found that SDO predicted intergroup bias only 
when people identified with their group and intergroup distinctions could be argued to 
be salient. Federico (1999) reported that the effect of SDO on in-group favouritism was 
stronger when intergroup status differentials were believed to be unstable. In the current 
study, priming criminal offenders will most likely have led respondents to identify as 
part of a high-status law abiding in-group, while this might have increased status 
differentials between them and criminal offenders. A second study was conducted to use 
a different approach to evaluate the context-specificity of SDO without priming status 
differentials. 
 
Study 2 
 Study 1 provided preliminary evidence that the preference for group-dominance 
over criminal offenders was a better predictor of punitive attitudes than overall group-
based dominance. However, it is not clear whether presenting the study as being on 
criminal offenders primed in-group status differences and hereby increased the 
relevance of SDO in predicting punitiveness. Study 2 used a different approach to 
examine whether a general measure of SDO predicted punitive attitudes over and above 
a criminal offender-specific measure. Drawing on Sibley and Liu’s (2010) approach, an 
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offender-specific measure of SDO was developed and measured in conjunction with a 
general measure of SDO.  
 
Method 
Participants 
A survey on social attitudes was posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 125 
persons from the United States participated in the study for 0.60 USD. 19 participants 
(15%) were excluded for not responding correctly to an instructional manipulation 
check (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) or a validation question embedded in the survey (11 
participants). The reported results correspond to 106 participants. The sample was 
diverse in terms of gender (65% female), age (Min=18, Max=65, M=34.4, SD=12.5), 
occupation (52% worked, 15% students, 14% unemployed) and ideology (49% leaning 
to the left, 33% centre, 18% leaning to the right); although less diverse in terms of 
ethnicity (79% white).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were first requested to read and agree to a consent form. Second, an 
instructional manipulation check was used to increase participant’s attention 
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Participants were instructed to respond affirmatively to a 
statement specifying that the survey contained questions on social issues. RWA and 
SDO were then measured using the same scales described in Study 1. Dominance over 
criminal offenders was next assessed using a scale adapted for this study (see Appendix) 
from Sibley and Liu’s (2010) SDO scales for inequality based on ethnicity, gender and 
age. It should be noted that for all analysis, longer versions of SDO scales were used for 
the general measure compared to the criminal-offender specific measure. Sibley and Liu 
(2010) showed that results remained practically the same when using a longer version 
compared to using the same items for both scales. Punitive attitudes were measured 
using the same six items as in study 1. At the end, participants were asked to answer 
background socio-demographic questions (age, gender, ethnicity, occupation and 
political ideology) and their thoughts about the aims of the study. Participants were 
debriefed at the end of the study and paid 0.40 USD for their participation. 
Seven point likert scales were used for all items (ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree). Table 4 displays descriptive and reliability statistics for all scales in 
the study. 
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Analysis 
Correlation analyses were first conducted to compare the correlations between 
punitive attitudes, RWA, overall SDO, and criminal offender-specific SDO. Replicating 
Sibley and Liu’s (2010) procedure, regression analyses were then conducted regressing 
punitive attitudes on SDO and criminal offender-specific SDO, while also controlling 
for RWA. To finish, a mediation analysis was conducted to examine whether criminal 
offender-specific SDO mediated the effect of SDO on punitive attitudes. For all 
analyses, one-sided tests were used. 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Reliability statistics showed a slightly higher reliability for a criminal offender-
specific scale of OEQ compared to a general measure of OEQ (0.06 points of 
difference), while the opposite was true for GBD (see Table 4). Descriptive results also 
showed that people were more likely to endorse SDO statements if these referred to 
criminal offenders instead of ‘inferior groups’: respondents were more likely to agree 
that criminal offenders (GBD criminals: M=3.87, SD=1.39) should stay in their place 
than they were to agree to the same regarding ‘inferior groups’ (GBD: M=2.74, 
SD=1.30). This difference was statistically significant (t(105)=7.79, p<.01). 
Respondents were also more likely to justify unequal conditions of criminal offenders 
(OEQ criminals: M=3.91, SD=1.43) than to justify the same for ‘inferior groups’ (OEQ: 
M=2.33, SD=1.14). Again, this difference was statistically significant (t(105)=11.65, 
p<.01). 
 Punitive attitudes correlated positively and significantly with all variables in the 
study (rs>.31, ps<.01). The correlations were higher with the criminal offender-specific 
SDO scale (r=.50, p<.01) than with general SDO scale (r=.37, p<.01). Similar 
differences were observed for the subscales of SDO. As before, the largest difference 
was observed for GBD: the correlation with punitive attitudes was higher for the 
criminal offender-specific GBD scale (r=.50, p<.01) than for the general GBD scale 
(r=.36, p<.01). The correlations between general SDO scales and criminal offender-
specific SDO scales were moderate (around r=.40).  
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation coefficients between punitive attitudes, RWA and 
SDO  (Study 2, n=106) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Punitive attitudes -               
2 RWA .36** -             
3 SDO .37** .25* -           
4 GBD .36** .19* .91** -         
5 OEQ .31** .26** .88** .61** -       
6 SDO Criminals .50** .36** .42** .35** .41** -     
7 GBD Criminals .50** .38** .40** .39** .32** .92** -   
8 OEQ Criminals .42** .28** .37** .26** .42** .92** .69** - 
M 3.65 2.92 2.53 2.74 2.33 3.89 3.87 3.91 
SD 1.25 1.25 1.09 1.30 1.14 1.30 1.39 1.43 
α .84 .92 .88 .84 .83 .89 .78 .89 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
SDO, criminal-specific SDO and punitive attitudes 
 Table 5 reports the results of three linear regression models. In Model 1 punitive 
attitudes are regressed on general SDO. In Model 2, criminal offender-specific SDO is 
added to the equation. Finally, Model 3 controls for RWA. The results show a strong 
and positive effect of SDO in Model 1 (b=.43, p<.01). After controlling for criminal-
specific SDO in Model 2, the effect of SDO shrinks importantly but remains significant 
(b=.23, p<.05). The strongest effect, however, is exerted by the criminal offender 
specific measure of SDO (b=.40, p<.01). Introducing RWA into the regression in Model 
3, slightly reduces the effect of SDO (b=.20, p<.05) and criminal offender-specific SDO 
(b=.35, p<.01). However, they both remain significant predictors. Similar results were 
obtained using GBD and OEQ (and their respective criminal offender specific 
measures) instead of overall SDO (not shown). In all cases, the effect of SDO and its 
subscales was reduced but remained significant after controlling for offender specific 
measures.  
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Table 5 
Effects of RWA, GBD and criminal offender-specific GBD on punitive attitudes  (Study 2, 
n=106) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  B SE t B SE T B SE t 
SDO .43 .10 4.09** .23 .11 2.16* .20 .10 1.94* 
SDO Criminals       .40 .09 4.53** .35 .09 3.81** 
RWA             .19 .09 2.10* 
R2 .14 .28 .31 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
Mediation analysis 
 To finish, meditational analyses were conducted to examine whether criminal 
offender-specific SDO mediated the effect of SDO on punitive attitudes. All analyses 
controlled for RWA. As expected, a significant mediation was observed (Sobel’s z = 
2.75, p < .01). The opposite was also true, although to a lesser extent: SDO significantly 
mediated the effect of criminal offender-specific SDO on punitive attitudes (Sobel’s z = 
1.73, p < .05). It should be noted, however, that SDO remained a significant predictor 
after controlling for criminal offender-specific SDO. The same analyses were then 
conducted with RWA, this time controlling for SDO. As before, the effect of RWA was 
mediated by criminal offender-specific SDO (Sobel’s z = 2.39, p < .01), while RWA 
also mediated the effect of criminal offender-specific SDO (Sobel’s z = 1.75, p < .05). 
As with SDO, RWA remained a significant predictor after controlling for SDO and 
group-dominance over criminal offenders.  
 
Discussion 
Group-based dominance over criminal offenders exerted a strong and positive 
effect on the support for harsh sentencing, above and beyond overall measures of RWA 
and SDO. This is people who are in favour of group-based dominance over criminal 
offenders and who justify unequal conditions between law abiding people and criminal 
offenders are more likely to support the use of harsh punishment. Interestingly, 
however, overall SDO and RWA remained significant predictors of punitive attitudes 
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after controlling for group-based dominance over criminal offenders (H3).  Finally, as 
expected, the offender-specific measure of SDO mediated the effect of SDO on punitive 
attitudes (H4). 
 
General Discussion 
The findings showed a consistent effect of RWA across experimental conditions 
and after controlling for group-based dominance over criminal offenders. The effect of 
SDO –and particularly of group-based dominance, GBD- was found to vary to a great 
extent depending on whether respondents thought of criminal offenders when 
completing the SDO measure. Still, a general measure of SDO predicted punitive 
attitudes after controlling for group-based dominance over criminal offenders. In line 
with Sibley and Liu (2010) the results of this paper suggest that there are both specific 
and generalised effects of SDO on the support for harsh sentencing.  
Furthermore, these results also provide an indication on the conceptual 
proximity between RWA and SDO items and crime and punishment issues. The fact 
that the effect of RWA did not vary greatly depending on the social group that was 
salient suggests crime and punishment are accessible to people high in RWA when 
responding to the RWA scale. As hypothesised, crime and punishment issues should be 
less accessible to people high in SDO when answering to the SDO scale. The latter 
might account for the lower effect of SDO when measured in the context of general 
social attitudes. Interestingly, however, an offender-specific measure of SDO had a 
great effect on punitive attitudes. Part of punitiveness seems to be related to a group-
based competition with criminal offenders, yet people high in SDO do not seem to be 
predisposed to think of crime and punishment as a matter of group dominance.  
These results suggest that part of the inconsistent findings in the literature 
regarding the role of SDO might be accounted by whether respondents had criminal 
offenders in mind when completing the SDO scale. If SDO and punitive attitudes were 
measured as part of a survey on general social attitudes, and particularly if SDO was 
measured before items on crime and punishment, then the effect of SDO can be 
expected to be significantly lower. On the other hand, if SDO items are completed 
having criminal offenders in mind, or –one might also expect- if crime and punishment 
are associated to competitive relations for power and status, SDO should be a stronger 
predictor. 
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Two other factors may also account for the stronger effect of SDO in the 
criminal offenders condition. First, as noted in Study 1, respondents seem to be less 
consistent in completing SDO items when no specific group is salient. Lower 
consistencies, on the other hand, can translate into lower predictive capacity. Second, in 
Study 2 respondents were significantly more likely to agree to SDO statements when 
they referred to criminal offenders compared to when no specific ‘inferior group’ was 
specified. It might be more socially desirable to agree with the justification of inequality 
of social grupos other than criminal offenders. If this was true, a measure of dominance 
over criminal offenders might be better able to capture preferences for inequalities and 
thus become a stronger predictor. 
 
Conclusions 
Critics of individual differences approaches (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; 
Schmitt et al., 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003) have argued that the extent to which 
RWA and SDO predict attitudes depends on the self-categorisation and intergroup 
comparisons that are salient when respondents complete the scales. Therefore, attitudes 
towards inequality depend on the specific interests that are served by sustaining unequal 
relationships. Consistent with this argument, the effects of RWA and SDO have been 
shown to vary greatly depending on the social group that is salient at the moment of 
completing the scales (e.g. Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2007; Schmitt et al., 2003). Others 
(Kteily et al., 2012; Sibley & Liu, 2010) have argued that the context in which attitudes 
towards inequality are measured need to be taken into account as it is possible to make 
SDO measure something that is was not intended to measure. Importantly, then, the 
question is not whether RWA and SDO are general attitudes, but rather whether general 
measures of RWA and SDO predict outcome variables and behaviours. 
 The findings of the studies presented in this paper provide evidence into the 
relevance of general measures of RWA and SDO in the context of attitudes towards the 
punishment of criminal offenders. RWA had a strong effect on punitive attitudes 
regardless of whether respondents had criminal offenders in mind when completing the 
scale, while the effect of SDO was found to be more context-specific. But despite the 
stronger effect of a criminal offender-specific measure of SDO in predicting 
punitiveness, RWA and SDO explained unique variance of punitive attitudes.  
 Sibley and Liu (2010) recommend taking special care to avoid priming a specific 
group prior to completing an SDO scale. Asking participants to think of groups in 
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general before completing SDO items should allow capturing a global measure of SDO, 
although Kteily et al. (2012) found that SDO was a general attitude regardless of this 
instruction. In this study, criminal offenders were primed by manipulating the 
description of the study. The important differences found in the effect of SDO suggest 
that the description of the study is enough to lead participants to change the way in 
which they respond to the questionnaire, probably due to the expectations they have in 
relation to the questions that will come. It is thus recommended to take into account the 
extent to which the title of the study might prime a specific group. 
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Appendix 
 
Group-based dominance over criminal offenders items 
 
- Criminal offenders are simply inferior to law-abiding people 
- It is OK if law-abiding people have more of a chance in life than criminal 
offenders 
- All groups of people should be given an equal chance in life regardless of 
whether they are criminal or not 
- We should do what we can to equalize conditions between law-abiding people 
and criminal offenders 
- If criminal offenders stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems 
- It would be good if criminal offenders and law-abiding people could be equal 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
The purpose of this doctoral dissertation has been to examine the relationship 
between ideological preferences and public support for harsh sentences for criminal 
offenders. This dissertation has started with the observation that when people think 
about the appropriate sentences for criminal offenders, they consider a range of factors 
that go far beyond concerns about controlling the behaviour of criminal offenders. 
Instead, people worry about the extent to which crime disturbs the normative order in 
society and how, by committing crime, offenders show disrespect and assume power 
over the victim and society. Crucially, then, beliefs about the role of crime and 
punishment in society are closely linked to views people hold about how social order 
should be structured and the acceptable means to maintain it.  
Given the central role that ideological attitudes have in shaping people’s 
thoughts about crime and their support for punitive policies, it is important to examine 
the social psychological drives that are at the base of punitive attitudes. In this 
dissertation I have proposed a social-psychological perspective to the study of public 
punitiveness. More specifically, I have argued that understanding ideologies from a 
motivated social cognition perspective provides a useful framework to understand why 
ideology and punitive attitudes tend to go together.  From this perspective, ideologies 
are argued to be rooted in psychological needs and motivations. Moreover, people’s 
motivationally driven ideologies are expected to lead them to assign positive or negative 
value to punitive policies, to the extent that they are perceived as helping to deal with a 
specific goal.  
 Harsh punishment might thus have positive value for some people, depending on 
their motivational goals and ideological attitudes. In particular, I have argued that 
punishment can be perceived as satisfying two main goals in society. First, crime can be 
recognised as disturbing collective security, this is, perceptions of security, stability, as 
well as strong bonds and in-group conformity. Harsh sentences are conceived in this 
context as sending a message to offenders and the community more broadly that 
collective security is important and that everyone should agree with the group’s norms. 
It is because of this perceived function of punishment that those high in right-wing 
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authoritarianism (RWA) might find comfort in applying harsher sentences of criminal 
offenders. Crucially, I have argued (in line with Duckitt, 2009) that high RWA 
individuals will support punitive measures to restore security and in-group conformity. 
High RWA individuals are also submissive towards authorities and they should endorse 
the actions undertaken by the criminal justice system to control crime.  
Second, crime can also be perceived as a threat to social hierarchies: by 
committing crime, criminal offenders communicate that they have power over the 
victim and society and one way of restoring hierarchies is by degrading their status. 
Stiff sentences can thus be perceived as a means to enhance status differentials between 
criminal offenders and the rest of society. Those individuals that have a motivation to 
achieve power and dominance over out-groups might therefore support harsh 
punishment as a means by which status and power hierarchies are restored. I have 
argued in this dissertation that high social dominance orientation (SDO) individuals 
should be particularly likely to support harsh punishment to avoid criminal offenders 
gaining power and restore status and power hierarchies.  
Evidence in favour of a dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes has shown 
that both RWA (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981, 1998) and SDO (e.g. Sidanius et al., 2006) relate 
to punitiveness. But a number of issues have been left unexplained, and this dissertation 
has sought to address some of them. In four empirical papers, this research has focused 
on exploring the different reasons why and circumstances under which those individuals 
high in RWA and SDO will support harsh punitive measures. The papers in this 
dissertation have examined different hypotheses proposed to evaluate a dual-
motivational model (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009): whether RWA and SDO predict attitudes 
for different reasons (‘differential mediation hypothesis’), whether they predict different 
specific outcomes (‘differential effects hypothesis’) and whether they predict attitudes 
under different circumstances (‘differential moderation hypothesis’). Using these 
hypotheses as a starting point, this dissertation has sought to address the following 
general research question: How do right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation relate to the endorsement of harsh punishment? More specifically, it has 
examined the following questions:  
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Q1.  Do RWA and SDO predict unique variance of punitive attitudes?  
Q2.  Why do people high in RWA and SDO endorse the harsh sentencing of criminal 
offenders?  
Q3.  Do people high in RWA and SDO support different retributive goals of 
punishment and attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders?  
Q4.  Under what circumstances do RWA and SDO predict punitiveness?  
 
Four empirical papers were presented on the differential ways in which RWA 
and SDO predict punitiveness. Paper 1 of this dissertation started by evaluating the most 
basic proposition of a dual-motivational model which is that RWA and SDO will have 
separate effects on punitive attitudes (Q1). Moreover, it used structural equation 
modelling to examine whether the statistical effects of RWA and SDO were mediated 
by different beliefs about crime and criminals, as well as different symbolic motives of 
punishment (Q2). Paper 2 explored the relationship between RWA, SDO, retributive 
punishment goals and attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders. In 
particular, it looked at whether RWA and SDO predicted different retributive goals of 
punishment (Q3). It also provided evidence on whether the statistical effects of RWA 
and SDO on the support for harsh punishment were mediated by different symbolic 
motives and retributive goals of punishment. Papers 3 and 4 examined the conditions 
under which RWA and SDO predicted punitiveness (Q4). In Paper 3, social conditions 
were experimentally primed to be dangerous or competitive and the extent to which 
RWA and SDO predicted punitive responses was measured. Paper 3 provided further 
evidence into the differential mediation of the effects of RWA and SDO on the support 
for harsh sentences. In Paper 4, participants were led to think about criminal offenders 
or attitudes in general when completing RWA and SDO scales. This approach allowed 
testing whether the effects of RWA and SDO were general across social categories 
salient in context or whether they predicted punitiveness only when measured in the 
context of crime and criminal offenders.  
This conclusion summarises the main findings of the papers in this dissertation 
in the light of the above mentioned questions and with reference to the particular papers 
where relevant. It then discusses limitations of the current research and avenues for 
future research.  
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4.1. Summary of research questions and findings  
Q1. Do RWA and SDO predict unique variance of punitive attitudes? 
While RWA has consistently been found to predict the support for harsh 
sentences, there are inconsistent findings in the literature in relation to the role of SDO. 
Whilst many studies have found a strong effect of SDO on punitiveness (e.g. Sidanius et 
al., 2006), studies that control for RWA have found conflicting effects. After controlling 
for RWA, one study (Capps, 2002) found a strong and significant effect of SDO, while 
two studies found a non-significant effect of SDO (Colémont et al., 2011; McKee & 
Feather, 2008). Paper 1 of this dissertation explored two different reasons for these 
inconsistent findings. First, controlling for RWA might reduce the effect of SDO to 
non-significance because RWA scales usually include items on crime and punishment 
as part of the authoritarian aggression scale and will thus ‘capture’ all of the predictive 
capacity. Second, previous research has found that only one of the subscales of SDO, 
group-based dominance, and not opposition to equality is relevant to punitive attitudes. 
In line with a dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes Paper 1 hypothesised that 
RWA and SDO would predict unique variance of punitive attitudes once authoritarian 
aggression was excluded from the measurement of RWA (H1.1), that all subscales of 
RWA (H1.2) and group based dominance (but not opposition to equality, H1.3) would be 
relevant to punitiveness. The findings of Paper 1 provided support for hypotheses 1.1 
and 1.2, but only partial support for hypothesis 1.3.  
First, consistent with previous research (e.g. Funke, 2005) all subscales of RWA 
were related to punitive attitudes. That is, harsh punishment is an aggressive response to 
threatening groups, symbolises the support for traditional conventions and values and 
the importance of following authorities. Note, however, that given the high correlation 
between the RWA subscales, only correlations between the subscales of RWA and 
punitiveness were observed. It is also important to highlight that the close link between 
authoritarian aggression and punitiveness is far from surprising. It has been argued that 
most authoritarian aggression items refer either implicitly or explicitly to crime and 
punishment policies and that punishment is in itself an aggressive response to 
threatening groups. Excluding such items from the measurement of RWA provided 
clearer information regarding the extent to which punishment is related to preferences 
for conventions and beliefs about the importance of authorities.  
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Second, SDO predicted the support of harsh measures and this was the case 
regardless of whether authoritarian aggression items were included as part of the 
measurement of RWA. However, it should be noted that this study only considered 
items that did implicit –and not explicit- reference to crime and punishment issues. 
Previous studies might have included items that did explicit reference to crime and 
punishment issues and this could explain why RWA rendered the effect of SDO non-
significant.  
Third, the results were inconclusive in relation to the role of the subscales of 
SDO. In Paper 1, Study 1 found that both GBD and OEQ predicted punitiveness above 
and beyond the effect of RWA, while in Study 2 only GBD remained significant. Papers 
2 and 3 in this dissertation showed stronger effects of GBD than of OEQ. In both cases, 
only GBD had a significant effect after controlling for RWA. It is clear from this and 
other research (e.g. McKee & Feather, 2008) that group-based dominance is a more 
relevant predictor of punitiveness. This is likely to be due to the harshness of the items, 
but also to different reasons why group-based dominance and opposition to equality can 
be expected to predict the support of punitive measures. People high in SDO might 
perceive criminal offenders as competing for resources and support harsh punishment to 
establish a position of domination over them. It is less clear, however, if punishment is 
perceived as a way of justifying inequalities more broadly.  
Findings from Paper 4 provide further information into the inconsistent findings 
on the role of opposition to equality. Findings from Study 1 suggest that respondents are 
less consistent in completing opposition to equality items when they have no social 
group in mind: the reliability index for OEQ was considerably higher when respondents 
had criminal offenders in mind compared to social attitudes in general. The latter 
translated into a higher standard error and a non-significant effect of OEQ (controlling 
for RWA) even though the coefficient was quite high. The effect of OEQ on 
punitiveness was smaller but significant in the criminal offenders condition. These 
findings suggest that, first, general opposition to equality items are to some extent vague 
and respondents might think of different social groups when completing one or the other 
item. Second, it seems to be the case that supporting unequal conditions between law-
abiding citizens and criminal offenders increases the likelihood to support harsh 
punishment (or allows justifying it). Yet, attitudes towards inequalities in general seem 
to be far removed from perceptions about criminal offenders and less able to predict 
punishment. 
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SDO was a strong predictor of punitive attitudes when crime and punishment 
were somehow associated to competitive inter-group relations. However, there is one 
more issue that should be addressed. It might be argued that the effect of SDO is an 
artefact due to the harshness of its items. This is some people might answer positively to 
both SDO and punishment items given their strong nature. While part of the reason why 
high SDO individuals favour harsh punishment can without a doubt be associated to a 
harsh view on society and the way people deal with each other, findings that high SDO 
individuals favoured status and power restoration suggest that its effect cannot be 
reduced to a harshness factor.  
 
Q2. Why do people high in RWA and SDO endorse the harsh sentencing of 
criminal offenders? 
In line with a dual-motivational model of punitive attitudes, RWA and SDO are 
rooted in different motivations and should predict punitiveness for different reasons. 
People high in RWA are motivated to achieve collective security and they have been 
argued to favour punitive policies because punishment symbolises authority and order, 
and can be perceived as helping to restore value consensus and collective security. 
People high in SDO, on the other hand, are motivated to achieve power and dominance. 
They have been argued to favour punitive policies because punishment is an unequal 
institution and can help maintaining dominance over criminal offenders. Furthermore, 
they are unempathic and will lack concerns for the wellbeing of criminal offenders.  
Papers 1, 2 and 3 addressed the differential mediations of the effects of RWA 
and SDO on punitive attitudes. Paper 1 examined whether the effects of RWA and SDO 
on the support for harsh punishment were mediated by different beliefs about crime and 
criminals, as well as different symbolic motives of punishment (collective security 
restoration, and status and power restoration). Paper 2 looked at whether different 
symbolic motives mediated the effects of RWA and SDO on retributive punishment 
goals. Finally, Paper 3 explored the differential mediation of the effects of RWA and 
SDO via symbolic motives of punishment, although its aim was to examine whether this 
mediation became stronger when dangerous and competitive social conditions were 
primed. It was hypothesised that the effect of RWA on punitive attitudes and retributive 
goals of punishment would be mediated by perceiving crime as a threat to collective 
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security and punishment as a means to restore it (H1.4, H2.4, H3.2). The effect of SDO on 
harsh punishment and retribution, on the other hand, was hypothesised to be mediated 
by perceiving crime as a threat to hierarchies, by a lack of concern for criminal 
offenders and the perception that punishment can help restoring status and power 
relationships (H1.5, H2.5, H3.4).  
The findings of Paper 1, 2 and 3 show support in favour of the previously 
mentioned hypotheses. People high in SDO were found to favour harsh punishment and 
retribution because they were concerned about status and power hierarchies in society. 
The effect of SDO (in Paper 1, Study 1) was mediated by the perception that crime 
posed a threat to hierarchical relationships in society. Furthermore, the effect of GBD 
(in Paper 1, Study 2 and in Paper 3) was mediated by preferences for punishment to 
restore status and power relationships in society. Finally, in Paper 2, the effect of GBD 
on the support for a vengeful perspective on retribution was mediated by a status and 
power restoration motive. SDO was also related to a lack of concern for the wellbeing 
of criminal offenders and the latter mediated its effect on punitive attitudes (Paper 1, 
Study 1). Furthermore, SDO was completely unrelated to concerns about security and 
in-group conformity: SDO did not predict perceptions of crime threatening collective 
security and the support of punishment to restore values. This finding suggests that the 
role of SDO is specific to situations that imply status differentials between criminal 
offenders and law abiding citizens. It should not predict punitiveness towards high-class 
offenders or crime that does not affect higher social groups in society. Concerns about 
status and power are also more distant from issues commonly discussed in relation to 
punishment, such as perceptions of insecurity, threats to social cohesion and deviation 
from norms and values. People high in SDO should thus be less likely to perceive a 
crime situation as threatening to their values and motivations. Given their lack of 
empathy towards criminal offenders, however, they should have no problem to support 
the harshest punishment when they perceive an offense as damaging status differentials. 
People high in RWA, on the other hand, perceived crime as a threat to collective 
security and punishment and retribution as ways of restoring in-group conformity and 
order in society. RWA also predicted a lack of concern for the wellbeing of criminal 
offenders and the latter mediated its effect on punitiveness. Although only SDO was 
hypothesised to predict a lack of empathy towards criminal offenders, it is possible that 
the measure used for concerns about wellbeing of criminal offenders captured a general 
disliking of criminal offenders and the belief that justice should be tough on them. It is 
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difficult to distinguish conceptually and empirically between the support of harsh 
treatment with criminal offenders and a lack of care for their wellbeing. Future research 
should use a measure of empathy that allows a clearer distinction with harsh treatment.  
A second unexpected finding was that people high in RWA were also concerned 
about crime diffusing status boundaries (Paper 1, Study 1) and supported punishment 
and retribution to restore them (Paper 1, Study 2; Paper 2; Paper 3). This finding might 
be due to high RWA individuals also having a preference for living in societies that are 
structured hierarchically. It has also been argued that the stability and order of society 
can be threatened if criminal offenders gain influence (see in relation to prejudice, 
Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). Importantly, if criminal offenders gain power and status in 
society, this also disrupts traditional set-ups of society because tradition says that 
criminal offenders are at the bottom of society. Furthermore, powerful criminals –
considered to be dangerous and lacking moral conscience- might use their power to 
disrupt social order and stability. Basically, high RWA individuals might want to avoid 
power falling into the “wrong hands”. Harsh sentences, on the other hand, can reduce 
the potential for change and instability in the normative and hierarchical structures of 
society. Therefore, while both RWA and SDO predicted preferences for the restoration 
of power and status relationships, the underlying motives can be argued to be different. 
The latter was supported by the finding in Paper 3 that RWA became a strong predictor 
of power and status restoration when the conditions were primed to be dangerous. Thus, 
high RWA individuals might be motivated to avoid deviant groups gaining power and 
disrupting social order more than to establish a position of domination as such.  
RWA also had strong direct effects on punitiveness (Paper 1, Studies 1 and 2; 
Paper 2; Paper 3) above and beyond its mediation through concerns about crime and 
criminals and symbolic motives of punishment. This is people high in RWA endorsed 
punitiveness for reasons that go beyond the ones considered in these studies. One of 
these reasons might be the tendency of people high in RWA to support actions 
undertaken by legal authorities, regardless of the content of these actions. Tyler (2006) 
has noted that people who are supportive of authorities might give little weight to 
evidence of distributional unfairness. Similarly, high RWA’s might be concerned about 
proportionality and justice, but defer to the authorities decisions to use harsh 
punishment nonetheless. One open question is how high RWA individuals would react 
in a context where authorities and policies are lenient, raising more questions regarding 
the link between punitivity and confidence in the justice system.  
216 
 
Q3. Do people high in RWA and SDO support different retributive goals of 
punishment and attitudes towards the treatment of criminal offenders?  
The dual-motivational model also expects that RWA and SDO should predict 
different specific outcomes (‘differential effects hypothesis’, Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). 
The third question of this dissertation examined whether RWA and SDO predicted 
different retributive goals of punishment. Paper 2 started by exploring whether two 
dimensions of retribution could be distinguished. It hypothesised that one dimension 
captured preferences for getting back at the offender and making him suffer (retribution 
as revenge) and the other dimension was related to the belief that offenders should be 
allowed to compensate proportionally to their wrongdoing (retribution as just deserts, 
H2.1). SDO (H2.5) and a status restoration motive (H2.2) were expected to predict 
retribution as revenge, as the harsh and demeaning nature of revenge would help 
enforcing status boundaries with criminal offenders. Value restoration (H2.3) and RWA 
(H2.4) were hypothesised to be associated to retribution as just deserts as a proportional 
compensation of the offender would be more likely to enforce in-group conformity. 
RWA was also expected to predict retribution as revenge to the extent that punishment 
was exerted by legal authorities. Only retribution as revenge was expected to have a 
positive effect on harsh punishment and the denial of procedural fairness (H2.6, H2.7) as 
unfair treatment communicates that criminal offenders have low status within the social 
group (in line with procedural fairness theory, Lind & Tyler, 1988). This effect was 
predicted to be negative for retribution as just deserts as it assumes some basic 
commitment with fair procedures.  
The findings provided support for a dual-dimensional model of retribution and 
differential effects of RWA and SDO on punishment goals: a two-factor model had a 
better fit than a one-factor model. Furthermore, the two dimensions of retribution were 
predicted by different ideological attitudes and, in turn, predicted different 
consequences in terms of the treatment of criminal offenders. One dimension, referred 
to as retribution as revenge, comprised elements of getting even and making the 
offender suffer. A vengeful perspective on retribution leads to preferences for harsh 
punishment and the denial of due process for criminal offenders. As expected, the desire 
to restore status and power relationships in society was the strongest predictor of 
retribution as revenge, while both RWA and GBD were significant antecedents.  
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Previous research had found that GBD predicted personal revenge and the 
current research provided evidence that people high in GBD also favoured revenge 
undertaken by authorities. The common factor here seems to be the harshness of the 
response more than who exerts the punishment. While RWA had not been found to 
predict personal vengeance (McKee & Feather, 2008), it did predict vengeance 
undertaken by authorities. People high in RWA seem to be more concerned with who 
undertakes the punishment than with how the punishment is undertaken. 
A second dimension, retribution as just deserts, comprised elements of 
compensation and proportional punishment. As predicted, retribution as just deserts was 
predicted by the motivation to restore values in society and RWA. Unlike expected, 
however, status and power restoration also predicted just deserts. Interestingly, once 
revenge was controlled for, just deserts did not predict harsh punishment and its effect 
on the denial of fair procedures became negative. This is people who favour just deserts 
often also favour revenge. But at any one level of revenge, just deserts actually 
decreases the extent to which people seek to deny fair process and exclude the offender.  
The findings of Paper 2 suggest that people high in SDO and RWA support 
different punishment goals. High SDO individuals seek to clarify status boundaries and 
supported retribution as revenge to restore status and power hierarchies. High RWA 
individuals, on the other hand, are motivated to achieve in-group conformity and they 
were more likely to support punishment to restore values. As in Papers 1 and 3, RWA 
also predicted status and power restoration motives. It remains to be seen how high 
RWA and SDO individuals will react to retributive goals depending on how identified 
they feel with the offender. Previous research has suggested that people react in 
different ways to crime committed by in-group and out-group members. Even more 
importantly, identification with the criminal offender has been found to interact with 
ideological dispositions in predicting punitiveness (e.g. Kemmelmeier, 2005).  
As has been noted above, RWA had strong direct effects on both dimensions of 
retribution, as well as the support for harsh punishment and the denial of procedural 
fairness. Again, it seems that those high in RWA support harsh treatment to the extent 
that it is exerted by authorities. Paper 2 also provided some additional and interesting 
information. Namely, that high RWA individuals are indeed in favour of allowing 
criminal offenders to compensate proportionally to the harm done, and, hereby, favour 
the use of fair procedures. However, they also want revenge and support the denial of 
procedural fairness overall. The latter indicates that high RWA’s commitment to actions 
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undertaken by legal authorities, as well as their anger towards law-breaking, are 
stronger than they commitment to fair rules and procedures.  
Paper 2 finished with a discussion on the implications of considering the 
identification with the criminal offender. It argued that retribution as revenge might be 
more relevant to out-group offenders as it seeks to restore status differentials. 
Retribution as just deserts, on the other hand, is argued to be more important when the 
offence is committed by an in-group member, as it is more likely to lead to the 
restoration of values in the community.  
  
Q4. Under what circumstances do RWA and SDO predict punitiveness?  
The final question of this dissertation refers to the circumstances under which 
RWA and SDO predict preferences for harsh sentencing. Two perspectives were 
discussed. First, ideological dispositions were argued to interact with social conditions 
in affecting punitive attitudes. Second, and addressing a criticism posed by social 
identity and self-categorisation theorists (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006; Schmitt et al., 
2003), the extent to which RWA and SDO predict punitiveness might also depend on 
whether respondents have criminal offenders in mind when completing the scales. 
Paper 3 addressed the first of these perspectives by priming dangerous and 
competitive worldviews and evaluating the extent to which RWA and SDO interacted 
with these in predicting punitiveness. It was hypothesised that under a dangerous world 
condition RWA would be a stronger predictor of punitive attitudes (H3.1) and that this 
effect would be to a greater extent mediated by the motivation to restore values and 
security in society (H3.2). On the other hand, SDO was hypothesised to become a 
stronger predictor under a competitive world condition (H3.3) and its effect would be 
mediated to a greater extent by the motivation to restore status and power relationships 
in society (H3.4). 
Unlike predicted, RWA had a strong effect on punitiveness and this effect was 
mediated by the motivation to restore values and security, regardless of the 
experimental condition. However, and consistent with Paper 1, its effect was also 
mediated by the motivation to restore status and power, particularly under the dangerous 
world condition. In contrast to other research (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Dru, 2007; 
Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005; Thomsen et al., 2008) priming threat in this 
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study did not activate the effect of RWA on punitiveness. One possible explanation for 
this finding is that people high in RWA might be chronically primed to perceive the 
world and criminal offenders as being dangerous and to favour punishment to restore 
order and stability. This is consistent with research that has shown that people high in 
RWA are more likely to perceive a situation as threatening to the social order (e.g. 
Lavine et al., 2002). Another possibility for the lack of interaction is that the prime used 
did only activate perceptions of threat to security and not to the normative order. 
According to Stenner (2005), it is normative threat more than threat to security that 
activates authoritarian predispositions. This research sought to activate perceptions of 
the world being insecure as well as lacking social consensus, but it might have activated 
security more than conformity issues. 
In relation to SDO, only GBD and not OEQ was a significant predictor of 
punitiveness after controlling for RWA. Importantly, GBD predicted punitiveness only 
when the social conditions were primed to be competitive and its effect was mediated to 
a greater extent by status and power restoration motives. These findings are consistent 
with previous research showing that competitive social conditions or increased 
competition salience increase the effect of SDO on social attitudes (e.g. Pratto & Shih, 
2000). The lack of effect of GBD in the dangerous world and control conditions 
suggests that people high in GBD are not predisposed to perceive crime as threatening 
hierarchies in society and punishment as a way of restoring status and power 
relationships. GBD did, however, become an important predictor of punitiveness in the 
context of competition.  
Paper 4, on the other hand, examined the extent to which the effects of RWA 
and SDO depended on whether respondents had criminal offenders in mind when 
completing the scales. In Study 1, participants were primed to think about social 
attitudes in general or criminal offenders in particular before completing RWA and 
SDO scales. In Study 2, general measures of RWA and SDO, and a criminal offender-
specific measure of SDO were obtained. Since RWA items are conceptually more 
proximate to crime and punishment issues, RWA was hypothesised to predict 
punitiveness regardless of whether respondents had criminal offenders in mind when 
completing the scale or not (H4.1). In contrast, SDO items are far removed from crime 
and punishment issues and respondents are likely to think about other social groups 
when completing the scale. Thus, the effect of SDO –and of GBD, in particular- was 
hypothesised to be stronger when people completed items having criminal offenders in 
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mind (H4.2). In line with Sibley and Liu’s (2010) finding, however, a general measure of 
SDO was predicted to affect punitive attitudes over and above a criminal offender-
specific measure of SDO (H4.3). Finally, people high in SDO should be more likely to 
favour dominance and justify inequality over criminal offenders and the effect of 
criminal offender-specific SDO was hypothesised to mediate the effect of SDO on 
punitiveness (H4.4). 
The findings of Paper 4 showed that RWA had a strong effect on punitive 
attitudes regardless of whether respondents were primed to think about criminal 
offenders when completing the scale. This provides indication that people tend to think 
about crime and punishment issues when completing RWA items. Criminal offenders 
are an accessible group when thinking about in-group conformity and collective 
security. However, the effect of SDO –and of GBD in particular- was higher when 
respondents had criminal offenders in mind when completing the scales. Interestingly, 
given the lack of specificity of the SDO items, it seems to be easy to prime a specific 
social group, intentionally or not. A second possible reason why SDO was a weaker 
predictor in the social attitudes condition was a lack of consistency in people’s 
responses. In relation to OEQ, people were not very consistent in completing the items 
when they had no social group in mind. Given the increased standard error in the social 
attitudes condition, its effect was not significant. In the criminal offenders condition, on 
the other hand, the consistency was higher and the effect of OEQ became significant.  
Finally, the inconsistent findings in the literature regarding the effect of SDO 
might be explained in relation to the social group people had in mind when completing 
the SDO scale. As showed in this study, the mere fact of describing the study as being 
on criminal offenders seems to change people’s expectations and hereby the way in 
which they respond to SDO items. The effect of SDO can be expected to be higher 
when the study has been presented as being on crime and punishment, which also means 
that special care should be taken to avoid priming certain groups prior to measuring 
SDO (as argued by Sibley & Liu, 2010). 
Taken together, Papers 3 and 4 suggest that SDO and punishment do not 
naturally go together. This is neither is punishment easily related to inequality nor are 
SDO items responded having criminal offenders in mind. Importantly, once punishment 
is perceived in the light of competition, or when SDO items are completed in the light 
of crime and punishment issues, SDO does predict the support for harsher punitive 
responses. Interestingly, these findings provide evidence that part of punitiveness relates 
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to competitive desires to dominate over and justify unequal conditions for criminal 
offenders. 
  
4.2. Overview of findings 
Overall, the papers presented in this document provide partial support for a dual-
motivational model of punitive attitudes. Crucially, two ideological attitudes –RWA and 
SDO – were found to predict punitive attitudes, but they did so to some degree for 
different reasons and under different circumstances. The effect of RWA was 
widespread: its effect was mediated by concerns about collective security as well as 
status and power hierarchies, it predicted both retribution to achieve revenge and just 
deserts, and it was a strong predictor across experimental primes. Importantly, there 
seems to a clear affinity between RWA and punishment, and high RWA individuals 
seem to support punishment as it is undertaken by legal authorities.  The effect of SDO 
was more limited. First, only GBD was a consistent predictor and the effect of OEQ was 
more modest. Second, people high in SDO were concerned about status and power 
issues and not about collective security. Furthermore, they only sought to punish to take 
revenge and did not care about proportionality. Finally, a general measure of SDO did 
not seem to be relevant in predicting punitiveness. However, when crime was associated 
to competition, SDO predicted punitiveness. The same happened when people 
completed SDO items thinking about criminal offenders. Overall, preferences to 
establish domination over criminal offenders were a strong predictor of punitiveness. 
Yet, people high in SDO were not predisposed to perceive crime and punishment as 
issues of domination.  
A dual-motivational model has proved to be a powerful framework to 
understand attitudes towards harsh sentences. It has enabled us to disentangle two 
different routes to harsh punishment: one that seeks to address threats to in-group 
conformity and collective security and the other that seeks to restore status and power 
relationships. However, it should be noted that the distinction between these two routes 
is more ambiguous than one would hope. For example, the moderate to high correlation 
between RWA and SDO – and between status/power and values/security restoration 
motives – suggests that these different motivations to punish are often one and the same. 
Crime and punishment often confound dimensions that relate to status and security 
issues because criminal offenders are often low in status and also perceived to be 
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dangerous. This is at least the case for those ‘violent criminals’ that people seem to have 
in mind when completing surveys on crime and punishment. Furthermore, in 
hierarchical societies it is very likely that the justice system will penalise crimes 
committed by low status offenders and attempts to reduce inequalities are likely to be 
perceived by those high in RWA as a disruption to security and in-group conformity. 
More research is required to understand exactly when and under what circumstances 
people high in RWA and SDO will react in similar or different ways towards crime and 
punishment. 
 A second issue that should be addressed in relation to the dual-motivational 
model are the hypotheses proposed by Duckitt and Sibley (2009) to evaluate its 
adequacy: the differential mediation hypothesis, the differential effects hypothesis and 
the differential moderation hypothesis. While these hypotheses have been extremely 
useful to guide the different studies in this dissertation, it should be noted that they often 
do not allow clear separate evaluations. For example, while punishment goals were used 
to evaluate a differential effects hypothesis, they could also be used to evaluate different 
paths to harsh punishment. Notably, the extent to which some evaluations provide 
evidence in favour of one or the other hypothesis depends on the types of analysis 
conducted more than on the nature of the variables. As has been argued before, these 
hypotheses should be used to guide research more than to provide a set of requirements 
to be achieved.  
Overall, however, and despite the overlap in the effects of RWA and SDO, as 
well as in the propositions made by the different hypothesis, a dual-motivational 
perspective has provided a useful model to understanding the separate paths that lead 
high RWA and high SDO individuals to the support of harsh punitive attitudes.  
 
4.3. Limitations  
I should however address some limitations of this research. First, research 
conducted as part of a doctoral dissertation is often constrained by funding and timing 
issues. This research has not been the exception. The latter has translated into the use of 
online surveys and experiments, short versions of scales and the inability to validate 
new scales before using them. For example, experimental studies in Paper 3 and 4 
would have benefitted from a more controlled setting. It thus remains to be seen 
whether the effects found would be stronger –or just different – in a laboratory setting. 
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Likewise, many of the scales used in this research (for example, to measure perceptions 
of crime threatening collective security and hierarchies in Paper 1 and retributive 
punishment goals in paper 2) were designed specifically for this research. Others (such 
as symbolic motives of punishment in Papers 1, 2 and 3) were adapted from previous 
research (e.g. Okimoto et al., 2011) but shorter scales were used. This situation is far 
from ideal and one could think of ways in which this might have affected the results. In 
line with John Duckitt’s comments to Papers 1 and 3 in this dissertation, it has not been 
evaluated whether the scales of values, and power and status restoration motives show 
high discriminatory validity. And indeed, both scales were highly correlated in Papers 1 
(Study 2), 2 and 3. It is thus not clear whether RWA predicted the motive of status and 
power restoration given this lack of discrimination with value restoration.  
A second important limitation of the current research is its narrow scope. It has 
concentrated in a very specific question, which is often unavoidable in PhD research. 
This research has focused on understanding people’s preferences for harsh punishment 
regardless of the crime committed and specific information about the offender. The 
studies in this dissertation have measured punitive attitudes in relation to people’s 
agreement to statements such as ‘People who break the law should be given harsher 
sentences’. Whilst it is interesting to understand why people support such statements 
(and this is often how politicians and the media talk about the issue), it is also true that 
people react in different ways depending on the type of crime, the amount of 
information given and the specific situation of the criminal offender. First, previous 
findings (Roberts & Doob, 1990; Stalans, 2009) and findings of Paper 2 suggest that 
when asked to think about crime, people usually think of violent crime. Second, 
previous research has found a more punitive public when a violent crime is involved 
(Wanner & Caputo, 1987) and less punitive public when more information about the 
case is given (De Keijser & Elffers, 2009). Similarly, when the questions provide 
different alternative sentences such as rehabilitation, people do consider less harsh 
sentences (Cullen et al., 1988, 2000; Gelb, 2006; Hutton, 2005; Roberts & Hough, 
2005). The same reduction in punitiveness happens when using focus groups or 
deliberative polls instead of survey methodology (Hutton, 2005). Third, respondents are 
less punitive when confronted with cases of specific offenders (for a review see Cullen 
et al., 2000; Sprott, 1999; Stalans, 2009).  
These findings suggest that RWA and SDO will relate in different ways to the 
support of harsh punishment depending on the type of crime and information about the 
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criminal offender. People high in RWA seek to maintain collective security and they 
might be especially sensitive towards violent crime and crime committed by threatening 
groups or groups perceived as deviating for the in-groups norms and values (such as 
immigrants). They should be less punitive towards crimes condoned or committed by 
authorities. Consistent with this argument, Feather (1998) found that people high in 
right-wing authoritarianism were more punitive towards a green protester but less 
punitive towards a police officer.  
People high in SDO, on the other hand, seek to maintain power and dominance 
boundaries between groups and they might be especially sensitive towards crime 
perceived as giving power to lower social groups (such as theft and burglary) but not 
towards crime committed by higher social groups (such as white collar crime). 
Similarly, SDO might be a stronger predictor of punitiveness when the offender is 
perceived to belong to a subordinate group (such as unemployed people). Consistent 
with this argument, Kemmelmeier (2005) found that high SDO individuals assigned 
harsher sentences to Black defendants.  
Paper 2 in this dissertation addressed the type of crime people think about when 
completing measures on crime and punishment. Interestingly, controlling for whether 
respondents thought about violent crime did not change the findings. It did, however, 
predict people’s support for a status and power restoration motive and the support for 
harsh punishment.  However, more research is needed on the ways people with different 
ideological dispositions react to different types of crimes and offenders belonging to 
different social groups.  
 Finally, and most importantly, while the studies in this dissertation present 
strong evidence of the link between punitive attitudes, RWA and SDO, they provide 
weaker evidence into the motivational underpinnings of the support for harsh 
punishment. Papers 1, 2, and 3 link punitive attitudes to the symbolic motives of value 
and status restoration. The latter, however, are measured as the agreement with 
statements on the role of punishment and could be considered as justifications more 
than reflections of underlying motivations. It is not clear, for example, if high RWA’s 
arguing that crime is an important threat to collective security reflects a motivated 
information processing or rather beliefs that are inherent to authoritarian points of view. 
Paper 3 provides the strongest evidence into the motivational antecedents of 
punishment: high SDO individuals –who are motivated to achieve power and 
dominance in society- become punitive when punishment is presented in the context of 
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group-competition. More research is needed into the motivational processes that affect 
high RWA’s and high SDO’s appraisals of the threats posed by crime and their 
preferences for harsh punishment.  
 
4.4. Future research 
As is often the case, this research has opened more questions than it has 
answered. To finish, I would like to address perspectives that have not been the main 
focus of this dissertation but that might offer some explanation of the findings or 
propose directions for future research. I will focus on the following perspectives: 
intuitive moral judgments, social identity and self-categorisation theories, instrumental 
models of group conflict, just world and system justification theories. 
 
4.4.1 Intuitive moral judgments 
The current research has measured punitive attitudes and punishment goals 
directly. However, previous research has shown that respondents are not always aware 
of the reasons why they favour punishment. Carlsmith (2008) showed that while people 
endorsed utilitarian views, they assigned punishment in line with retributive factors 
(such as the seriousness of the offence). Furthermore, respondents seemed to agree to all 
possible justifications of their views on capital punishment (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983)1. 
These findings, added to the importance of moral outrage in predicting people’s 
responses to moral transgressions (e.g. Darley, 2009), suggest that punitive attitudes are 
intuitive more than completely reasoned (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001, 2007; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Robinson & Darley, 2007). People may have an intuition to 
punish and use the reasoning system to look for information to justify this intuition 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Meanwhile, studies have shown that people will be more 
likely to incur in corrective reasoning if they are intelligent, have high need for 
cognition, are exposed to statistical thinking (see Kahneman, 2003) or if their first 
                                               
1 Other studies have evidenced problems with self-reported measures in the context of research on fear of 
crime (Sutton & Farrall, 2005; Sutton, Robinson, & Farrall, 2011). Interestingly, higher levels of social 
desirability lead men –but not women- to report lower levels of crime (Sutton & Farrall, 2005). The same 
increase in fear of crime happened when men were instructed to respond questions on fear of crime 
depicting themselves in a good light (as opposed to answering honestly), while the opposite was true for 
women (Sutton et al., 2001). As with research on punitive attitudes, a number of factors seem to affect the 
way people report their attitudes on crime and punishment issues. 
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judgment is inconsistent with their ideological beliefs (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, 
Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002).  
These findings also have methodological implications. Arguing that people may 
show an intuitive desire to punish, while some may correct for this first intuition by 
using the reasoning system, suggests that two different concepts are at play. While the 
punitive intuition is a fast and automatic response to moral transgressions, a punitive 
attitude should consider people’s evaluation of whether this intuition is consistent with 
their beliefs. Oswald & Stucki (2009) proposed a two-process model of punishment, 
integrating both intuitive and rational processes. The authors suggest that people first 
make an automatic judgment about a norm violation, which mainly considers the 
seriousness of the action and which will tend to lead to moral outrage and a retributive 
response. A reasoned judgment will follow if the person has sufficient cognitive 
capacity and if he is held accountable for the judgment. They found that being induced 
to think less about the case and offences with high outcome severity were associated 
with harsher punishment recommendations. These findings may help explaining 
differences in punitiveness found using different measurements. For example, asking 
broad questions about the leniency of the courts or using surveys may lead people to 
give a fast answer and thus rely on their intuition to punish, while asking to assign 
sentences to specific cases or using focus groups or deliberative polls –and thus leading 
people to think more about the case- may increase the accessibility of people’s 
corrective reasoning system.  
The role of the intuitive system in punishment allocations suggests that more 
attention should be placed in understanding the emotional aspects of crime and 
punishment (De Haan & Loader, 2002; Freiberg, 2001). More research is required on 
how intuitive and reasoning systems lead people to adopt punitive attitudes and in 
particular, how they interact with people’s ideological dispositions in increasing 
punitiveness.  
 
4.4.2 Social identity and self-categorisation theories 
One important issue that has been only partly addressed in this dissertation refers 
to the identity and self-categorisation processes involved in the decision to support 
harsh punishment of criminal offenders. Crucially, people respond in different ways to 
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RWA and SDO items depending on the self-categorisation form that is salient and they 
show different punitive reactions to offenders when they are considered to be part of the 
in-group or the out-group (e.g. Feather & Souter, 2002). Social identity (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2010) and self-categorisation (Turner et al., 1994) 
theories provide a useful perspective to understand how identification with criminal 
offenders can affect the attitudes that high RWA and high SDO individuals hold 
towards harsh punishment.  
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2010) posits 
that individuals seek to form and maintain a positive social identity based on their in-
group membership. Importantly, when social identities are threatened, people will seek 
to restore identity by increasing positive differentiation along valued dimensions or by 
devaluating out-groups. The strength of the effect of social identification is such that the 
perception of belonging to different groups is enough to trigger intergroup 
discrimination and no real conflict of interests is necessary (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 
2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Furthermore, self-categorisation theory (Reicher et al., 
2010; Turner & Reynolds, 2010; Turner et al., 1994) has shown that people categorise 
their own self at various levels of abstraction (ranging from personal to social 
identities). Importantly, self-categorisation processes are flexible and context-
dependent. The way in which the self is categorised in a particular instance will affect 
the way in which people behave in a specific social context. Importantly, when a social 
identity –in opposition to personal identity- becomes salient, individuals tend to 
perceive themselves more as representing a specific social category and less in terms of 
their individual characteristics. It is thus crucial to understand the social-structural 
realities of how groups relate to each other and these considerations are central to justice 
research (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008).  
Self-categorisation might be important in at least two aspects. First, as discussed 
in Paper 4 of this dissertation, the salient self-categorisation affects the ways in which 
people complete RWA and SDO items and therefore the relevance of dispositional 
attitudes in predicting punitiveness. From a self-categorisation and social identity 
perspectives, people respond in different ways to SDO (e.g. Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006; 
Schmitt et al., 2003; Turner & Reynolds, 2003) and RWA (Lehmiller & Schmitt, 2006) 
items depending on the social group they have in mind. Paper 4 of this dissertation 
applied this argument to the case of criminal offenders. In particular, it evaluated 
whether people responded in different ways to RWA and SDO items if the survey was 
228 
 
introduced as being on social attitudes in general or criminal offenders, in particular. 
Results showed that in particular for SDO, stronger effects were found when people 
responded items having criminal offenders in mind (Study 1). Furthermore, a criminal 
offender-specific measure of SDO was a stronger predictor of punitiveness than a 
general measure of SDO.  
Second, people also seem to react in different ways depending on whether the 
offender is perceived to be part of the in-group or an out-group. In-group offenders, on 
the one hand, are expected to agree with common values and disagreement can 
undermine the identity of the group. Two solutions are possible to protect the identity of 
the group: people might show positive bias towards in-group offenders and seek to 
increase value agreement and rehabilitate the offender, or they might exclude the 
offender from society (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010), which is often referred to as ‘the 
black sheep effect’. Consistent with the latter option, some studies (e.g. Feather & 
Souter, 2002; Marques, 1990) have found stronger reactions to norm violations 
committed by in-group members. 
Out-group members, on the other hand, can be perceived in terms of a 
competitive relationship. Since they are not expected to agree with the norms and values 
of the in-group, it is less important to restore the out-group member’s values, and status 
and power restoration motives will be more important (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2010; 
Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2010). Consistent with these assumptions, 
Okimoto and Wenzel (2010) found stronger retributive reactions for out-group members 
threatening the status and power of the nation (in-group favoritism) and stronger 
reactions to in-group members threatening common values (‘black sheep effect’). In line 
with this argument, this dissertation has argued that a vengeance perspective of 
retribution and the denial of procedural fairness might be especially relevant for out-
group offenders, while for in-group offenders just deserts and value restoration 
perspectives should be more relevant. However, more research is required on the latter. 
The perceived social identity of the offender might not only affect punitive 
reactions directly, it might also interact with dispositional variables. Kemmelmeier 
(2005) found stronger support for the punishment of Black defendants among high SDO 
individuals, while low SDO individuals were more punitive towards White defendants. 
This is perceiving the offender as part of a disadvantaged out-group might lead people 
high in SDO to support punishment as a way of enhancing inequalities. On the contrary, 
egalitarian people may want to compensate for discrimination that is usually directed at 
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minority groups. Similary, Green et al. (2009) found that high SDO individuals tended 
to show more negative reactions to an offender portrayed as being part of an out-group 
(Arab offender), while low SDO individuals had stronger reactions when he was 
portrayed as being part of the in-group (Swiss offender).  
The extent to which respondents categorise themselves in opposition to criminal 
offenders seems to be crucial in explaining their reactions. It is not always clear, 
however, whether people will categorise the offender as being part of the in-group or an 
out-group. This comparison might be straightforward when considering offenders from 
a minority group (such as immigrant offenders). However, do people consider burglars 
as being part of the out-group? And what happens with white collar criminals? More 
research is required to understand the circumstances under which criminal offenders 
will be categorised as members of an out-group, as well as understanding the impact 
that this categorisation  has on people’s preferences to punish.    
 
4.4.3 Instrumental models of group conflict 
The extent to which people favour punitive reactions against criminal offenders 
might not only depend on whether they are perceived as members of an out-group. It 
might also depend on whether negative interdependence and conflicting goals are 
perceived between different groups. Instrumental models emphasise how negative 
attitudes and behaviours are meant to remove sources of competition by convincing 
oneself or others that the competition lacks worth or by taking away opportunities and 
benefits from them (Esses et al., 2001). First, realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 
1965; Jackson, 1993; Sherif, Harvey, Hood, Sherif, & White, 1961) has highlighted 
how conflicts of interest between groups lead to intergroup conflict. Groups are likely to 
compete for resources in particular when there is resource scarcity or real or imagined 
threats to economic interests, status and safety, among others. Second, an extended 
version of realistic group conflict theory, the unified instrumental model of group 
conflict (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2005), also posits that group competition 
for resources, wealth and dominance in society is central to understanding negative 
attitudes towards out-groups. Consistent with this model Esses and collaborators (Esses 
et al., 2001; see also Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998) found more negative attitudes 
towards immigrants among Canadian respondents in a competitive condition (difficult 
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job market and highly skilled immigrants) and among respondents high in SDO. 
Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby and Hansen (2007) provided further support for the 
argument that increased competition affects attitudes towards out-groups. The authors 
primed competition and observed higher levels of prejudice in an unrelated intergroup 
context, suggesting that competition can also be carried over to an unrelated out-group.  
However, according to this instrumental model, the extent to which people 
perceive competition depends on situational factors (resource scarcity or the salience of 
competitive out-groups) as well as ideological dispositions (RWA and SDO). Cohrs and 
Stelzl (2010) highlighted that an instrumental model of group conflict resembles a dual-
motivational model of ideological attitudes in arguing that ideological dispositions are 
key in understanding negative attitudes towards the group and that they interact with 
competition and threat in predicting attitudes. The authors point out, however, that these 
approaches differ in that the conceptualisation of Esses et al. (2005) relates to concerns 
for social conformity, while Duckitt (2001) also considers collective security issues.  
Of particular importance for instrumental models of group conflict are zero-sum 
beliefs, this is the belief that gains of resources or power for one group result in loss for 
the other (Esses et al., 2001). Zero-sum beliefs can be argued to be important when it 
comes to crime. Garland (2001) has proposed a zero sum fallacy according to which 
criminals and crime victims are negatively interlinked: the worse the treatment of 
criminal offender the more it helps victims. Similarly, zero-sum beliefs might be 
relevant to explain conflict with criminal offenders, as power and resources gained by 
criminal offenders can be perceived to take away power and resources from the rest of 
society. Perceiving criminal offenders as competing for resources and power is likely to 
lead to negative attitudes and punitive measures. This is particularly important for high 
SDO individuals who are more likely to hold zero-sum beliefs and perceive out-groups 
as competing for resources (Sidanius et al., 2004).  
This dissertation has provided evidence that part of people’s perceptions of 
crime and punishment relate to issues of competition for power and dominance over 
criminal offenders, but only for some groups of people and under certain circumstances. 
Paper 1 (Study 1) showed that high SDO and high RWA individuals were more likely to 
perceive criminal offenders as trying to gain power and resources over society and the 
latter mediated the effect of ideological dispositions on punitive attitudes. Similarly, 
people high in SDO and RWA were also more likely to favour punishment to demean 
the offender’s status and humiliate him (Paper 1, Study 2). Paper 3 provided evidence 
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that high SDO individuals were especially concerned about group-based dominance 
over criminal offenders when the social context was primed to be competitive. Paper 4, 
on the other hand, showed that an adaptation of SDO to measure group-based 
dominance over criminal offenders was a strong predictor of punitiveness. In line with 
an instrumental model of group conflict, therefore, perceptions of competition with 
criminal offenders seem to lead to preferences for harsh sentencing. The current 
dissertation did not, however, find direct effects of priming competition (Paper 3) and 
individual differences seemed to be more important. Further research is required to 
evaluate whether stronger primes of competition and their interaction with dispositional 
variables predict zero-sum beliefs with criminal offenders and stronger support for 
harsh criminal sentencing.  
A second important question that remains to be addressed is whether people are 
likely to perceive criminal offenders as competition in the first place. For this to happen, 
criminal offenders need to be seen as part of an out-group but similar enough to be 
interested in the same resources and have the power to potentially take away resources 
from the rest of society (Esses et al., 2001). More research is needed to address the 
circumstances under which people will perceive criminal offenders as competing for 
resources and power with the rest of society. 
 
4.4.4 Just world and system justification theories 
Finally, I would like to address possible interpretations of the current research 
and its findings from the viewpoint of just world and system justification theories. Just 
world theory (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; see also Furnham, 2003; Hafer & 
Bègue, 2005) maintains that people have a motivation to believe that the world is just 
and that everyone gets what they deserve. Believing that the world is just enables people 
to live their lives with confidence and trust in the future. Crucially, people go to great 
lengths to find evidence that the world is fair and just. When confronted with an 
innocent victim, people tend to search for ways of restoring justice and will even 
derogate the victim to convince themselves that misfortune will not happen to them. 
Importantly, research (Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996; see also Bègue & Bastounis, 
2003; Sutton & Douglas, 2005; Sutton & Winnard, 2007) has shown that two different 
beliefs are at play: the belief that the world is just to others and the belief that the world 
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is just to the self. On the one hand, believing that the world is just to the self can be 
understood as a coping strategy and it is associated to higher levels of life satisfaction 
(Lipkus et al., 1996; Sutton & Douglas, 2005) and confidence in the achievement of 
goals (Sutton & Winnard, 2007). On the other hand, believing that the world is just to 
others is a general interpretation of the social world and has been found to be related to 
harsh attitudes towards the poor (Sutton & Douglas, 2005; Bègue & Bastounis, 2003), 
higher delinquent intentions and lower confidence in achieving socially legitimate goals 
(Sutton & Winnard, 2007), among others. 
Closely related to just world theory, system justification theory points out that 
people are in general motivated to believe that the arrangements are legitimate and fair 
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Unlike just world 
theory, however, system justification focuses on how people adopt ideologies that allow 
justifying and rationalising the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). According to Jost 
and Hunyady (2005), system justification theory departs from just world theory by 
contemplating a wider range of causes (e.g. situational and dispositional) and 
consequences (e.g. for intergroup relations and justice) of the belief in the legitimacy of 
the status quo. One interesting proposition of this theory is that system justification 
ideologies serve a palliative function of decreasing anxiety, uncertainty and negative 
affect (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). 
The belief in a just world –particularly the belief in a just world to others- and 
the tendency to justify the system might be relevant to punitive attitudes to the extent 
that they affect people’s attributions of blame and responsibility to victim and offenders. 
Blaming the victim for their own misfortune and punishing the offender can both be 
thought of as mechanisms to restore justice in society (in the words of just world theory) 
and legitimise and rationalise the status quo (in the words of system justification 
theory). Interestingly, punishing criminal offenders might reduce the discomfort of 
perceiving the world as unfair. Consistent with this argument, previous research has 
found associations between the belief in a just world and desires for punishment 
(Carroll et al., 1987; Bègue & Bastounis, 2003). Goldberg et al. (1999), on the other 
hand, showed that respondents increased punitive responses of an unrelated crime when 
a previous injustice elicited anger. In a similar vein, Hafer (2000) measured 
participant’s latencies in responding to different words and showed that they were 
slower in responding to justice-related words after viewing an innocent victim, but only 
when the crime went unpunished. She concluded that innocent victims threatened 
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justice beliefs, and punishment helped restoring justice. These findings are consistent 
with Tetlock et al.’s (2007) motivational perspective on punitive attitudes, according to 
which people disengage from a prosecutorial mindset when they perceive that norm 
violations have been punished.  
 The findings of this dissertation suggest that supporting harsh punitive measures 
can help restoring justice and justifying the system. First, punishment can help 
justifying current values and norms by communicating that the offender’s acts were 
wrong. Paper 1 provided evidence that people favour punitive attitudes because they 
perceive crime as a threat to moral values and security (Study 1), and because 
punishment can help restoring consensus (Study 2). Second, punishment could arguably 
also help justifying social inequalities in that punishing low-status criminal offenders 
communicates that disadvantaged people that commit crime deserve their place in 
society. Paper 1 of this dissertation also provided evidence that people favoured harsh 
punishment because they perceived that criminal offenders were gaining power over 
society (Study 1) and because punishment could restore status and power relationships 
(Study 2). In a similar way, harsh punishment can also increase beliefs about the world 
being just, by communicating that everyone receives what they deserve. 
 Further research could explore the system justifying function of punishment and 
evaluate whether supporting punitive attitudes serves a palliative function. Previous 
research has provided initial –yet indirect- indication that observing a crime being 
punished can reduce perceptions of injustice (Hafer, 2000) and anger (Goldberg, Lerner, 
& Tetlock, 1999). More research is needed on whether hearing about a crime being 
punished decreases negative affect in general and whether it does so for individuals with 
different motivational goals. Importantly, applying harsh punishment might decrease 
negative affect for those who value social order and value consensus, but less so for 
those who are concerned about respecting human rights. Such research would provide 
further evidence into the motivational antecedents of punishment. 
 
4.5. A final word 
This dissertation has highlighted the importance of considering ideological 
preferences in understanding people’s punitive reactions to criminal offences. 
Consistent with Tetlock and collaborator’s (Tetlock, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2007) 
prosecutorial mindset, from a motivated social cognition perspective people are 
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motivated to punish because they seek to uphold the social order and restore collective 
security. In line with a dual motivational model of punitive attitudes (Duckitt, 2009) I 
have argued that punishment may also serve a second motivational goal: that of 
maintaining hierarchies in society assuring that criminal offenders ‘stay in the place 
where they belong’.  
The findings of this dissertation suggest that there are two important drives of 
people’s support for harsh punishment. First, some people might perceive crime as a 
threat to social cohesion and security, and criminal offenders as immoral, dangerous and 
deviant. Here, punitiveness is driven by the motivation to increase social order and in-
group conformity. This drive is more typical of those who are motivated to achieve 
collective security, such as high RWA individuals. Second, crime can also be perceived 
as a threat to the hierarchical structure of society and criminal offenders as an inferior 
group that is trying to gain power and influence over superior groups. Punitive attitudes 
can also be driven by motivations to restore the status quo in status and power 
hierarchies in society. High SDO individuals are more likely to take this root to 
punitiveness, although this is likely to be the case only when criminal offenders are 
perceived as competing for power and resources.  
Most criminological research so far has criticised instrumental models of justice 
from a Durkheimian point of view (1964; 1973). Crucially, crime and punishment are 
argued to be moral phenomena: criminal offenders threaten social bonds and 
punishment restores social order and value consensus. In this dissertation I have argued 
that crime and punishment not only address social order in relation to achieving 
normative consensus, they also allow maintaining hierarchical structures in society. The 
criminal justice system can therefore be argued to fulfil two functions in society: it 
reduces the potential for change in the normative order and helps maintaining 
hierarchical structures in society.  
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